345. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald)1
SUBJECT
- Current Situation in Laos
ICC
Political Resolution—On January 7 the ICC adopted (Canadian and Indian voting for, Pole abstaining) a resolution recommending that the Royal Lao Government and the Pathet Lao resume negotiations with a view to restoring the Government’s administration in the two northern provinces without delay. Though not perfect, this resolution is favorable to the Lao Government and greatly improves its moral position. The Government accepted the recommendation on January 17, but the Pathet Lao, ignoring the ICC deadline of January 18, only acknowledged receipt of the document on January 25 and neither accepted [Page 745] nor rejected it. Regarding the Pathet Lao reply as in effect a rejection, the ICC on February 15 sent a special report to the co-Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference transmitting the resolution and correspondence relating thereto. On February 11 the Lao Government publicized the resolution and its reply, and USIA is giving the Lao propaganda effort full support.
Cease-Fire Resolution—To implement the ICC December 9 cease-fire resolution, already accepted by both the Lao Government and the Pathet Lao, the Indian Chairman has introduced in the Commission a further resolution calling for a demarcation line separating the opposing forces in Sam Neua. It would be a “purely military” line effective only “pending a political settlement”, to be supervised by joint commissions, and subject to review generally at monthly intervals. This smacks distressingly of partition in the manner of Viet-Nam.
We have presented to the Canadians our strong opposition in principle to such a line as being inimical to the Lao Government’s interests and directly in conflict with the Geneva Accords, which recognized the unity of Laos. Since it seems certain that a demarcation line will be adopted, however (the Indians regard preservation of a cease-fire as their main task in Laos), we have developed the following position: 1) The Canadian Commissioner should endeavor to insert language in the Indian draft making implementation of the cease-fire resolution specifically contingent upon Pathet Lao performance on the political resolution; 2) if the Canadians fail and a demarcation line is nevertheless adopted, the Lao Government, if it decides to accept it, should do so with strong and clear reservations fully safeguarding its future position. It seems less undesirable for the Lao Government to accept with reservations than to reject outright since in the latter event the Indians would simply state the Government and the Pathet Lao were equally at fault. External Affairs in Ottawa has already instructed the Canadian Commissioner to attempt to amend the resolution as we have suggested.
Auto-Defense
The Lao Government’s program of arming civilians in the two Pathet Lao provinces and organizing small-scale commando action behind Pathet Lao lines is proceeding steadily and will shortly be stepped up. It is reliably estimated that the temporary demarcation line which may be drawn in Sam Neua Province will not hamper these operations.
Formation of Lao Government
The National Assembly resulting from the December 25 elections convened on February 12, and the new government is expected to be presented to the Assembly on February 20. It is certain that [Page 746] Prime Minister Katay will succeed himself, and appears probable that the Cabinet will be a broad coalition containing both old faces and new. Inclusion of elements outside Katay’s own party would bring in some of the strongest pro-Western and anti-Communist leaders.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–2056. Secret. Drafted by Byrne.↩