Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 15, 1955—7 p.m.

447. Since Rangoon delegation’s return, I have talked with Katay, Sen, Bridle and Kirpal. Following is a summary of impressions.

Katay, who during past nine months had swung from view Pathet leaders only erring brothers to view they are 90 percent communist stooges, was swayed by Souphannouvong’s unexpected cordiality and apparent conciliatoriness to believe Prince wants settlement. On other hand, Katay (1) believes Phoumi (leader Pathet Vientiane delegation) is opposed to settlement and (2) recognizes Pekin or Hanoi may veto settlement. He therefore concludes settlement is possible, but not probable. He says agreement must be reached by October 31 if elections are to take place in two northern provinces, and that elections will proceed in remaining ten provinces whether or not agreement is reached. He said Souphannouvong agreed meet next time in Vientiane if further meeting two leaders required. Contrary to previous intention, he does not plan RG appeal to Geneva powers until after elections, since he does not wish to provoke possible interference with elections.

Katay excuses his principal concessions at Rangoon as follows. Bxd [Ban?] on reinforcements to two provinces preceded by sufficient reinforcement ANL units there; troops in neighboring Luang Prabang and Xien Khouang provinces can be moved in rapidly if Pathet attacks occur. Agreement to submit to Bureau National Assembly Pathet request for authority their candidates to file after October 10 deadline is meaningless since Bureau will certainly not agree.

Sen, with irrepressible optimism or wishful thinking maintains Rangoon meeting “65 percent successful” and that gap between two parties not wide. He recognizes Souphannouvong presumably checking now with Viets but hopes two delegations can be brought together in Vientiane within next few days and will press them hard to do so. He believes “final” deadline for agreement is November 12. He obviously will not support ICC report or appeal to Geneva powers before that date, and not even then if faintest glimmer of hope of settlement remains.

… ANL leaders do not consider cease-fire will stick period.

Our tentative conclusions are following:

1. Rangoon exercise was helpful in that RG has clearly demonstrated, to Lao people and to other governments, conciliatory spirit, even going further than some of its friends thought wise. British and Canadians more than satisfied and Indians have no complaints.

2. Rangoon exercise was harmful in that Pathets have once again successfully stalled, escaped onus for rupture or deadlock without making any real concessions or permitting issue to come to head in such way as to make ICC decision and report inevitable. It is now impossible to escape additional two weeks to one months shilly-shallying, and no assurance ICC will act even then.

3. As long as negotiations continue, there will always be some danger perilous RG concessions. In view influence Crown Prince and others, as well as imminent election deadlines, we consider such concessions unlikely. We will make ourselves heard if necessary and will urge any further negotiations be confined to Vientiane.

4. Had Pathets really desired participate in elections, we feel they would have agreed earlier in order permit longer active campaign. Barring change in orders from Pekin–Hanoi, we expect them continue to stall, avoid break but refuse permit effective restoration Royal Administration in two provinces.

5. As indicated Embtel 437,² we continue to believe prompt high-level action required to prevent de facto partition of Laos, which becomes more and more confirmed by time, and possible outbreak sizable hostilities in two provinces.

6. From point of view critical nature Lao situation, we would continue urge Western powers take initiative in raising question along lines suggested Embtel 437. We realize however there may be wider considerations which would make such initiative injudicious. In that case we urge Western power be at least prepared, in case Soviets raise Vietnam issue, to respond with aggressive presentation Lao case as one both more immediate and more critical than Vietnamese and as requiring prior settlement as test of Communist sincerity.

7. Unless hostilities should break out, we doubt that ICC will report, and thus create further occasion for high-level discussion, before end of year.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1555. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, New Delhi, Ottawa, Bangkok, Saigon, And Phnom Penh.
2. Dated October 12, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/10–1255)