Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

351. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Assistant (Special Operations) (Erskine) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray)¹

Washington, April 18, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Military Equipment for the Laotian National Army

1. As you are aware, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended² that the Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos be expanded to permit the additional arming of the Auto Defense Forces currently operating in the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. CIA’s resultant plan involves the transfer from the Laotian National Army to the Auto Defense guerrilla forces of a heterogeneous collection of weapons and their subsequent replacement by U.S. weapons and submachine guns.

2. Since the initiation of this plan, it appears that sufficient reserve stocks of the Laotian National Army have been utilized to equip the Auto Defense Forces. The U.S. Ambassador to Laos has, however, repeatedly requested that the U.S. weapons suggested as replacements for the Laotian Army be furnished without further delay in order that the United States may show her good faith to the Laotian Government.

3. It is recognized that, in this instance, the responsibility for initiating requests for military equipment rests with the International Cooperation Administration. I have been informed that such requests have not as yet reached your office. As you are aware, prompt initial deliveries are necessary if the full psychological value of the program is to be realized.

4. In order to assist in expediting final action on this program, I am quoting below pertinent extracts of a memorandum³ indicating program requirements, received from covert forces in the field; these will be repeated in the request from ICA:

“The following equipment is required from the Department of Defense to implement fully the support program and to continue it during the current fiscal year (to 30 June 1956):

• Carbines, .30 Calibre M–2—3,500
• Sub Machine Guns, .45 Calibre M–3—1,500
• .30 Calibre Carbine Ammunition—3,500,000 rds.
• .45 Calibre Ammunition—1,500,000 rds. …³

5. It is requested that all possible measures be undertaken to effect delivery of the small arms and ammunition involved as soon as possible.⁴ In this connection, I understand that the Canadian Government will probably be advised of our intentions. If the International Control Commission thus becomes aware of the shipment, it would probably be advisable to utilize U.S. military aircraft for the lift.

G.B. Erskine
General USMC (Ret)

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 60 b 1339, 400 Laos. Top Secret.
2. See footnote 2, Document 344.
3. Ellipsis in the source text.
3. Not found.
4. The request for 5,000 small arms was not fully authorized until May 30. This was done only after JCS Chairman Radford complained to Gray of ISA that he had learned from Ambassador Yost that only 500 of the 5,000 small arms had been delivered. (Memorandum from Radford to Gray, May 25, and memorandum from Hollister to McGuire, May 30; both Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 60 B 1339, 400 Laos)