Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

384. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 24, 1956¹

Washington, September 24, 1956

SUBJECT

• Current Political Situation in Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• His Royal Highness Savang Vathana, Crown Prince of Laos
• His Excellency Ourot Souvannavong, Ambassador of Laos The Secretary of State
• Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
• Patricia M. Byrne, FE/SEA

Accompanied by the Lao Ambassador, His Royal Highness Savang Vathana, Crown Prince of Laos, in Washington on a private and unofficial visit, called on the Secretary at 3:15 p. m. at his own request.

After stating that we were happy to see Crown Prince Savang here, the Secretary referred to the questions he had discussed with Savang in Laos. These questions, important for Laos and for the United States, were still unresolved.

Savang replied that they were even more complicated now, for it was not only a question of the Pathet Lao (though even in this matter the Government’s fear of a violent Chinese Communist reaction had delayed a solution), but of actual contact with Communist China.

In response to the Secretary’s question as to the results of the Lao Government delegation’s visit to Peiping, the Crown Prince said that he had seen Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and other members of the group in Paris before coming here. Contrary to the condition the Government itself laid down, that the visit would only be undertaken after the settlement of internal problems, the delegation had left precipitately before those problems had been settled. In Peiping the group was feted and escorted everywhere in a grand manner. A visit which should have been of a purely courtesy nature in response to Chou’s invitation had been interpreted differently. Chou and his followers had attempted to distort the politeness of the RLG delegation and make it accept Chinese Communist proposals. Despite the general Lao distrust of the Chinese Communists, Souvanna was not sufficiently distrustful of Chou’s “friendliness” and accepted his offer of aid, albeit in a vague fashion. The Secretary here interjected that Chou En-lai was a very slippery man ….

Savang continued that the RLG Five-Year Plan and Chinese Communist participation therein were not accomplished facts, but implementation of the implied commitment would require the introduction of Chinese Communist technicians. The Pathet Lao were purely an internal problem for which the Lao Government itself was responsible. The possibility of eventual Chinese Communist aid was far more serious, as he had pointed out to Souvanna upon hearing the latter’s report. Savang was surprised at the Prime Minister’s move in Peiping, which did not conform to the Cabinet decision that no engagements would be made. He was not in a position to disavow the Government’s actions, but it must be recognized that a political error had been committed. He had indeed come to the United States to see how this political error could be remedied.

The Secretary asked rhetorically what the United States could do to help Laos stay free. A small country like Laos located next to a large power strong in that it was run by a dictatorship needs friends. The United States was ready to be a friend, as had already been demonstrated, but the expression of friendship was only a beginning which must be translated into acts. If Laos wished to be helped and to stay free, the United States could do something. It would perhaps have been better if the Lao had struck at the Pathet Lao nearly two years ago at the time the Secretary visited Vientiane. That this had not been done was not the fault of the Lao Government but perhaps of our Allies, who had discouraged the Lao from acting. Since the moment for military action had passed, it was now necessary to seek a solution in the light of the present situation. The United States could not, however, replace the Lao will to remain free; independence or alien domination was a Lao choice.

This choice, Savang replied, had already been definitely made. Yes, said the Secretary, but in a rather weak manner.

Savang defended the Lao position by saying Laos had been loyal and correct in its attitude toward the free nations and had resisted Communism internally. But now the Chinese Communists had changed in appearance: They were no longer insulting but were ostensibly offering good things.

Mr. Robertson mentioned that when the Crown Prince had made the same point to the President that morning, the President had replied that the Communist “smile” was nothing but a shift in tactics. If the Communists were truly sincere, why did they not return North Viet-Nam, the two Lao provinces, and Tibet, for example. Savang had answered the President by saying that the Communists already had control of those areas, whereas they were only trying to swallow his country. The Secretary agreed, saying that when the Communists were angling for something they were sweet; afterward they squeezed the unfortunate state as, for example, in Poland.

The Crown Prince said that since the Chinese Communists had changed their tune, it was good to come to the United States and be assured of United States moral support. He was not alone in his firm will to resist Communist enticements. There were, of course, certain naive Lao who might have to be replaced if they remained susceptible to the Communist approach. In this “life or death struggle” for Laos’ survival, Laos could not tolerate vacillation. His people were opposed to Communist dictatorship.

Did not the arrangement with the Pathet Lao, asked the Secretary, mean the introduction of Pathet Lao into the Government? In reply Savang stated the settlement had not yet been achieved, but if it were achieved, the Lao knew the true Communists among the Pathet Lao. Prince Souphanouvong, for example, was of no consequence, occupying only the fifth position in the Pathet Lao hierarchy. He was being used by the Communists only because he belonged to the Prime Minister’s family. After an understanding with the Lao Government had been reached, he would be relegated to unimportance, such were the tactics of the Communists. Real leaders of the Pathet Lao were those who followed Communism blindly, and they were known to the Government.

