Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

327. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, December 15, 1955—5 p.m.

750. Reference Department telegram 545.²

1. In our view little help can be expected of ICC in removing Pathet Lao threat. Canadians have tabled resolution calling for re-establishment Royal Administration in North (Embassy telegram 746³) but there is little chance Indians will support strong or effective recommendation. Most probable action is inconclusive report to Geneva co-chairmen.

2. Royal Government convinced ICC can serve no useful purpose in either of its main functions:

(1) Expediting political settlement.

(2) Enforcing military terms Geneva Agreement. Nevertheless, RG not likely brusquely ask ICC to leave but will increasingly tend ignore ICC and perhaps gradually encourage its withdrawal. Royal Government would certainly welcome prompt reduction in size ICC, which occupies badly-needed housing and office space. (We are inclined agree RG estimate and consider their gradual approach wise under circumstances.)

3. ICC itself not likely take any steps reduce or eliminate Commission Laos unless similar steps taken Vietnam. Poles obviously want remain, as indicated in Cambodia. Indians appear ready hang on and keep trying; Bridle is probably still several months away from exhausting his patience. Views of both might however, change with clear demonstrations ICC impotency. For present, both still appear to feel ICC can reduce likelihood, frequency and duration of conflicts between armed forces. To our mind, this will be true only if Canadians push freedom to investigate in PL area (Embassy telegram 740⁴).

4. We believe Pathet Lao after December 25 elections will tend to consolidate and formalize separate status and may even set up “government” in their area. They are boycotting elections, which they argue are being so conducted as to exclude PL “in violation Geneva Agreement”. PL have already warned that northern provinces as [are?] their exclusive “regroupment zone”. PL may try by military action push ANL out of areas ANL occupies in two provinces. ANL in effective counter to PL attack Muong Peune area last week (Embassy telegram 739⁵) casts doubt PL capability do so unless substantially reinforced by DRV, which, however, may be taking place.

5. RG post-election plans not yet clear. Highly probable RG will declare current elections are political settlement envisaged at Geneva and call on PL troops to accept reintegration into national community. Next step would be continued propaganda efforts demoralize PL and encourage defections, which have been significant in past two months. Coupled with increased guerrilla activity in PL area such efforts could appreciably weaken PL, whose rank-and-file have reportedly become increasingly demoralized in past few months. Nevertheless, doubtful such efforts alone can eliminate PL control its present sectors since DRV would be likely supply support necessary to hold area against this type erosion.

6. Prime Minister and Minister Defense seriously considering eventual military action to settle question but for political reasons contemplate responding to PL attack rather than taking military initiative. Decision far from firm, however, and has not been raised before whole Cabinet. Possible that even in absence Cabinet decision ANL, if attacked, would launch vigorous counter-offensive and might in process capture major points two provinces. Chances success would, of course, be increased by action mentioned foregoing paragraph. On other hand, strong Anglo-French-Indian pressure on RG might inhibit other than purely defensive military action.

7. It is uncertain to what extent RG will be prepared after elections to continue efforts toward peaceful settlement. It will probably try avoid onus of showing unwillingness to negotiate on any terms and may consider reasonable ICC suggestions; however, it will probably refuse even to begin bilateral negotiations without prior PL commitment on re-establishing Royal Administration, which unlikely. It is conceivable RG may eventually offer hold “complementary elections”, with PL participation, to elect additional deputies, but this also unlikely unless military operations definitely vetoed.

8. In December 25 elections, our present guess is that Katay and Phoui and their followers will win at least two-thirds Assembly seats. Phoui according to his brother Ngon content let Katay remain as Prime Minister, and probability is new government will not differ substantially from present government. On one hand, it will be pro-Western and susceptible to Western guidance if exercised with discretion. On other hand, it will not be free from opportunism and, if Western support should slacken or Peking play PL card with skill, could be enticed into flirtation with other side. With adequate Western aid it will continue to be able maintain internal security outside of two northern provinces.

9. Department undoubtedly far better situated judge overall Communist bloc posture than we. In our view DRV will continue support PL covertly and increasingly, with men and matériel, but will during next six months stop short of overt, large-scale intervention even at risk of seeing PL driven into the hills, particularly if SEATO intention hold umbrella over Laos made clear.

10. We continue feel only possibility peaceful re-establishment Royal administration in North lies in change in policy toward Laos by Moscow and Peking. Department is in best position to judge whether high-level Western approach to bring about such change is feasible and could conceivably be effective.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–1555. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ottawa, New Delhi, London, Paris, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. In telegram 545, December 8, the Department requested the Embassy’s views on the political situation in Laos in conjunction with the preparation of NIE 63.3/1–55, infra. The Department specifically requested information on the ICC situation, election prospects, Communist bloc posture regarding Laos, and views of Lao political leaders. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–855)
3. Dated December 14, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/12–1455)
4. Dated December 12, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/12–1255)
5. Dated December 13, not printed. (Ibid.)