Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

376. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, August 23, 1956—3 p.m.

301. Department pass CINCPAC. Reference CINCPAC 180318Z (parts 1–4).² Problem of whether small country announcing neutral policy should be rewarded with offers of increased aid is not new but is nevertheless exceedingly difficult. Direct competition with Communists is of course distasteful nor is it suggestive of strength and confidence on our part. More important, perhaps, is fact offer of such aid suggests that recipient is more important to us than vice versa. When chips down believe small countries and particularly elite therein likely realize reverse is true—self preservation depends on US and allies. Whether this applies to particular case of Laos is again exceedingly difficult. It is important remember in this connection that we now confronting not so much danger of overt attack which would reduce this country quickly but rather infiltration at all levels which gives somewhat more time for country to take countermeasures aided by US.

Elsewhere such radical departures as Prime Minister’s handling of PL negotiations, assertion of settlement to justify Peking trip and hasty, almost surreptitious departure, could be expected cause reaction among more conservative elements. There are signs that this may happen here at least on part of those who have considered US aid as indispensable to Laos survival. Number of key Lao have expressed their concern to me and President of National Assembly has claimed it would not go along with Souvanna if he accepted Chinese aid or brought plan to government before elections (Embtel 284³). These statements have to be discounted somewhat as calculated to reassure us, but I do believe that there is worry and uncertainty among elite at Souvanna’s course and anxiety for their own political future. Disquiet moreover not lessened by my absence from airport when delegation flew off lightly with Souvanna to Communist China. (Incredible as it may seem most of his entourage just went for the ride.)

There are, moreover, some assets here, stabilizing factors which we should not overlook. China is feared, Viet Minh are feared and disliked. (As traditional invaders they mean something to Lao while, except to handful of sophisticates, Communism probably evokes little comprehension or reaction. Pride of history and race, a mild but rather deep nationalism, exists and the Lao who have been a dependent people for most of past 100 years want to keep their independence (which of course is independence in political sense thanks to US aid, not in sense of economic viability). They have moreover some limited instruments to rely on, loyal army, beginnings of effective national police and neighbors, Thailand, Vietnam, who acknowledge importance to them of independent—even if neutral—Laos. Souvanna himself professes to want a neutral Laos armed against subversion and infiltration and has once at least since current developments expressed his readiness continue planning for emergencies with Thai (Embtel 275⁴).

If Peking trip compromises Laos seriously situation would, of course, be much more critical. But in absence disastrous accommodation to Communists on present trip I think our emphasis should be on ways we can most effectively help Laos gird for Communist political offensive, overt and covert, within country. This is more important in my view than to concentrate on building Lao Army to deter or delay aggressor. US power and Lao belief in our will to exercise it is only real deterrent any way. It is also more important than competing directly with Communist bloc by new, hurriedly conceived massive aid programs. Only few projects (see below) can be realized soon enough to have real political impact any way.

This brings us to recommendations in CINCPAC message and review of programs US agencies here.

First and foremost is energetic, comprehensive program strengthen internal security agencies. This has been recommended … and approved in principle. We will be actively interested in developing it further. Revisions PEO program as I see it must await developments in RLG-PL negotiations and outcome indicated RLG intentions eventually reduce force level. I believe we should encourage substantial reduction and apply any savings to internal security first, road networks second. But whether or not there is reduction, internal security should have highest priority.

Economic aid programs should be bolstered by selected conspicuous short term projects as CINCPAC suggests. I urge immediate action on one such; about 2,000 KV in diesel units for electrical power Vientiane, as discussed with Moyer. Airport lighting another obvious small project. We will be seeking ideas for other visible demonstrations of American effectiveness.

Reference telegram furthermore points up inadequacies fulfillment FY 1956 requisition for ANL of which only 15 percent delivered to date. Urge action be taken expedite these deliveries and streamline procedures future requirements. PEO will follow up with specific recommendations.

USIS program adjustments will be subject separate telegram.

By combination such programs and efforts aid most responsible elements here I hope we can at least develop a country which while it desires neutrality will be as strong as possible and lean to us rather than to our enemies. This sort of buffer is about all we can reasonably expect as I see things at this juncture and I venture raise question, what more would we really want of country like this? Preservation Lao as buffer is in itself most important, perhaps vital, objective for security of area. To attain even that objective we will require patient and sensitive handling with greater awareness than in past that US hand should be behind scenes and not embarrass friendly leaders who would lose by too conspicuous identification with US.

Foregoing illustrative of my own outlook and amounts to enthusiastic concurrence most of CINCPACs reference telegram but subject my opening paragraph. (Paragraph 5 CINCPAC telegram not yet received.) Representatives of other agencies here concur views herein as does my immediate staff. Would welcome comments any addressees.⁵

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/8–2356. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Ottawa, and New Delhi.
2. Not found.
3. Dated August 21, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J93/8–2156)
4. Dated August 18, not printed. (033.51J93/8–1856)
5. In telegram 915 from Paris, August 24, Yost “heartily” endorsed the views set forth in telegram 301. (Ibid., 611.51J/6–2456) Ambassador McClintock in Cambodia, in telegram 254 from Phnom Penh, August 29, was also in “full agreement.” (Ibid., 751J.00/8–2956)