Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

364. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, June 23, 1956—2:49 p.m.

1313. For Sebald. Department desires take advantage your visit Vientiane to convey to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and other Lao leaders following US views.² After you have been fully briefed recent developments by AmEmbassy Vientiane present these views orally to Souvanna Phouma. You may leave an informal record with him in the form of an unheaded, undated memorandum containing the text cited below:

• “1. As Secretary of State recently reaffirmed to His Royal Highness Prince Savang, US is standing and is determined to continue to stand firmly behind its commitments to the nations of free Asia as set forth in the SEATO treaty and its appended protocol. The SEATO powers, particularly the US, possess powerful forces especially in the air and on the sea. The Chinese Communists and Viet Minh are fully aware of the strength of these forces and of SEATO treaty and its protocol regarding Laos.
• “2. The policy of US Government is to help Laos preserve and strengthen her independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. We believe others hope to maneuver Royal Government into making concessions which would increase presently weakened Pathet Lao subversive potential, develop Communist influence and power within Laos and weaken Royal Government. Chinese Communist activities in Buddhist countries of Tibet and Burma seem to us clear indications Chinese Communist intentions Laos. US believes great circumspection and prudence are indispensable in responding to any Chinese Communist overtures, which if not carefully handled, could jeopardize common objective Royal Government and US to preserve the independence and freedom of the Lao people. American congressional and public opinion are now friendly and sympathetic toward Laos but neither Congress nor American people would be willing make continued substantial efforts assist Laos Government maintain independence, security and freedom if that government appeared to be unnecessarily sacrificing its own interest to Chinese Communist advantage. We continue to believe a visit to Peiping is unnecessary and would present serious dangers. Certainly a satisfactory settlement fully reestablishing power and authority of RLG should first be achieved.
• “3. We continue to believe that the firm basis for any negotiations with Pathet Lao should be the January 7 ICC resolution. In this connection we trust the Royal Government will not undertake any commitment directly or indirectly involving US without prior consultation with US and we are confident Royal Government will keep US fully informed in advance. For example, any large scale integration Pathet Lao units into Laos armed forces requiring increased size, such forces would be very serious matter which could not help but affect the nature of the various US programs designed to strengthen Laos independence and integrity.
• “4. In the meantime, US Government will study Laos government priorities as expressed to US Study Group by His Highness Souvanna Phouma, with particular reference to economic development of Country designed to: a. increase food production through irrigation and other projects; b. improve internal distribution through reopening national roads; c. diversify economy and lay basis continued economic growth; d. offer program which would have considerable appeal vast majority population and eliminate or reduce considerably danger disaffection with Government. Any economic aid from US for such development would be subject to available funds and congressional authority. Moreover, ability of US proceed with such important matters would depend on firmness and constancy in Royal Government defense of its sovereign rights.
• “5. After arrival Ambassador Parsons US would be prepared to begin discussion with Royal Government concerning negotiation of treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation.”

FYI: For Vientiane and Bangkok. Foregoing intended help strengthen Royal Government’s will to defend its interests vis-à-vis Chinese Communists, to discourage what appears to be undue haste by Royal Government in responding Chinese Communists overtures and to warn Royal Government it cannot commit US to any position it may assume without prior consultation. Vientiane inform Department and Bangkok when memorandum delivered. Embassy Bangkok may then, at its discretion, inform Phibun that we have presented foregoing views to Lao. End FYI.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/6–2356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Corcoran; cleared by SEA, C, ICA, FE, E, and L/E (in substance); and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Bangkok.
2. Sebald talked with Katay on June 26 and made the points as instructed in telegram 1313. He did not see Souvanna Phouma. (Telegram 1655 from Vientiane, June 27; ibid., 790.5/6–2756) For additional information on Sebald’s June 26 talk with Katay, see Document 377. Parsons saw Souvanna Phouma on August 1 and read him the paper outlined here; see telegram 134, infra.