Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

379. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson¹

Washington, September 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Laos

I should like to submit for your consideration the following tentative SEA thinking on what the United States might do to counter the current adverse trend in Laos.

General Observations

Recent Lao Government actions, despite appearances, do not represent an abrupt turning from alignment with the West to accommodation to the Communists. Rather, they are a logical development in Laos’ evolution as it attempts to reconcile the historic pattern of its relationship to China with its own interpretation of contemporary power politics. So long as the Communist threat took the form of military occupation of two provinces rightfully belonging to the National Government, Laos, with constant propping up by the American and to a lesser extent the British, French, and Thai Embassies, was able to hold its own against the Communists and indeed improve its international legal and moral position. With the Bloc shift from the scowl to the smile, however, Laos’ vulnerability to Communist enticements and “soft” tactics was exposed.

Factors also affecting the Lao decision to seek accommodation to the Communists are undoubtedly 1) our inability to give the Lao categoric assurances of tangible assistance in the event of aggression and 2) failure of the Geneva machinery to achieve a settlement despite nearly two years’ efforts. Perhaps more than most countries Laos has been reminded of our support by such means as frequent personal messages from the Secretary to the Crown Prince, but our necessary vagueness and our remoteness from Laos lead it to question whether the U.S. could, even if it so desired, help to prevent military conquest of Laos. This uneasiness plus frustration over the impotence of the ICC, and to some extent of the co-Chairmen, have caused Laos to look for its own solution and thus respond unusually rapidly to Communist overtures.

Laos’ receptivity to the Communist peace offensive means the nearly exclusive Western role in Laos has come to an end. To the extent we remain there, Laos will in the foreseeable future be the object of a mixture of foreign influences, Communist, neutralist, and Western. Which of these pressures will prove to be the most powerful is now unknown, but the achievement of any Western success in the U.S.-Chinese confrontation in Laos will demand our not conceding the field to the Communists. Our objective remains to contain, reduce, and eventually eliminate Communist influence.

It is hopeless to expect that Laos can in any way actively contribute to the defense of the Free World. It is also hopeless to expect that in the present circumstances Laos will stand militantly anti-Communist with the West. A neutral but non-Communist Laos would nevertheless still serve as buffer protecting Thailand and Cambodia. Its loss would remove this protection and do psychological damage to other states’ belief in U.S. effectiveness. Therefore, so long as Laos resists Communist penetration and the balance in the cold war remains clearly on our side, the U.S. must stay in Laos.

If, however, the Lao insist on committing what we consider political suicide despite U.S. advice and material support, we may wish to disengage or threaten to disengage, total disengagement being synonymous with withdrawal of American economic aid. Since withdrawal of American aid means certain absorption of Laos by the Communists, this step cannot be taken lightly. Laos’ softness and extreme vulnerability to Communist envelopment does nevertheless lead to the relatively great possibility that we might find it necessary to pull out in order to avoid involvement in the actual moment of disaster.

Short of this drastic action we shall, as necessary, have to employ temporizing but nevertheless concrete methods of displaying our displeasure, such as a possible suspension of activity on the Fiscal Year 1957 aid program. We patently can no longer rely only on friendly advice and warnings since our expressions of “serious concern” have too obviously not been taken seriously by the Lao.

Assets and Liabilities

In achieving our objective of keeping Laos’ “neutrality” an armed neutrality leaning more toward our side than not, we have the following assets: 1) Lao hatred for the Chinese and Vietnamese; 2) tolerance for the West and friendliness to the U.S.; 3) total dependence upon outside aid, which at present is principally American, for survival as a politically independent state; 4) unlikelihood the Communists would replace the total amount of U.S. financial assistance; 5) Lao reliance on the U.S. for protection in case their security is threatened; 6) current absence of resentment against U.S. advice; 7) concern of certain important Lao leaders over Souvanna’s recent flirtation with the Communists.

We are, on the other hand, burdened with the following liabilities: 1) Acute consciousness of vulnerability to invasion owing to extensive common borders with Communist China and Viet Minh-controlled North Viet-Nam; 2) Lao uncertainty of U.S. and SEATO assistance in the event of Chinese Communist or Viet Minh aggression; 3) consequent fear of offending the Communists and mistaken belief that “neutrality” will earn them Communist good will; 4) attraction to Communist China as representing Asian resurgence; 5) dim appreciation of Communist objectives and estimation of the Pathet Lao as nationalists; 6) universal Lao desire to please everyone, resulting in acquiescence in both Western and Communist importunings; 7) growing Lao sensitivity and resistance to Western prodding; 8) Prime Minister Souvanna’s vanity, weakness of character, and supreme faith that he can control the Chinese Communists, the Viet Minh, and the Pathet Lao; 9) vast expanses of uninhabited or jungle area providing excellent haven for Communist political and agit-prop cadres and facilitating subversion of the country-side; 10) probable Pathet Lao entrance into the Cabinet, the civil service, and the National Army.

