Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

375. Memorandum From the Chairman’s Staff Group to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)¹

Washington, August 23, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Thai-Laotian Military Planning

Background

1. Bilateral Thai-Laotian military planning first came into the limelight through a message to State from Acting Ambassador Anschuetz of Thailand (Bangkok 856 of 23 Sep 55²). The Acting Ambassador referred to a briefing by Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Sarit in which absence of a forward strategy for defense of Thailand was painfully evident. He went on to state that Sarit personally favored a forward strategy, and that the Thai Prime Minister probably would do so “under appropriate circumstances”. By encouraging Thailand to adopt a forward strategy in its planning the United States would, in the Acting Ambassador’s judgment:

a. Insure maximum readily available support to Laos.

b. Create the impression in the minds of the Thais and Laotians of U.S. intention to provide substantial support in event of armed aggression.

c. Involve Thai prestige in a manner that would encourage Lao resistance to aggression rather than in seeking accommodation with Red China and its satellites.

2. As an approach to stimulating bilateral Thai-Laotian planning, the Acting Ambassador proposed the following program:

a. Thailand to invite the Laotians to use Thai military training facilities in Thailand and to provide Thai field manuals and training materials which have been developed with JUSMAG assistance.

b. Thailand to inform the Laotian Government that Thailand would sympathetically consider a request from Laos for intervention of Thai forces and for certain logistic support from Thailand in event of emergency.

c. Thai-Lao staff talks to be initiated in the near future on a contingent planning basis with a view to providing Thai participation and support in Laos under appropriate circumstances.

d. Thailand to be encouraged unilaterally to develop contingent plans to provide military support in Laos irrespective of the receptiveness of Laos to Thai suggestions concerning bilateral planning.

e. JUSMAG to provide guidance to Thailand on these matters.

f. If and when feasible, these plans to be coordinated with SEACDT (SEATO).

3. In his 122209Z Oct 55 to CNO,³ CINCPAC endorsed the desirability of U.S. encouragement and sponsorship of Thai-Laotian planning and indicated that he was prepared to provide necessary guidance. He pointed out that forthcoming SEATO planning would consider defense of Thailand and Laos as part of planning encompassing neighboring countries as well.

4. On 14 October 1955, the JCS concurred in principle to the first five of the program steps proposed by the Acting Ambassador (J.C.S. 1992/485). At the same time, they approved a State message which stated:

“To: AmEmbassy Bangkok (No. 1248 of 15 Oct 55⁴); AmEmbassy Vientiane (No. 283 of 15 Oct 55)

Concur in principle recommendations a, b, c, d, e (same as in paragraph 2 above). Addressees should coordinate manner and timing approaches to Lao-Thai authorities and other details implementation. Impending visit Lao military mission to Thailand may give opportunity express views to two governments.

No impression will be given Thais and Laos that U.S. does or does not intend to provide military forces… .“⁵

5. On 19 January 1956, following Joint Chiefs of Staff approval and subsequent amendment (J.C.S. 1992/501 of 15 December 1955), State message 674⁶ advised appropriate addressees that:

“Defense agrees desirability beginning bilateral Thai-Lao military staff planning soonest, subject following provisions: Planning should be 1) in consonance SEATO and U.S. objectives; 2) directed toward immediate threat but subject later integration into SEATO planning; 3) result in practical plan which U.S. can support logistically; 4) MAAG/Thailand and USARMA/Vientiane will keep CINCPAC informed of Thai/Lao progress in development combined plans and forward copies when available to CINCPAC for information; 5) plans must not include employment U.S. forces other than those which may be required by provision U.S. logistic support.

“Determination here of level and source U.S. logistic support will await CINCPAC recommendations after review plans but should not delay initiation planning… .”

Current Considerations

6. The first bilateral planning conference between Thailand and Laos was held at Udorn commencing 6 July of this year. A second conference, scheduled for early August, has been postponed by the Laotians due to the workload imposed by the Pathet Lao integration. Ambassador Parsons states, however, that the Laotian Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff, Royal Laotian Army, agree that military talks with Thailand should continue. Work is underway in preparation for the next meeting (Vientiane to State No. 213 of 11 Aug 56⁷).

7. Ambassador Bishop has recently advised State that “in view changed military and political situation in Laos, believe Department will wish to review US policy toward pressing for joint Thai-Laos military planning for possible military action within Laos. Chief JUSMAG and I agree until instructed otherwise we should avoid any further mention this matter to Thai… .” (Bangkok to State No. 451 of 15 Aug 56⁸).

8. CINCPAC, in reviewing the foregoing two messages, has called to the attention of CNO (CINCPAC 182259Z Aug 56⁹) what he considers to be divergent points of view regarding Thai-Laos planning as represented by:

a. The indication by Ambassador Parsons that planning is to be continued;

b. The view of Ambassador Bishop that the U.S. position concerning the planning should be reviewed in light of Laotian political developments.

CINCPAC holds that continued Thai-Laos planning is not contingent upon current Laos-Pathet Lao talks and should be continued for various military, political and psychological reasons. He recommends that CNO discuss this problem with State as soon as possible.

9. Ambassador Bishop referred to CINCPAC on 20 August an urgent request that CNO not discuss the Thai-Laos planning question with State until CINCPAC receives additional information from the Ambassador by air mail (Bangkok to CINCPAC No. 5839 read-dressed to CNO 201218Z Aug 56¹⁰). He refers to a discussion of this subject with you and Chief JUSMAG Thailand during your recent visit to Bangkok. In his view, “we must go slowly in this matter and must have State-JCS views coordinated and agreed before U.S. policy can be decided”.

