Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

380. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, September 7, 1956—4 p.m.

384. Department pass CINCPAC. Reference Embtel 359.²

1. In seeking evaluate situation Laos it is now first necessary recognize that Peking-Hanoi trip³ turned out not to be voyage to Canossa, and that shift in Laos international position occurred before visit not in consequence of it. Chou En-lai used velvet gloves in order win, later exploit, Lao confidence and there is no evidence RLG strayed far if at all from neutral path this time. Therefore in my opinion, nothing happened at Peking or Hanoi which would in itself justify withdrawal US support necessary to survival of independent Laos.

2. Focus of attention is now shifting rapidly from visit to RLG-PL front where clouds again gathering. PL have not yet come down to Vientiane to begin substantive negotiating, and there is apparently no indication when they will come or why they have not. At lunch fifth, Sen, who told Souvanna several days ago PL representatives would be here fifth or sixth, had to admit to him in my presence there had been no reply from Sam Neua. At same occasion Souvanna again told me he could not make definite plans or leave until he had seen negotiations well started; yet he must go to France soon to be operated on. Local diplomats, myself included, accept in varying degree that Souvanna put himself in something of a squeeze: As he said he would not go until Mixed Commissions at work, PL were in position to delay his trip (to west) by staying away. On other hand, as most local diplomats agree, PL should have little enthusiasm for negotiation with Souvanna away and Katay in charge of government, and it would have been to their advantage to get going soonest after Souvanna’s return if they wanted settlement. This paradox typifies confusion of current situation. It cannot be discounted that PL may now wish see negotiations break down. Another explanation is possible, however, namely that, (a) PL leaders have had trouble—with rains in north and communications mostly on foot and difficult—making contact with partisans and agreeing among selves on line of action, (b) PL feel their bargaining position would be weakened by running to Souvanna immediately on his return from Peking.

3. Now, as reported Embtel 379,⁴ Souvanna has extricated himself from dilemma by decision depart on schedule which he long ago fixed even though this reverses what he told PL and diplomats and press (Embtel 342⁵) about staying here till Mixed Commissions well started. Katay was in Pakse until late yesterday when returned Vientiane so presumably this surprise to him too. Prior to making decision, Souvanna had long talk sixth with Wouhak, PL liaison man here, but as yet we have no information on what transpired or what participants wish us to understand. Evidently, however, Wouhak gave Souvanna enough to permit latter rationalized departure decision.

4. In conclusion, I do not believe Peking trip calls for change in US aid policy, nor do developments in RLG-PL situation to date. I therefore continue adhere to general line set forth Embtel 301.⁶ If Laos foreign friends are proved right and Souvanna proved wrong on his tactics with PL, our task will be try assure Lao draw right lessons from this experience. In current fluid situation, in fact, it is all more necessary for us to be steady while Lao are not.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/9–756. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, Phnom Penh, Ottawa, and New Delhi.
2. In telegram 359, September 4, Parsons reported on a conversation he had with Souvanna Phouma on September 3 in which the Lao Prime Minister denied accepting Chinese aid or renouncing the SEATO Protocol as reported by Radio Peking. Souvanna also informed Parsons that Laos was retaining the Seno base at U.S. urging despite a Lao cabinet decision to deactivate it. (Ibid., 651J.93/9–456) See also footnote 4, Document 116.
3. August 21–27.
4. According to telegram 379, September 7, Souvanna Phouma planned to leave Vientiane for an official visit to Saigon lasting less than 24 hours on September 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J00/9–756) An account of the visit is in telegram 863 from Saigon, September 11, not printed. (Ibid., 033.51J51G/9–1156)
5. Dated August 31, not printed. (Ibid., 033.51J00/8–3156)
6. Document 376.