Office of the Historian

344. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Assistant (Special Operations) (Erskine) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)1

Washington, February 13, 1956.

SUBJECT

  • Support of Laos Resistance Forces
1.
As you are aware, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, has recommended that higher priority and more support be accorded Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied CINCPAC’s views and have recommended to the Secretary of Defense2 that increased emphasis on CIA operations can provide a useful and timely mechanism for increasing U.S. efforts to bolster Lao resistance to Communism.
2.
This recommendation is based on an estimate of low combat effectiveness of the Laos National Army, increasingly tenuous French support, disinclination of the United States to become openly and directly involved and the expressed confidence of Lao and other officials in the so-called “auto-defense” system.
3.

As you know, representatives of this office have recently returned from the area where they discussed with CINCPAC and with military personnel on the ground the implications of increased CIA support to its operations in Laos. The following JCS comments represent as well the opinions of these observers:

“CINCPAC considers that Laos National Army conventional offensive military operations are inadvisable at the present time. In his opinion, the Pathet Lao threat could be neutralized if not defeated by timely, aggressive, coordinated and adequately supported resistance force operations. These operations should be designed to harass enemy lines of communication and arouse hill tribes and villages against Pathet Lao in occupied area.

“CINCPAC has further stated that Central Intelligence Agency progress in supporting the resistance forces is good; however, the urgency of present situation necessitates that higher priority and more support be accorded Lao CIA operations.

“CINCPAC comments that the most obvious shortcoming of the CIA operations appears to be lack of on-the-ground supervision at district and village level and the absence of organic air transportation. CINCPAC considers that this support action represents CINCPAC’s priority requirement for Central Intelligence Agency support.”3

4.
While it is agreed that these views on the efficacy of guerrilla and auto-defense operations in the province of Sam Neua and Phong Saly may be somewhat optimistic, it is considered that if these expanded measures can achieve some expanded degree of success, they should be fully supported. It is the view of the Department of Defense observers who recently visited Laos that the auto-defense technique will not permit a final disposition of the Pathet Lao in Phong Saly and Sam Neua, but will perhaps generate a situation in which the regular armed forces of Laos will ultimately be enabled to eliminate these groups. CINCPAC has, in subsequent discussions, informally supported this view.
5.
We would be pleased to receive your views on this matter, and if you agree that it is feasible to expand your operations, to be informed in detail of the Defense support you require.4
G.B. Erskine
General USMC (Ret)
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/SA Files: FRC 60 B 1339, 320.2 Laos. Top Secret.↩
  2. Memorandum from JCS to Wilson, January 26, not printed. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Quoted material is from the memorandum cited in footnote 2 above.↩
  4. No CIA reply has been found, but see Document 351.↩