Office of the Historian

401. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 7, 19561

Washington, December 7, 1956

SUBJECT

  • Laos

PARTICIPANTS

  • His Excellency Katay D. Sasorith, Deputy Prime Minister of Laos
  • His Excellency Ourot R. Souvannavong, Ambassador of Laos
  • The Secretary of State
  • William J. Sebald, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
  • Patricia M. Byrne, FE/SEA
[Page 851]

At his own request, His Excellency Katay D. Sasorith, Deputy Prime Minister of Laos and Chief of the Lao Delegation to the Eleventh United Nations General Assembly, called on the Secretary at 10:45 a.m.

The Secretary began by saying he remembered with pleasure his visit to Vientiane in February 1955 and his interesting exchange of views with Katay. He remarked that Laos seemed still to be struggling with the same problems as at that time. Katay agreed, and went on to say that as a responsible Lao leader and in the name of the Royal Government he wished to thank the Secretary for the United States’ generous aid to Laos. Laos was deeply aware of American support.

The Secretary replied that the United States was always ready to support Laos in its efforts to resist Communist encroachment, but that it could not take the place of Laos’ own will to defend its independence. Primary responsibility lay with Laos, not the United States. As he had stated in Vientiane, the United States through SEATO would come to Laos’ defense in the event of aggression if invited to do so. Laos could rely on us to be faithful to our promises, even if, as we had shown in the United Nations, being faithful to our promises was contrary to the interests of our traditional allies. We had two commitments: 1) Not to undertake aggression ourselves, and 2) to oppose aggression against our friends with all our power. It was difficult to break with one’s friends. Therefore, the fact that we were faithful to our promise to oppose aggression even when this placed us in opposition to our friends was sure testimony that we would be faithful to our promise to resist the aggression of our enemies.

The Deputy Prime Minister responded with the statement that Laos was absolutely certain it would be defended in the event of Communist aggression. Without the Manila Pact Communist actions in Asia would be far worse, but now they were deterred by their fear of SEATO.

Hungary, said the Secretary, revealed the true Communist colors. They tried to entice with their promises of economic aid and their pledges not to intervene in internal affairs, but once they got a foot in, there was no way to get them out. They employed all possible means to maintain smaller states within their tight grasp.

The conversation ended at 10:55 a.m.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–756. Secret. Drafted by Byrne on December 10 and cleared by Kocher and Sebald.↩