309. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson1
SUBJECT
- Developments in Laos, August 15–September 2, 1955
Government–Pathet Lao Negotiations
With the principal object of educating the Indians on the ICC, the Lao Government is patiently continuing negotiations with the Pathet Lao. Chief matter at issue is the elections scheduled for December 25: The Pathet Lao insist upon clearly unnecessary changes in the electoral law as a prerequisite for their turning over administration of the two provinces to the Royal Government.
It is expected that negotiations will break down, and the Indian Chairman has set September 24 as the deadline for a settlement. After that date the ICC intends to recommend terms, which it is anticipated will be unacceptable to one or both sides. Though uncertain of the Indian attitude at that point, the Canadian Ambassador is determined to present a resolution on the Government’s right to exercise its authority in the two provinces, force it to a vote, and refer the entire matter to the Geneva co-Chairmen.
Doggedly optimistic, the Indian Chairman is determined to explore every means of reaching a solution. To this end, he talked with the Pathet Lao leader, Prince Souphannouvong, coming away with three main and characteristically Indian impressions: 1) The Pathet Lao chief was completely “sincere”; 2) force would not achieve a settlement; and Viet Minh influence with the Pathet Lao was exaggerated. The Indian Chairman is arranging a meeting between the Lao Prime Minister and Souphannovong.
Military
Throughout the negotiations the Pathet Lao have continued their small-scale attacks against National Army posts in Sam Neua, presumably with the aim of pushing Government forces out of the province or at least into the triangle which the Pathet Lao are offering the Government in the current military talks. Although ordering strong resistance, the Government apparently does not want at this time to revive the issue in the SEACDT.
[Page 682]Ambassador Yost’s Prediction
In a telegram of August 25,2 Ambassador Yost speculated that the situation likely to confront Laos in October or November was one involving 1) intensified fighting in the two provinces and the possible expulsion of the Royal forces; 2) a break-down in Government-Pathet negotiations and reference of the problem to the Geneva powers where it would probably languish indefinitely; and 3) an electoral campaign in full swing, denounced by the Pathet Lao as a farce in violation of the Geneva Agreements and interrupted by Communist-provoked disorders.
Crown Prince’s Visit to India
On September 18 the Lao Crown Prince will visit India and will undoubtedly make a plea for Indian support in obtaining Communist adherence to the Geneva Accords. We are suggesting that the Crown Prince try a secondary tack: He might state his willingness to see a reduction of Western, i.e., American, influence in Laos, if India could assume some or all of the financial responsibilities now borne by the U.S., or if India could use its influence to obtain Communist pledges of nonintervention in Laos, thus decreasing the external threat and concomitantly the need of American aid.3
Acceleration of the Police Program
In order to insure a non-Communist election victory, the Lao Government and our missions in Vientiane have recommended that the police program be accelerated so that a 2,000-man force (1,000 new recruits) would be ready by the end of October. Interested Washington agencies have approved the speed-up, and the Department of Defense and ICA are taking steps to ship the required equipment to Laos immediately. MDA markings will be removed from redistributable equipment in Viet-Nam, and civilian carriers used to transport the items to Laos.
Helicopters
Because of serious communications difficulties in the two northern provinces which are characterized by inaccessible terrain, the Department has recommended that two helicopters be provided the Lao Government for liaison and supply of commando posts. The Thai Government is willing to lend two such craft, if the U.S. guarantees replacement should they be lost or damaged in Laos, and furnish pilots and maintenance. The Department of Defense has now agreed [Page 683] to a contingency guarantee of replacement by the addition of two helicopters to the Thai MDA program.
As a result of conversations with the Canadian Ambassador on ICC Laos, we do not anticipate difficulties in the importation of these helicopters or of the police equipment, despite the restrictions of Article 9 of the Geneva Agreement on Laos.
Rice
Because of the Thai refusal to advance the $3 million credit required by the Japanese to finance the purchase of rice for Laos, negotiations on the triangular rice deal have come to nought. Consequently, the ICA today authorized the use of Lao program dollars for the direct purchase of 10,000 tons of Thai glutenous rice to meet the Lao shortage.
The Cambodian Government has not come forward with a firm request for additional rice, and there are no plans for a similar Cambodian dollar purchase of rice in Burma.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–255. Secret. Drafted by Byrne.↩
- Telegram 217, Document 308.↩
- In the margin of the source text at this point Young wrote the following: “I am not sure yet this is sound. KTY”↩