Office of the Historian

392. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson1

Washington, November 7, 1956.

SUBJECT

  • Preventive Action in Laos

I am again sending you the attached telegram2 on Laos which I was unable to discuss with you yesterday, but which I hope we can talk about tomorrow, November 8, at the meeting scheduled for 12 noon.3

Something must be done now to stop, if possible, the unfavorable trend in Laos. CIA agrees with our assessment that the situation is deteriorating and that negotiations with the Pathet Lao are being handled in a naive and slipshod manner. Despite efforts of Western powers at extending friendly advice to Lao leaders, particularly Souvanna Phouma, there seems to be an almost inexorable drift, probably unintentional on the Royal Government’s part, toward dangerous compromise of its independence.

We have thus far confined our representations to expressions of concern over possible developments such as coalition government, Communist aid, and large-scale uncontrolled integration of Pathet Lao troops. These expressions of concern have been noted but unheeded. I am afraid the Lao position may erode beyond remedy unless we try to check it with strong action ahead of time. We have never threatened to withdraw aid on the exceedingly sound premise that we should not threaten unless we were prepared to carry through. Being prepared to carry though is a most serious step indeed, but I feel we must face this issue now before it is too late.

Preventive action, involving a threat we would follow up if need be, is required in Laos now to pull blithe leaders up short and to strengthen the hand of those who like us, are concerned at the recent [Page 835] flirting with Communism. Laos is too “soft” to permit us to see the establishment of Communist missions in Vientiane and the installation of Pathet Lao in positions facilitating their subversion of the country. Laos’ exceptional vulnerability means the Communists must if possible be barred at the gate since successful control after their entry would be difficult if not impossible.

I therefore recommend that, as suggested in my general policy memorandum on Laos which I sent you in September,4 we make our position known in advance in terms responsible Lao authorities can understand. We should tell them that we may be obliged to reappraise our policy toward Laos, including the possible suspension of aid, if they take certain steps. This should eliminate misunderstandings if we find it necessary at some future point to withdraw aid; it should also give the Lao a chance to take stock of their position. Should our warning prove unavailing, we would know that further expenditure of funds in Laos was futile.

Recommendation5

That you sign the attached telegram giving Ambassador Parsons instructions for his next meeting with the Crown Prince (probably November 9 or 10) and permitting him at his discretion to inform key Lao leaders of the possible suspension of aid should certain dangerous developments occur.6

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/11–756. Secret. Drafted by Byrne and Young and cleared by Kocher.↩
  2. Not attached; for text as it was sent, see infra.↩
  3. No record has been found of this meeting.↩
  4. Document 379.↩
  5. Robertson approved the recommendation “with emendations,” but there was no indication on the source text as to what the emendations were.↩
  6. Sebald wrote the following note on the source text: “You know my views on this but I think you should listen to K.T.Y’s views. W.J.S.”↩