(There followed an exchange in English between the Secretary and Mr. Robertson in which they explored whether and how we could strengthen Savang’s hand. In this exchange Mr. Robertson mentioned Savang’s indignation that the West had recognized at Geneva in 1954 the Pathet Lao movement which had been created by the Chinese Communists specifically for that conference. He added that Savang was aware of things that had taken place at Geneva of which we knew nothing, and that the Crown Prince was not alone in Laos in his anti-Communist stand. The Secretary affirmed that he had obtained the latter impression on his visit to Laos in 1955. It was remàrked that Savang had as yet not said how the United States could help.)

The Secretary then asked Savang whether the Secretary should make a statement reaffirming what he had said in 1955, that is, that an attack upon Laos would bring SEATO into operation. Savang replied that SEATO was already precise in the immediate protection of Laos as spelled out in the Protocol; on the other hand SEATO was imprecise in that SEATO members’ response to aggression could only be made following the request of the Protocol state. Since the Lao constitutional process in the event of need of such a request would be slow, the Protocol could not have an immediate effect, which seemed a contradiction of the terms of the Treaty itself. Moreover, SEATO was of prime importance to Laos in case of future need, but at the moment the Pact was not applicable since, rather than wishing to attack Laos, the Chinese Communists desired to send in an army of political agents disguised as technicians. The Crown Prince agreed with Mr. Robertson’s remark that the Chinese Communists had turned to technicians because of the very existence of SEATO.

Since Savang seemed to feel that a statement with respect to SEATO would serve no real purpose at the present time, the Secretary asked him what else might help. Savang answered that, though the RLG delegation had not formally accepted Chinese Communist aid, the possibility of future Chinese Communist participation in the Five-Year Plan was already sufficiently dangerous. He would therefore use two main arguments to prevent acceptance of Chinese Communist assistance: 1) It was immoral to take aid from a country so poor that its economic level was not much above that of Laos, as the delegation had seen; 2) there was no need of Chinese Communist aid in the Lao Five-Year Plan since Laos already received all it could absorb from the United States, France, and the Colombo Plan powers. The receptivity of certain Lao to Chinese Communist promises was an internal problem.

The Secretary then put the direct question to Savang, who had apparently not seized the Secretary’s intent, as to whether there was anything we could say publicly or privately to Savang in Washington that would improve the situation.

Savang replied that he had been asked by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to come here. This, he supposed, meant that the Lao Government was anxious, uncertain, and fearful of being considered as taken in by Chinese Communist words. They had, after all, come away better than they might have. Communist China was a large country, SEATO was not on the spot, and Laos itself guarded its frontiers (it was even now resisting Pathet Lao attacks which continued despite the two August communiqués).

So far as a declaration on Laos was concerned, he was ready to hear any declaration. With respect to a statement re aid, it would be unseemly for him to ask for anything. He had come here only out of friendship and loyalty to the past policy pursued by Laos in cooperation with the United States.

It would, however, be “precious” if he and the large majority of Lao (a few had been suborned) could have the assurance that despite the change in Chinese Communist policy, despite the RLG declaration in Peiping, they could count on the moral aid of the United States. Then if errors were committed, he could take action to remedy them. He again referred to the possibility of having to replace certain leaders. Laos now faced a completely new development. If the United States altered its attitude, particularly outwardly, Laos would be isolated.

Mr. Robertson asked whether the Prince was aware how difficult it would be to carry on our support and obtain Congressional backing with funds if the negotiations with the Pathet Lao led to their participation in a coalition government and to substantial integration of Pathet Lao troops into the Royal Lao Army.

Savang replied with some vehemence that the United States had the right immediately to refuse its financial support if the Pathet Lao entered the Army. If the United States considered integration of these “disguised Chinese Communists” dangerous, it could of course withdraw its aid. This would permit the Lao to restudy the entire question. So far as coalition government was concerned, according to the Constitution the Pathet Lao could not enter the government until the government had resigned and elections had been held. He was certain the Government would interpret the Constitution as he had.

The Secretary then said, “You can count upon our support—moral, political, and material—so long as that support goes to a government vigorously seeking to maintain its own independence.”

Savang replied that that was the sine qua non for American aid, but that it was not really a condition for Laos since Laos was already of the “independence” persuasion.

The conversation ended at 4:30 p.m.

Outside the Secretary’s office, Mr. Robertson told the Crown Prince we recognized that he must work in the manner he thinks best for the national interests of Laos, that we had been reassured by his frank discussion, and that we had confidence in him.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2456. Secret. Drafted by Byrne and approved by Kocher and Robertson on September 26. Briefing memoranda from Robertson to Dulles, September 22 and 24, for use in preparation for this meeting are ibid., 751J.11/9–2256 and 751J.11/9–2456.