365. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
134. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, ICA. Embtel 131.2 I saw Prime Minister this morning with Blancke. Recognized he was very busy with arrival Souphannavong but wanted insure one point perfectly clear before talks started as otherwise there might be embarrassments. This was question reintegration in so far commitment US resources involved. In talk with Colonel Quan our Military Attache had learned of planning figure circa 1,000 PL troops for integration. We recognized this figure not yet official but naturally wanted no misunderstanding of our views, which had been set forth especially by Sebald, and RLG assurances given that respect. As reminder I read excerpt from paper left for Souvanna by Sebald June 26, second and third sentences numbered paragraph 3, Deptel 1313, June 23.3
Said I had asked for instructions re our position, which expected would take into account intricacies of situation. Nevertheless RLG must recognize there were political realities to be faced in US as in Laos: Souvanna could imagine that US public and Congressional opinion would not take kindly to paying for Communist soldiers recently in armed conflict with proper Lao Government. In any case it would be very unlikely that direct integration fighting forces would be acceptable to US. Possibly some indirect arrangement might be worked out, i.e. eventual integration some elements after thorough screening and reindoctrination to insure no hardcore Communists let in. Even this might be hard, as PL would undoubtedly try, as Communists did everywhere, to infiltrate their most “faithful” elements; this worried US, and should worry RLG as well.
Souvanna insured me he understood necessities of our position. Said, as he had said before, that number of PL troops able be taken in must depend on spaces in Army—he would have take some, of course, 200 or 300, possibly even 400, but would make clear this depended [Page 780] entirely on spaces available under force ceiling. (Blancke observed this already a bit exceeded.) Prime Minister would moreover make no commitment involving US without consultation. Understood unfeasibility of direct integration, planned screen and indoctrinate internees thoroughly and keep them apart under special supervision. I again apologized for disturbing him at busy point but wanted insure no misunderstanding.
Prime Minister attitude throughout talk was friendly and receptive—as, perhaps, it is with everyone. He made no mention of Quan’s or Phoumi’s plans and I am confident none has been adopted. While [garble] no commitment yet made it is less good that preparations for talks have not been more concrete with firm initial position. I fear he still regards forthcoming meetings in terms of talks with his brother rather than negotiations with a Communist-controlled team.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.51J/8–156. Secret; Priority.↩
- In telegram 131, July 31, the Country Team reported that it had agreed to discuss with Lao leaders the question of Pathet Lao integration in the Lao National Army. Upon discussion with Chief of Staff Colonel Quan on July 31, Embassy officers discovered that he envisioned putting approximately 1,000 Pathet Lao into a “reserve” force as a separate unit. While the Country Team foresaw public relations problems with U.S. financial support of former Communist soldiers, it warned against becoming too inflexible. Instead, it suggested that the United States pay for a token force of 200–300 ex-Pathet Lao soldiers, which after screening and reindoctrination, would replace existing Lao National Army soldiers, thus keeping the Army below the 25,000 ceiling. (Ibid., 651G.51J/7–3156)↩
- Supra.↩