Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

400. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 27, 1956—7 p.m.

835. Department pass USUN/NY for Kenneth Young. Ref Deptel 612.² I gave Prime Minister afternoon 27th our unfavorable reply to his proposal bring 2 or 3 Pathet Lao into Cabinet in exchange for written agreement promising restoration of RLG authority in north and reintegration PL national community.

Before taking this up, I told Souvanna that funds for November–December support military budget (Icato 460³) had been received and there was, therefore, no reason fear further unintentional delay such as occurred October.

I told Souvanna my government’s response included 3 points: First of all, an unfavorable reply to his proposal, second, our opinion that governmental crisis now would not be in national interest and third, that mindful of his inability leave Laos when important problems pending, nevertheless, we thought it useful and possible agree on date for unofficial discussions Washington should his duties permit him be in New York for GA early next year. I then gave Prime Minister aide-mémoire in close translation reftel. I included last operative paragraph reftel to assure use could not be made of document to claim US seeking upset him and also to emphasize our continuing desire reach constructive solution mutual problems.

Prime Minister’s first remark was that he was deeply disappointed (navre). He then remarked that it had been an effort worth making. However, there were other and more important problems which were occupying him now, and it would therefore be best leave aside PL problems for present. Somsanith⁴ was returning tomorrow and it would be necessary meet with him and several other unspecified ministers on these other important problems, one of which he subsequently identified as conflict between National Congress and Crown in which Souvanna is caught in middle. He then said he might have to request Katay’s immediate return Vientiane (perhaps because National Congress yesterday voted that Katay was to blame for “misinterpreting” Congress work to government which in turn misinformed Crown).

Earlier in talk, it was necessary for me explain why we still continued believe PL dangerous to national safety. I repeated usual arguments such as

(1) Communist change of tactics from armed force in north to political overt and covert action throughout country would be spearhead by PL and

(2) continuing Commie-like tactics selling their willingness negotiate all over again for further concessions on neutrality, etc. Apart from foregoing, I said it was impossible for my government believe that movement which so many Lao had themselves branded as Communist as recently as May could have reformed by November. For instance, Prime Minister himself had introduced Sisouk at large meeting May 27 as person best qualified to speak on this problem. Sisouk had proceeded brand PL movement very frankly and I quoted extracts including Sisouk’s description of Vietminh financial support for PL effectives. In this connection, I asked who had paid and was still paying PL effectives in north now, and wondered what effect this had had on their loyalty. Prime Minister had nothing new or particularly persuasive to say in answer foregoing but said in many long talks with his brother, Souphanouvong, he had become convinced he was not Communist and genuinely desired come back to fold. He then asked me if other Lao Ministers had not told me same thing.

I told Souvanna other Ministers had indeed said they not sure he was Communist and also that he sincerely wanted to return to national community. Nevertheless, it seemed unreasonable to me to be dissident one moment and Cabinet Minister the next, particularly as PL had thus far given no discernible proof their good faith. Souvanna said question of face involved and it therefore necessary make allowances. I said I understood this but he should remember US support dependent on public and congressional view of events in Laos. Souphanouvong and PL widely branded in US as Communists, in part on basis statement of Lao themselves such as I had quoted. If now US Congress were to read Souphanouvong taken into Cabinet, ready conclusion would be Laos was compromising itself with Communists. Souvanna said he could understand our viewpoint.

In separate telegrams tomorrow⁵ will report conversations with British, French and Canadian representatives whom I have briefed on recent discussions which culminated in today’s refusal to go along with Souvanna’s proposal. For moment I have no comment other than that Souvanna: (1) Showed no rancor and was reasonable throughout, (2) gave no hint of resigning because of PL problem, (3) spoke only in terms of thinking of what do next when he returned to this problem. He made no commitment but I would be surprised if coalition idea is not shelved as impractical in present circumstances.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2756. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Ottawa, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, New Delhi.
2. Document 397.
3. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, ICA Message Files: FRC 58 A 403, Box 33, Vientiane)
4. Prince Somsanith.
5. Telegrams 843 and 847 from Vientiane, both dated November 28, neither printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2856)