Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, August 29, 1956—7:14 p.m.

243. For Ambassador from Robertson.

1. We are disturbed at Souvanna’s communiqué reported Radio Peking² welcoming Chinese Communist aid and stating Laos does not accept SEATO protection since provisions relating Laos decided without its participation and membership would not accord Geneva Agreements. As implied Deptel 658 to Bangkok³ we do not wish use ultimate threat withdrawal American aid until we prepared carry through; we would in general be prepared take such drastic step only if extreme gravity recipient country’s actions meant absorption by Communists despite continuation American assistance. Lao moves do not yet seem fall into this category.

2. We cannot decide U.S. action until we have reliable reports re what transpired Peiping Hanoi. Request soonest fullest information on trip from sources you deem advisable. You have discretion whether call on Souvanna shortly after his return or leave initiative to him.

3. Available information nevertheless indicates we may soon have to do something show Lao we mean business, since our expressions serious concern have thus far had little effect on Souvanna. As interim measure therefore we considering suspending all activity FY 1957 aid program Laos if reports Lao commitments Peiping are verified (FY 1956 funds including troop pay would continue be released as heretofore).

Request your comments following proposed démarche to Souvanna if Peiping reports confirmed:

Three major incidents past two months raise serious questions for U.S. regarding firm and assured basis for future dealings Laos: 1) Lao Government publicly declared it had no plans coalition government and would not travel Peiping until after settlement achieved with Pathets. In complete contradiction this declaration are August 10 RLG-PL communiqué and trip Peiping undertaken before anything which could reasonably be considered as settlement approached; 2) Prime Minister was categoric in assuring you August 9 (Vientiane 204⁴) Laos would make no commitments Peiping whatsoever, yet it has now accepted ChiCom aid offer and invited ChiCom economic mission survey Lao needs; 3) Souvanna June 26 (Vientiane 1649, June 26, 1956⁵) acknowledged validity U.S. contention Laos had requested SEATO guarantees 1954 but had now stated Peiping that inclusion Laos in SEATO protocol undertaken without Laos’ participation and had renounced SEATO protection. U.S. would consider necessary U.S. or SEATO make public declaration rectifying erroneous impression Souvanna had thus created with respect Laos’ link with SEATO. These conflicting declarations render true Lao intentions obscure. Pending better understanding Lao position, U.S. suspending planning and discussions FY 1957 aid program for Laos, in order afford opportunity reappraise and clarify situation. End proposed démarche.

Foregoing would enable us take concrete action without putting us in irreversible position. At point we determine, we could state developments clarified to our satisfaction permitting resumption FY 1957 aid planning. If representation made we would suggest you also inform lesser-ranking Lao leaders and British French Thai Indian colleagues of U.S. move. Purpose this concrete display U.S. displeasure would be 1) indefinitely delay execution Souvanna commitments Peiping, particularly arrival ChiCom missions; 2) build up restraining influence on Souvanna in Assembly and Cabinet; and 3) obtain Lao public statement Souvanna misquoted re SEATO. We shall not discuss foregoing other agencies pending receipt your reaction.⁶

4. Meantime, you may authorize U.S. representatives Laos undertake in contacts with Lao officials create awareness dangers being “neutralized” and generate opposition to Souvanna’s hasty actions and one-way concessions. American officials might state while U.S. recognizes Lao desire remain independent and neutral, Laos should beware of real ChiCom intent in neutralizing Laos, which is, in classic Chinese imperial manner, to paralyze and reduce to vassalage small well-intentioned neighbor. In this education campaign U.S. would continue give behind-scenes support to influential Lao leaders such as Katay, Nhouy and Leuam who before Peiping pilgrimage appeared skeptical and uneasy over hazardous course charted by vacillating Souvanna Phouma.

5. We should like your views re a) whether such actions would restrain Souvanna and others; b) who might be likely successor to Souvanna if general criticism his actions developed in Lao circles; and c) position we should take with Crown Prince if he visits U.S.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J93/8–2956. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution—No Distribution Outside Dept. Drafted by Byrne and Young, cleared by Sebald, and approved by Robertson.
2. See Document 116.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J93/8–2556)
4. Dated August 9, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/8–956)
5. See footnote 3, Document 109.
6. In telegram 351 from Vientiane, August 31, the Embassy noted that Radio Peking’s account went far beyond other reports of Souvanna Phouma’s statements in Peking on SEATO or acceptance of Chinese aid. The Embassy in Vientiane suggested in lieu of suspension of aid planning a modified démarche pointing out that, if the situation warranted it, the United States could refuse to pay Laos for former Pathet Lao effectives brought into the National Army. (Ibid., 033.51J93/8–3156)

   In telegram 254 to Vientiane, September 1, the Department agreed with this modification and noted that any sanctions against Laos would be considered in light of the facts of Souvanna Phouma’s visit to Peking and Hanoi together with the Embassy’s recommendation. (Ibid., 033.51J93/8–3156)