Actions to Support Lao Independence and Retard Lao Neutralism

On the assumptions that we have sufficient assets to arrest a swing to the Communists and that enough influential Lao leaders are determined to defend Lao independence, it is recommended that the following long-term courses of action be taken in the cold war to contain and reduce Communist influence in Laos:

1) We should continue to assure Laos of U.S. political and economic support and military protection in the event of Communist aggression.

2) We must prevent the Lao Government from making concessions to the Pathet Lao which would lead to subversion of the Army and civil service.

3) Top priority should be given to increasing the effectiveness of the countersubversive and intelligence services of the police, Army, auto-defense, and propaganda organizations to combat inevitably stepped-up Chinese Communist, Viet Minh, and Pathet Lao subversion and to handle reindoctrination of Pathet Lao troops.

4) We must try to minimize Laos’ contacts with the Communist Bloc, stave off recognition of Communist China and the Viet Minh, and dissuade Laos from accepting Communist aid.

5) We should, on the other hand, try to strengthen Laos’ commitments to the Free World through steady pressure on Thai-Lao planning and maintenance of the Seno base. The Thai should continue to contribute to this effort. We should respect Laos’ wish, because of its policy of neutrality, not to be too publicly linked with SEATO, but should periodically remind Laos of SEATO protection as appropriate.

6) We must make our aid program more effective in the immediate future. U.S. financing of the total cost of Lao troop pay has almost no meaning for the Lao peasant. What is essential is short-term projects with quick and tangible impact.

7) We should carry on a constant campaign, in which members of all agencies would take part, designed to make the Lao elite and near-elite aware of the dangers of being neutralized. Such a campaign might have as its theme that the U.S., though preferring mutual security arrangements, respects the choice of states who deem that neutrality best serves their national interests. Nevertheless, Laos should beware of the Communist interpretation of “neutral”: Neutralization to them means paralysis and vassalage. In order to meet Communist criteria of “neutrality”, Laos may find it has renounced the protection of the Free World which it may one day need.

8) We must give behind-the-scenes support to influential leaders like Katay and Nhouy who are skeptical and uneasy about the hazardous course charted by Souvanna Phouma.

Spot Moves to Arrest the Drift

The foregoing steps may work over the long run. In the meantime, however, we are likely to face a fluid situation of uncertainty with respect to Lao intentions, when an adverse drift is evident but the margin is still in our favor. We shall probably be beset with spot crises which will have to be met on an ad hoc basis, with means less final than threatening to terminate or actually terminating provision of aid. Sanctions in this situation would be selective, designed to avoid placing ourselves in an irrevocable position but at the same time to arrest and if possible reverse any drift toward pro-Communist neutralism.

Conditions for Disengagement

While meeting these crises by ad hoc means, we must be watchful for critical issues as the following, which might so reduce the favorable margin in Laos as to cause us to consider taking or threatening to take more drastic action:

1) Pathet Lao participation in the Cabinet without duly held free elections under Royal Government control;

2) Integration of Pathet Lao troops in such numbers or in such manner as to jeopardize the integrity of the Army;

3) Accession of Prince Phetsarath, Prince Souphannouvong, or Bong Souvannavong to the Prime Ministership;

4) Acceptance of large-scale Chinese Communist aid and technicians;

5) Request for withdrawal of the French garrison at Seno base (this would be tantamount to closing the base since the Lao are unable to run it themselves. It would also be evidence of a desire to go too far in breaking ties with the West inasmuch as its retention is provided for in the Geneva Accords, a fact acknowledged even by the Pathet Lao and the Chinese Communists in their recent communiqués);

6) Public renunciation of SEATO protection.

If the U.S. decides that any one or combination of the above critical issues would make continued American financial support of Laos futile or undesirable, the Lao should be given ample and clear warning. A threat of withdrawal should not be made if we are not really prepared to carry through, but if we are so prepared we should not take action without first allowing the Lao a chance to reassess their policy and position.

Such a threat of withdrawal or eventual withdrawal should be explained along the following lines: It is a mistake to believe that there are no strings attached to the granting of American aid: There is indeed a string, which is that the recipient country must continue to exhibit the desire and will to maintain its independence.² Such-and-such an action reveals, on the contrary, Lao willingness to permit its independence to be subverted and to become an appendage of the Communist Bloc. Therefore the United States must reluctantly withdraw its financial assistance in order to employ those resources where they will yield the return of political independence.

It is recommended that if the United States reaches the point of threatening to withdraw or actually withdrawing its aid, the British, French, Thai, Canadians, and Indians be given prior notification for whatever influence they might have on the Lao to obtain a modification of the Lao position.

Recommendations:³

1. That the foregoing be considered a general basis for planning U.S. action in Laos.

2. That in the immediate situation we maintain a detached and reserved attitude, taking no action and keeping the Lao Government uncertain of our position until the facts are clear and we have had sufficient time for reassessment.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–456. Secret. Also addressed to Sebald; drafted by Byrne.
2. At this point Sebald wrote the following marginal notation on the source text: “I would suggest that this ‘no strings’ argument be differently phrased to get away from the concept of ‘strings.’ While basically sound, this paper is somewhat out of date already. WJS.”
3. There was no indication on the source text whether this memorandum was approved.