10. CNO will withhold referral of the problem to J.C.S. or State pending further word from CINCPAC (CNO 202237Z Aug 56¹⁰).

11. In reporting an 18 August conversation with the Prime Minister of Laos, Ambassador Parsons states that, according to the Prime Minister, Laos cannot accept Thai-Lao planning if it takes on the aspect of “an alliance”. On the other hand, he wishes to continue “staff talks on the basis of what it would be necessary to do for defense in case of emergency and Laos had to call upon its friends” (Vientiane to State No. 275 of 18 Aug 56¹¹).

12. Ambassador Bishop reported on 22 July that the Chief of the Thai Defense General Staff, General Jira, had been reluctant to go into “too much detail” in briefing the Laotians at the 6 July meeting “because of the forthcoming visit of the Laotian Prime Minister to Communist China”. Agreement was reached, however, on mutual exchange of information and personnel; details to be worked out later (Bangkok to State No. 207 of 21 July 1956¹²).

13. As a point of emphasis, further meetings are planned between Thai and Laotian military representatives (same reference as in preceding paragraph).

14. On 22 August, Ambassador Bishop reported the following information received from the Thai Foreign Minister on 17 August: “Thai cabinet decided to go ahead with all plans for aid and cooperation with Laos, including military planning… . Thai government has not written off Laos, but hopes to hold Laos more or less on side of free world”. From the Thai Prime Minister the Ambassador received on 20 August the following: “Lao racially related Thai and … Thai people could expect to influence Lao people. Thai government expecting to continue all measures designed to influence Lao Government and people… .” (Bangkok to State No. 524 of 22 August 1956¹³).

Where and How Did Thai-Lao Planning “Get Off the Track”?

15. Analysis of the background and recent developments on this subject leads the Chairman’s Staff Group to the conclusion that Ambassador Bishop’s concern over the Royal Government-Pathet Lao developments in Laos, and his view that JCS-State review of U.S. policy covering Thai-Lao planning is required, have caused the recent surge of commentary. It appears to us that, except for postponement of the second meeting scheduled for early August, and for natural Thai concern over the implications of Pathet Lao integration, the planning is on the track.

Discussion and Recommendations

16. In the view of the Chairman’s Staff Group, continuation of Thai-Lao planning is highly desirable as a positive step in the direction of Asians helping Asians. Furthermore, Thailand’s pro-Western and SEATO status, plus her racial tie with Laos, will be valuable factors in influencing the latter against further accommodation with Communism and neutralism.

17. Continued bilateral planning holds forth promise of a significant intelligence channel for the West. By controlling carefully the extent of planning and divulgence of SEATO and other Western information, undue disclosures to Laos can be avoided.

18. Present U.S. guidance and machinery for Thai-Laotian planning is generally adequate with one notable exception—absence of any positive U.S. commitment to apply military force in support of these countries, particularly Laos, in event of aggression. As you have pointed out, failure to do so in a convincing manner is primarily responsible for our failure to establish in Laos a degree of confidence in the U.S. and its policy required to prevent the Pathet Lao fiasco. This same positive commitment is needed as a basis for SEATO planning. It does not require allocation nor earmarking of specific forces and resources.

19. To improve this situation we consider that a review of U.S. guidance for both Thai-Lao planning and SEATO planning is desirable for the purpose of developing a U.S. commitment in support of the countries concerned that will stimulate their confidence and give new meaning not only to the military planning, but to the total U.S. program in Southeast Asia. The goal should be a modification of the currently pending restatement of U.S. policy for Southeast Asia to provide for such a commitment on a SEATO-wide basis. As a corollary, we consider that the President should obtain emergency authority for employment of U.S. military power in Southeast Asia comparable to that which he enjoys under the Formosa Resolution.

20. Meanwhile, the Group recommends that Thai-Lao planning be continued under U.S. monitorship based on guidance now in effect. Were we to disassociate ourselves from the project, or even to withdraw our emphasis thereon, further conviction would be generated in the Laotian mind that the United States does not intend to support them in event of aggression. On the Thailand side such a reversal would unquestionably be regarded as a sign of weakness in the face of the Communist gain in Laos, and would amount to undercutting of a major Thai government program. The latter, as you know, is based on the fact that Thailand is pledged to render assistance in opposing Communist aggression in any portion of the SEATO area. The signatories of the SEATO pact agree that Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam come within the meaning of the “treaty area” in Article 7 of the pact.

Very respectfully,

Chairman’s Staff Group¹⁴

1. Source: JCS Files, CJSC 091 Thailand. Top Secret. Radford wrote the following note in the margin of the source text: “There is a Joint State Def Msg of sometime around late Sept or Oct which is not mentioned here and which I would like to see. R.” The message in question has not been identified.
2. Document 310.
3. Document 313.
4. See Document 315.
5. All ellipses in this document are in the source text.
6. Dated January 9, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/1–956)
7. Not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/8–1156)
8. Not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/8–1556)
9. Not found.
10. Not found.
10. Not found.
11. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.51J93/8–1856)
12. Not printed. (Ibid., 751J.5/-2156)
13. Not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/8–2256)
14. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.