385. Memorandum From the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Transmittal of Cable from Mr. Allen W. Dulles Concerning the Situation in Laos
On 23 September 1956 we received a cable from Mr. Allen W. Dulles … which is paraphrased as follows:
“1. Ambassador Parsons … spent a day with us in Bangkok for a general review of operations and prospects.
“2. The next few months represent a critical period as implementing of the negotiations with the Pathet Lao are carried on and the general composition of the future government structure in Laos emerges… . Embassy … representatives in Laos are mildly optimistic as to the outcome if the U.S. effort is properly developed, particularly in the field of police and internal security.
“3. Ambassador Parsons emphasizes, however, that Laos is a long term problem and that if U.S. aid is cut off or drastically diminishes over the next few years Laos may slip into the Chinese Communist camp.
“4. One of the most difficult problems is that of leadership as among King Sisavang Vong, Crown Prince Savang Vathana, Premier Souvanna Phouma, Vice-Premier Katay D. Sasorith, Prince Petsarath, with Prince Souphanavong of the Pathet Lao complicating matters in the background. Serious quarreling among these elements might bring disaster unless Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Ouane Ratrikoun, stepped in to establish military rule.
“5. I had a long talk with Prince Petsarath … with Ambassador Bishop … present. We were impressed with Petsarath’s vigor and strength; he is far from being the ‘senile old man’ he is sometimes described. Petsarath is wholly uncompromising on his attitude against Laos remaining in the French Union. He showed no signs of being pro-Communist, although he did not seem particularly disturbed [Page 824] at the trend of the negotiations between Souvanna Phouma and Souphanavong. He said that obviously Laos had to live next to Communist China and the Viet Minh, adding that Laos was a small country and this neighborhood had to be taken into account. Petsarath was quite strong in expressing fears of the Chinese Communists. He said Laos can accept American advisors but never Chinese Communist advisors, since the latter would stay and colonize whereas the Americans would be subject to no such temptation. I gather from his conversation that he expected a position next to and almost parallel with the Crown Prince and possibly will strive for the Premiership.
“6. While I personally have no way of judging Petsarath’s relative strength as compared with his half-brother, I can understand Malcolm MacDonald’s appreciation of him as the strongest of the three, but one conversation is hardly adequate for a real appraisal.
“7. In a conversation with Air Marshal Fuen Ronnapakas just before leaving Bangkok I rather gathered that the Thais were inclined to favor Katay as Premier but they recognize the fact that he is not a member of the Royal Family might make it more difficult for him to maintain this position.
“8. Ambassador Parsons is highly pleased with the caliber of intelligence being passed him ….
“9. While there is nothing particularly new in the situation in Laos, except of course the trend of the Pathet Lao negotiations, Laos remains the piece of real estate must vulnerable to Communists anywhere in the world. We cannot quickly do anything about the fact that Laos is primitive, underdeveloped, underpopulated, and ideal for hiding military and other infiltration, that it lacks communications, that it has a shaky government regime torn by personal and political rivalry, nor that it lies next to two Communist regimes, the Chinese and Viet Minh, each of which possesses overwhelming military strength and well organized subversion possibilities. To my mind Laos is first on the totem pole for Communist political takeover, with vast consequences to the security of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand whenever the Communists are ready to take the risk of moving in. Using military force indirectly as an over-hanging threat the Communists could bring heavy political and subversive pressures to bear on Laos on the model of the Czechoslovakian coup. I feel we have limited time to counter this Communist potential.”
Lieutenant General, USAF
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2756. Secret.↩