Office of the Historian

387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, October 16, 1956—7:35 p.m.

426. Vientiane 595 repeated Paris 118 London 93 Saigon 123 Phnom Penh New Delhi Ottawa Unnumbered.2 In view Souvanna’s propensity to see approval where there is none or select statements favorable his purposes to remember while ignoring others, believe you should in tone you think best leave him in no doubt our position re Chinese Communist aid, coalition government, large-scale integration PL troops and indeed any integration without adequate reindoctrination and controls.

You might remind Souvanna that, as Secretary told Crown Prince, Laos can count upon U.S. moral material political support so long as that support goes to government vigorously seeking maintain its independence. Such is our earnest desire but Laos too has obligations help us convince U.S. public and Congress of wisdom this course.

Recommend you avoid mentioning “neutrality”. Direct criticism would as you have pointed out only antagonize Souvanna; on other [Page 827] hand though we concur your 3013 that Laos can serve as no more than buffer, we do not wish express “understanding” Lao neutrality policy as British have. We consider there no need now give up trying keep Laos clearly on side West. Moreover it unrealistic for Lao believe nation can be neutral without being strong in itself or without agreement all powers as in case Austria Switzerland. Since ChiComs do not fear Laos, “neutrality” will not appease them. Their accord on Lao “neutrality” is therefore only ruse designed as first step toward communization. We recognize from Lao point view neutrality may appear consonant its vulnerable status. If however we voice sympathy this policy Lao may use such expression sympathy as justification some future action in name neutrality which we would consider dangerous.

Re Vientiane 5154 regret delay reply, which expected soonest separate message.5

Re Vientiane 5706 release of $2.5 million military budget support authorized Icato 318.7

With respect Vientiane 603,8 if Souvanna comes Washington we shall not bar way, but request you do utmost discourage his visit, stressing presence Secretary New York and difficulty receiving high–level officials November. Very fact so much done for Crown Prince on short notice means Department less able obtain red-carpet treatment for another Lao official so soon afterward in even more difficult period.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1656. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Byrne; cleared by Young, Kocher, and Sebald; approved by Robertson; and repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, Ottawa, New Delhi, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.↩
  2. In telegram 595 from Vientiane, October 13, Parsons reported that he expected to see Souvanna Phouma on October 18 and asked if there were any points the Department wished him to make during the interview. (Ibid., 033.51J41/10–1355) Parsons spoke to Souvanna Phouma along the lines suggested in telegram 426. A report is in telegram 629 from Vientiane, October 19, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.5–MSP/10–1956)↩
  3. Document 376.↩
  4. Supra.↩
  5. Telegram 448 to Vientiane, Infra.↩
  6. In telegram 570, October 10, the Embassy reported Lao concern over delay in U.S. payment of approved expenditures of the Lao military budget including wages for September and October. According to the telegram, Lao officials pointed out that “malintentioned sources would interpret US procrastination as blackmail to force RLG comply with US view on PL integration.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/10–1056)↩
  7. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, ICA Message Files: FRC 58 A 403, Box 33, Vientiane)↩
  8. In telegram 603, October 15, Parsons reported that Bouasy had informed him that Souvanna planned to attend the U.N. General Assembly and proceed to Washington to call on American officials. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–1556)↩