Office of the Historian

307. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald)1

Washington, August 24, 1955.

Bill: At the restricted OCB luncheon meeting today2 I took up with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson and General Erskine and General Cabell the question of the Thai Government providing two helicopters to the Laotian Government. I said that I had discussed this problem with Secretary Dulles last evening and that he was personally much interested in this project.3 I said we envisaged this as being publicly presented as a Thai initiative and that we had in mind the furnishing of the helicopters by the Thai Government to the Laotian Government … . While everybody agreed to the desirability of this project, and General Cabell strongly supported, General Erskine said it seemed to him there were two problems involved: (1) availability of helicopters, and (2) if we were going to undertake a commitment to replace the two Thai helicopters if they should be lost, we should have to have funds available for this purpose. He did not know where the funds could be found.

With respect to availability of helicopters, I said this was not, I believed, very pertinent. While I recognized they were in critical short supply, the commitment would be to replace them and if it took us a few months to do so, I did not think this would raise a real problem with the Thai Government since the very fact they they were willing to loan them indicated that they did not have an overriding need for them at this juncture. With respect to funds to back up such a commitment, it was agreed that the appropriate people in the Department of State would get in touch with Mr. Gordon Gray’s office to examine the possibilities.4 (To avoid this being kicked around at the lower level, I would suggest that you see Mr. Gordon Gray personally on this matter and that prior to such a meeting you might consult with Mr. Nolting as to the possibilities for funds to back up this commitment.) I also told the Defense representatives [Page 678] that we would be sending a telegram to Ambassador Yost5 outlining how we hoped to deal with the situation by having the Thais provide the two aircraft as set forth above, and asking his general reaction as well as to how he thought the ICC would react.6 It was agreed that State should send forward such a telegram this afternoon. I made clear that the telegram would indicate that we wished Ambassador Yost’s views and it was not to be discussed with the Laotian Government at this juncture.

DMacA
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2455. Top Secret; Limit Distribution.↩
  2. There is no record of this discussion in either the OCB minutes or in the preliminary notes of OCB luncheon meetings. (Ibid., OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430) Apparently topics discussed at the “restricted” meeting were off the record.↩
  3. A brief report is in a memorandum from MacArthur to Sebald, August 24, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/8–2455)↩
  4. According to telegram 158 to Vientiane, September 1, the Department of Defense agreed to replace the two Thai helicopters should they be lost or damaged in Laos. (Ibid., 751.5622/9–9155) This eventually paved the way for the Thai loan of helicopters, pilots, and maintenance support to Laos.↩
  5. Telegram 131 to Vientiane, August 24, not printed. (Ibid., 751.5622/8–2455)↩
  6. In telegram 228 from Vientiane, August 28, the Embassy suggested that in light of an earlier ICC decision that the Royal Government had considerable freedom in importing arms for its own defense, it would be preferable to import the helicopters directly for the Ministry of Defense with the disclaimer that they would not be used for offensive purposes. (Ibid., 751.5622/8–2755)↩