393. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
556. Vientiane 712 repeated Paris 142 London 117 Saigon 158 Bangkok Phnom Penh Ottawa Unnumbered.2 We fully share your [Page 836] concern over rapid Lao drift toward formal relations with Communist Bloc and continuing concessions to PL. Despite friendly Western advice and constant RLG protestations desire defend independence, RLG seems bent on making moves which ignore Communist performance elsewhere in world and which give unnecessarily privileged and therefore dangerous position to Communist PL. As you have pointed out whether PL do or do not want settlement it clear RLG should stand firm.
Request you inform Crown Prince next personal interview we are worried that, though many Lao leaders profess awareness intentions and menace of Communists, accommodation in international sphere and last-minute yielding in domestic negotiations seemingly go on unchecked. RLG–PL neutrality agreement including prospective multiplicity contacts Communist Bloc is case in point;3 safeguards for RLG position now secret, public effect here will consequently be unfavorable, and once more concession is made to PL opinion while that of Free World apparently disregarded. We recognize some RLG actions taken for tactical reasons but as Crown Prince stated Singapore there no meeting Communists half way since they never appeased.
At your discretion you may also inform (in writing if you so desire) Crown Prince Souvanna and other leaders you deem appropriate that U.S. wishes make its position clear in advance in order preclude any future misunderstandings: Namely that it may be obliged reappraise its political and economical policy toward Laos if developments occur which in U.S. view might jeopardize Laos’ prospects as independent state such as: 1) PL participation coalition government 2) integration PL troops in such numbers or in such manner as to imperil integrity Army 3) acceptance Chinese Communist or other Communist Bloc economic or technical assistance and missions 4) accumulation seemingly minor concessions to Communists which in our view would in their totality destroy Laos’ ability preserve its independence. Believe inadvisable you mention Cambodia but if Lao argue Cambodian neutrality did not result alteration U.S. policy you might state temper U.S. changing owing recent developments around world.
FYI: Department increasingly alarmed over steadily weakening attitude Lao Cabinet under Souvanna leadership and simultaneously improving position PL–Viet Minh. Where is situation leading? Vagaries, inconsistencies and about-faces RLG incline us believe U.S. Government [Page 837] should insure no responsible Lao authority left uncertain our position.
By foregoing we are in sense anticipating increasingly adverse Congressional and public reaction re Laos after U.S. elections when more attention will be given foreign affairs.
We steadily whittling away Cambodian program though not in manner or extent as to push Cambodia over to Communist side. But while gradual reduction aid may work Cambodia, owing its lack common border with Communists and greater ability finance own needs, we feel preventive action necessary Laos. Its exceptional vulnerability means Communists must if possible be barred at gate since successful control after their entry doubtful. End FYI.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–556. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Young and Byrne, cleared with Kocher and Sebald, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, London, Ottawa, and New Delhi.↩
- In telegram 712, November 5, Parsons expressed concern over the situation in Laos. (Ibid.)↩
- According to telegram 704 from Vientiane, November 2, the joint political commission agreed on November 1 to a policy of neutrality for Laos highlighted by diplomatic relations with all countries regardless of ideology and acceptance of all economic aid to Laos granted without strings. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–256)↩