404. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

978. At Nhouy Abhay’s request I called on him morning 22nd one hour before important Cabinet meeting which will discuss RLG terms for agreement to coalition government. Nhouy obviously desirous obtain US position before going into Cabinet meeting.

I first set forth at length US position on four import licenses along lines Department instruction (Deptels 762 and 7572). Said if [Page 860] Prime Minister will give satisfactory reply our letter (Embtel 9633) I will instruct Director USOM release funds at once for Army. Nhouy will transmit information to Prime Minister and I expect this problem be settled this weekend.

Re coalition government, I explained that US fundamentally opposed and that if RLG proceeds with plan it will undoubtedly lead to reevaluation US policy. We will take into account not only mere fact formation such government, but also portfolios given to PL, technical details how RLG intends implement dissolution PL movements, military integration and restoration RLG authority over two provinces. Stressed that if it became apparent RLG could not control PL once integrated into national community, that Laos on way lose its independence, that continuance US aid could not prevent this, then we would conclude aid should no longer be forthcoming.

Re import licenses, Nhouy replied that he will transmit information to Prime Minister. Personally he is satisfied severe US action this problem showed up importance avoid shady deals and will therefore have salutary effect. However, Army must be paid and therefore he is pleased problem on way to settlement.

Re coalition government, Nhouy pointed out RLG is not going in blindfolded. Detailed plan has already been worked out by government which calls for:

(1)
Immediate dissolution PL “organization”,
(2)
Placing at disposal RLG general staff all PL fighting units and their matériel,
(3)
Immediate re-establishment RLG administration in two provinces,
(4)
That this settlement applies Article 19 of Geneva Agreement which implies withdrawal ICC from Laos and that henceforth all questions become internal problems. Nhouy stated propaganda units, RLG military, provincial governors and police have either already been alerted or will be in immediate future to get ready for their respective roles once agreement signed.

Nhouy then asserted that for this kind of solution Prime Minister disposes of majority both in Cabinet and Assembly, but should Souvanna want to make basic concessions from this plan, he would no longer have their support.

Coalition government is only temporary and will permit RLG and PL show their good faith live up obligations. If Souvanna does not adhere to agreement once accepted by making further concessions, [Page 861] it would lead to his downfall and new majority could be found in Assembly. Under present conditions there is nobody to replace him at helm of government. If PL show their bad faith, however, ANL and police can undertake military action which Nhouy claims ANL is prepared to do. Once ICC out of way, there is nobody to interfere. Should ANL be opposed by Viet Minh volunteers or regular forces, problem would become international. In that case, Nhouy told me in strictest confidence RLG plans to first refer to agreements already signed with Viet Minh such as September Declaration in Hanoi wherein Viet Minh agree that PL problem is internal and to apply Five Principles. If that should fail, RLG would appeal to UN. Finally, Nhouy asserted as last resort RLG could appeal to SEATO for assistance. Nhouy asked me to keep this information secret.

Entire conversation was most cordial and I assured him again before leaving that US does not want to forsake Laos if Laos will take necessary steps to safeguard its own independence.

Nhouy did not specify when Souvanna might put coalition issue before Assembly, but we believe it will be in coming week.

Parsons
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2256. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, and Ottawa and passed to Young at USUN.
  2. In telegrams 762 and 757, December 21 and 20, respectively, the Department and ICA authorized the Embassy to release funds for the Lao National Army for December on the condition that the Royal Lao Government submit a letter and give oral assurances that it would work more closely with USOM on import procedures in the future. (Ibid., 751J.00/12–2156 and 033.51J11/12–2056, respectively)
  3. In telegram 963, December 20, the Embassy noted that Souvanna Phouma’s reply of December 20 on the question of import procedures was not entirely satisfactory, but the Embassy suggested that it would be advantageous to settle the suspended funds matter before National Assembly debate on the Pathet Lao settlement. (Ibid., 751J.00/12–2056) A summary of Souvanna’s letter of December 20 is in telegram 962, December 20, not printed. (Ibid.)