Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

308. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, August 25, 1955—5 p.m.

217. Following is summary current status and future prospects Pathet Lao problem:²

1. All leaders Royal Government are now fully aware that Pathets are committed instruments of Viets and ChiComs, that intention of their masters is to retain control 2 Lao northern provinces for use as base against remainder Laos and as bargaining counter in Vietnam settlement, and that, unless there is radical change in this intention, no agreement with Pathets is possible.

2. Government continues political and military negotiations with Pathets solely to satisfy ICC, world opinion and particularly Indians. Since, however, they felt it would be dangerous to make further substantive concessions to Pathets, and Indian ICC chairman is still pressing for such concessions from both sides and taxing government with indifference, government may fail to satisfy him of its desire for settlement. Meanwhile Crown Prince will make personal plea to Nehru in Delhi first week September.

3. While ICC continues to postpone date when they will consider possibilities of bilateral negotiation exhausted, it would not appear, in view imminent Lao elections, negotiations could be prolonged beyond end September. Indians and Canadians have agreed that, if negotiations break down, ICC would give problem to Geneva Powers. What is not yet clear is (a) whether Poles will agree to this procedure, (b) whether if they do Indians, in effort to obtain ICC unanimity, will propose “compromise” unacceptable to Royal Government or (c) whether, regardless of Polish attitude, Sen could be persuaded join Canadians in recommending immediate reestablishment Royal administration in 2 provinces. In any case it seems extremely probable that any solution proposed by ICC would be rejected by one or both parties and problem would be thrown into lap of Geneva Powers, either by ICC or by Royal Government.

4. Meanwhile fighting in 2 provinces is being stepped up, in first instance by Pathets with view either to reducing area held by Royal forces or to driving them out altogether, in second instance by government which is reinforcing its garrisons in order to maintain and consolidate their position and improve supply lines. Should bilateral negotiations break down, fighting would probably be further intensified. While approximately ⅓ of Royal Army is already in 2 provinces, government believes it could with further reinforcement hold principal positions against Pathets, but probably could not do so if covert Viet participation is substantially increased. Viets undoubtedly have capability driving government forces out of 2 provinces whenever they wish.

5. Government intends to proceed with December 25 elections in 10 provinces even if no settlement with Pathets is reached. In this case Pathets will probably urge abstention from elections, though they may well same time (a) provoke disorders wherever they are able, (b) clandestinely back candidates susceptible to their influence and (c) hold separate elections in 2 provinces they occupy.

6. In summary, situation likely to confront Laos in October or November involves (a) intensified fighting in two provinces and possible expulsion Royal Forces, (b) breakdown bilateral negotiations and reference Lao problem to Geneva powers where it wo old be likely to languish indefinitely, (c) electoral campaign in full swing, denounced by Pathets as farce in violation Geneva accords and interrupted by Pathet-provoked disorders.

Comment: Since strength Pathet-Viet forces and attitude UK, France and India presumably preclude reconquest two provinces by force, only foreseeable means of avoiding these eventualities would be radical shift in policy Communist powers toward Lao problem. While such shift in near future seems improbable, it does not seem completely inconceivable in view (a) relative unimportance two Lao Northern provinces and (b) Nehru’s expressed interest in Laos and Cambodia.

Pressure on Communist powers could be exerted through following channels: (1) Indian would be most efficacious if Nehru would be sufficiently peremptory. Indians, however, are not enthusiastic about present Lao Government. It seems very doubtful Nehru would risk jeopardizing his overall relations with ChiComs by being as stem as situation probably demands. Nevertheless Laos, UK, US and France might well urge him to do so. (2) Geneva machinery will probably be that preferred by UK and France. In this case also mild degree of reassure likely to be exerted would almost certainly be inefficacious. (3) Manila Pact machinery should be used, if UK and France will go along, for deterrent warning [garble] Pathet-Viets intensify military operations, but it would not be helpful in political settlement. (4) Most valuable vehicle of pressure, in absence of effective Indian, would probably be projected high-level negotiations with Communist powers. It is recognized raising Lao problems in this framework might facilitate Communist efforts bring about discussion other Far Eastern issues, which we would consider premature, and in particular provide new opening for linking Laos and Vietnam. One means of avoiding this gambit might be to put Laos forward in Far East, in somewhat same way Austria was put forward in Europe, as preliminary test Communist sincerity in their alleged adherence to principles peaceful co-existence and non-interference internal affairs other states, test on outcome of which our willingness to negotiate other issues might depend.

I believe prospects in Laos are sufficiently serious to warrant resort to all four of these means of pressure as situation develops during next two or three months. Unless they are used effectively, probability is that (1) two provinces will be lost to Laos for indefinite future and “independent’ regime or government established there, (2) this regime will increasingly work to subvert Lao authorities and people in rest of country, (3) free world will lose face in Laos and in area generally, (4) disturbed and unstable Laos will constitute source of infection for neighboring South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, (5) temptation to Royal Government leaders to make hazardous pilgrimage to Hanoi and Peking will be greatly enhanced.

While I do no consider loss two provinces by any means necessarily entails loss rest of Laos, I consider it would constitute most grave obstacle to restoration stability in Southeast Asia.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2555. Secret. Repeated to Paris, New Delhi, London, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. A more informal assessment of the situation is contained in a letter from Yost to Young, September 1. (Ibid., PSA Files: Lot 58 D 207, SEA, Lao Correspondence (1955))