Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 15, 1956—3 p.m.

775. Reference: Embassy telegram 767.² At outset talk with Crown Prince morning 14th I outlined sequence events since my audience with him 9th,³ namely receipt 10th instructions Department telegram 566,⁴ interview with Prime Minister 11th⁵ in which I carried out instructions Department telegram 566 re Washington visit thus leading Souvanna to disclose Crown Prince had prevailed on him remain Vientiane. Subsequent gambit by Souvanna asking me have talk with Souphannouvong had given me opening convey briefly warning contained Department telegram 556.⁶ I then showed Crown Prince copy of follow-up letter to Souvanna (summarized Embassy telegram 773⁷) and informed him our worries as set forth second paragraph Department telegram 556.

Savang read with great deliberation and made no immediate comment except that Souvanna would surely show him this letter. Difficult to be sure but I thought predominant reaction was one of satisfaction, perhaps relief as well; in any event, he was more buoyant, less distressed than on 9th. After pause he remarked he had just received Prince Souphannouvong who professed good intentions of Pathet Lao and had even asked Savang’s support for participation in government. Crown Prince said he had replied with three brief points: first, that any country or kingdom has a certain geographic entity, that country must follow its constitutional procedures and, finally, that he would not enter into matters of daily politics. To me Savang added coalition could come about only with resignation of government and then, without indicating his course of action, he said he would not accept PL in government.

Next phase of talk included series of criticisms of Souvanna. He hated say so but matters handled in such way that he thought quite likely Pathet Lao would soon read my letter to Souvanna. I replied PL already knew how they were regarded by US, that Department had given me discretion carry out instructions orally or in writing and that I had considered letter better served purpose of avoiding misunderstanding. Crown Prince said this was best and not to be concerned over possible reaction from Souvanna; he would not dare react strongly. Crown Prince then said government was naive (“inconsaient”). Perhaps I knew of Chou En-lai’s recent telegram requesting message of congratulations on Sun Yat Sen anniversary. In any event, there was reply complying with request but it had not been despatched (apparently because of orders from Crown Prince). Souvanna did not foresee consequences of his actions.

Savang remarked for most part ministers not activated by principles, nor was opposition. It was therefore hard know where to turn. Perhaps U.S. would do well to work with opposition. I replied would find it difficult work with Bong Souvannavong to which Crown Prince casually replied Bong in other circumstances could be just as pro-American as anyone. (Perhaps foregoing should be assessed in terms Savang’s aversion to Souvanna and his brothers.)

To put US attitude in perspective, I repeated to Crown Prince we had now taken two steps: First, aide-mémoire on integration PL effectives which was contingent on satisfactory over-all settlement; second, letter to Souvanna. Savang then indicated RLG reaction to position in [on] PL effectives was to ask French if they would finance balance of cost of integration over what US financed. He did not give me French reaction but said with emphasis he would never accept French aid for such purpose. More generally, he gave me impression he approved US steps if end result was strengthen Laos against PL. Contrariwise, he apparently would regret US actions if result was PL acceptance and settlement. As before, (Embtel 753) he implied PL would accept final terms whatever they might be because they, as opposed to RLG, were united and on whole more able. I remarked we assumed national unity was goal, and therefore, we were also emphasizing internal security measures to aid RLG once settlement achieved. Crown Prince indicated national unity was beside the point, his thought apparently being that with firm direction and control PL would not be problem unless (as he also said) Chinese forced issue.

Crown Prince at one stage asked point blank if US support for Laos was firm. I replied that he had had personal assurances of Secretary (Deptel 326⁸) which was in its essence our policy. Nevertheless, he had also read letter to Souvanna and must realize our capabilities depended in part upon Lao actions. He then deplored difficulty of democracies in giving firm assurances of future actions which depended upon legislature. He also, at this point in conversation, again implied he was, if necessary prepared take measures outside normal channels keep a government in power which could maintain Laos integrity and independence. He also referred to loyalty of army and its unwillingness cede places to former PL. In fact, he had prevented, and he had so told Souphannouvong, army from killing PL who were brothers and he only supported hostilities when foreigners from across border came in and, with PL aid, attacked Laos. In closing this phase talk, Crown Prince seemed again evidence satisfaction our action but remarked it was more difficult to do what was done than prevent it in beginning. Mistakes had been made while he was away.

Much of foregoing was expressed in somewhat round-about terms. At least it is clear that Crown Prince does not favor settlement with Pathet Lao along lines thus far developed. I also believe Crown Prince needs our constant reassurance and that there is no doubt that he is working with US out of conviction that his interest and that of Royal House as well as country lie that way.

Talk lasted nearly an hour and with Crown Prince going over at length much familiar ground. I did not have good opportunity probe further into question whether Savang intends (a) precipitate incipient political crisis, or (b) make Souvanna stay on and act more responsibly (Embtel 770⁹). However, I did say pointedly during initial presentation that since Souvanna had assured me he was going New York before UN closed, probably January or February (Embtel 763), I assumed Prime Minister expected still be in power at that time. Crown Prince did not pick this up. I would judge he still has no alternative to Souvanna but with Assembly meeting next week situation could become kaleidoscopic.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1556. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, and Phnom Penh.
2. Dated November 13, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–1356)
3. A report of that discussion is in telegram 753 from Vientiane, November 10, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–1056)
4. In telegram 566 to Vientiane, November 10, the Department suggested tentative dates for an unofficial and informal visit by Souvanna Phouma to Washington to coincide with a trip to the United Nations. (Ibid., 751J.5–MSP/10–3156)
5. A report of that interview is in telegram 763 from Vientiane, November 12. (Ibid., 033.51J11/11–1256)
6. Supra.
7. Telegram 773 from Vientiane, November 14, contained the summary of a letter dated November 13 which Parsons gave to Souvanna Phouma on November 14. The letter was based on the instructions in telegram 556 to Vientiane.
8. In telegram 326 to Vientiane, September 26, the Department summarized for the Embassy’s benefit talks between Savang and American officials in Washington in September. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.11/9–2656)
9. Dated November 13, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–1356)