397. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
612. Vientiane 809 repeated Paris 170 London 148 Saigon 193 pouched other addressees.2 Concur we cannot support Souvanna’s [Page 845] plan take PL into Cabinet but that negative response should be tempered insofar possible. Request you convey following Prime Minister:
U.S. has carefully considered Souvanna request American support for his proposal give PL two or three Cabinet positions in return written PL agreement permit restoration RLG authority two provinces and integration PL into national community. Because of firm U.S. conviction PL are Communist appendage Viet Minh and past painful experience with other attempts meet Communists half-way through coalition government, U.S. unable respond favorably Prime Minister’s appeal for support. Since U.S. continues strongly believe entrance Communists into Cabinet would threaten Lao independence, U.S. considers it would violate own principles if it gave approval to potentially dangerous arrangement.
Moreover Geneva Agreement recognizes RLG sovereignty throughout Lao territory; PL are dissidents and therefore suppliants in reintegration negotiations. It consequently appears to U.S. that PL not RLG should demonstrate good faith. First essential is full detailed unequivocal agreement on restoration RLG authority two provinces and reintegration PL into national community. Acceptance PL into Cabinet now on other hand would represent unnecessary sacrifice RLG assets in return unenforceable commitment re subsequent PL fulfillment Geneva terms. Letter November 13 therefore still stands.
U.S. distressed learn Government crisis threatens over issue PL participation Cabinet. U.S. not aware PL of such stature and influence as be able provoke RLG crisis, which U.S. considers should be avoided in best interests Laos. Stable government patently required this important period Lao history.
At your discretion you might add Department believes might be useful discuss with Souvanna various Lao problems of mutual concern our two countries. Prime Minister was unable come Washington November 19 and 20 owing pressing issues requiring his presence Vientiane, but if situation permits him leave Laos attend UNGA early next year perhaps convenient time for informal unofficial visit Washington could be worked out.
FYI: We do not wish under any circumstances make statement implying possible acquiescence inclusion PL in Cabinet at any time, nor do we wish make plea Souvanna remain office too personal, even though we heed views sound leaders like Nhouy.
Agree you should discuss recent developments Vientiane with British French Canadians, at your discretion informing them U.S. position. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2156. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne, cleared with Kocher and Murphy, and approved by Sebald. Repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Paris, and London, and to USUN for Young who was Senior Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.↩
- Supra.↩