Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

306. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 63.3–55

Washington, July 26, 1955.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS TO JULY 1956²

The Problem

To analyze the present strengths and weaknesses of Laos; and to estimate probable future developments and trends to July 1956.

Conclusions

1. Laos is a primitive, sparsely populated kingdom which emerged as a political and administrative unit only after World War II. In 1953 Laos realized its independence within the French Union. Since January 1955, the US has provided assistance essential to balance the Laotian budget and international payments position and to maintain its armed forces. (Paras. 8, 11, 40–43)

2. There is a large measure of unity in non-Communist political circles in Laos. Except for the current rice shortage, there are few pressing economic and social problems which are readily exploitable by the Communists. Nevertheless, the country is in a poor position to deal with the Communist threat because of popular apathy and rudimentary communications and transportation, and because of long dependence on the French for most important administration and security functions. (Paras. 8, 13, 40)

3. The Pathet Lao, a small group of radical Lao nationalists taken over and supported by the “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” (DRV), poses the immediate Communist threat to Laos. At Geneva, the Pathet Lao was afforded recognition and was permitted to regroup its forces in the two northern Lao provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua pending a political settlement. Since then it has prevented the Lao government from reestablishing administrative control over these two provinces. The Pathet Lao, with DRV support, is using the time gained from prolonged negotiations with the Lao government to strengthen its armed forces and its political control in the northern area of Laos. However, the Pathet Lao military forces, without reinforcement by DRV units, will probably not develop during the period of this estimate the capability to seize Laos by force. (Paras. 19, 23, 29)

4. Pathet Lao, in its negotiations with the Lao government, will continue to seek participation in a coalition government for all of Laos. It will probably also continue its propaganda to have its area and candidates included in the national elections scheduled for December 1955. The Pathet Lao is unlikely to accept any proposal which weakens its control of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Unless directed to do so for reasons of Bloc strategy, the Pathet Lao is unlikely to launch attacks southward from its present areas or to initiate general guerrilla warfare throughout Laos during the period of this estimate. However, the Pathet Lao possibly reinforced by infiltrated DRV regulars, will probably continue its military efforts to force the small isolated Royal Lao Army garrisons to withdraw from Sam Neua and Phong Saly. (Para. 30)

5. The Laotian government will probably continue efforts to counter the Pathet Lao by improving Lao military and security forces and by seeking to obtain full support of the major non-Communist powers. We believe that during the period of this estimate, the Lao government will probably continue to exclude significant Pathet Lao influence in the other ten provinces. Furthermore, we believe the major non-Communist political parties will probably win a substantial majority in the national elections scheduled for December 1955. (Paras. 18, 27)

6. The Lao government almost certainly will not be able to solve the Pathet Lao problem by force during the period of this estimate. Despite its numerical strength, the Lao Army does not have the logistic and command capabilities to conduct a large-scale military operation. Moreover, the French are unlikely to provide such support. In any case, in the unlikely event that the Lao government should attempt to regain control of the two northern provinces by force, the DRV would probably covertly provide military units sufficient to prevent the destruction of the Pathet Lao. Although the Lao government may be able by covert means to develop an anti-Communist resistance effort in Pathet Lao territory, such resistance will probably not weaken Pathet Lao forces significantly or threaten Communist control of the northern provinces. (Paras. 31, 38, 45)

7. In the longer run, if the Pathet Lao is not suppressed by force, the best that the Lao government can hope to accomplish is to increase its military and police effectiveness and popular support sufficiently to prevent the spread of Pathet Lao influence. The long-range prospects for achieving this limited objective appear slightly better than even if Laos receives timely economic, technical, and military assistance. The chances would be greatly reduced if South Vietnam fell under DRV control. (Para. 32)

Discussion

[Here follow sections I, “Introduction,” and II, “Government and Politics.”]

III The Pathet Lao

18. The government, unless it regains administrative control in the two Pathet Lao provinces, probably will not attempt to hold elections there, and non-Communist candidates in the remaining ten provinces will probably win a large majority of seats in the National Assembly. However, if the major non-Communist groups fail to cooperate, Communists or Communist sympathizers may win some seats. In any event, we believe that the post-election government will be controlled by a coalition similar to the present Cabinet grouping and that it will follow similar foreign and domestic policies.

19. The principal internal threat to the Royal Lao government is the Communist-controlled Pathet Lao movement. It began in 1949 as a splinter of the Free Laos movement when a group of the more radical nationalists led by Prince Souphanouvong joined the Viet Minh in Tonkin. The Prince was probably motivated by ambition for the throne and an intense hatred for the French. Although this Lao “independence” movement had virtually no popular support among Laotians, the Viet Minh integrated this group into the DRV united front in 1951 as the “Neo-Lao Itsala Front.” The executive arm of this front was called the “Pathet Lao.”

20. When substantial DRV regular forces entered Laos in 1953 and again in early 1954, they brought with them a small number of Laotian military units and installed the prefabricated “Resistance Government of Pathet Lao” in northern Laos. At the Geneva Conference, the Communists exaggerated Pathet Lao strength (at that time Pathet Lao forces numbered about 2,500 poorly armed men) and won the right for the Pathet Lao forces to regroup in the two northern provinces pending a “political settlement.” Although at Geneva the Lao government asserted its right to administer these two provinces and the conference “took note” of this declaration, the Pathet Lao has been able to establish effective control over all Sam Neua and Phong Saly, except for several small isolated pockets held by some 2,500 regular troops of the Royal Army. The Communists have since stubbornly maintained this control insisting that such was the intent of the Geneva accords. Long political negotiations between the two sides under the auspices of the International Control Commission (ICC) for Laos have produced no settlement.

21. Despite intensive efforts by the Pathet Lao, assisted by the DRV, to indoctrinate propagandize the Lao population of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, the movement probably has won few willing adherents and for the present at least has little popular support. There have been reports of widespread confiscation of land and property in these two provinces and of severe measures against local officials accused of being disloyal to the Communists. The small Communist cadres, which probably remained behind in some of the other provinces when the Pathet Lao troops regrouped in the north, have apparently generated little popular support for their cause in the other Lao provinces. The Vietnamese taint associated with the Pathet Lao movement has hampered Communist efforts because Laotians generally fear and dislike Vietnamese, whether Communist or non-Communist. Moreover, the aggressive tactics of the Communist movement are substantially more alien to the Lao people than to the Vietnamese.

22. Using the respite afforded them by the Geneva Agreements and by the subsequent negotiations with the Lao government, the Pathet Lao has strengthened its military forces. With direct Viet Minh aid in equipment and advisory personnel (believed attached to all Pathet units), the Pathet Lao has built up an estimated armed strength of 6,000, organized into twelve infantry battalions and one heavy weapons battalion. Four infantry battalions are deployed in Phong Saly and the remainder in Sam Neua.

23. The effectiveness of these forces has apparently increased in recent months as a result of intensive training and indoctrination. However, a shortage of rice, coupled with a general lack of ideological motivation, may have resulted in poor morale among some of the units. Moreover, some of the troops are reportedly forced conscripts from areas which the Pathet Lao occupied prior to its regroupment in Sam Neua and Phong Saly.

Government Relations with the Pathet Lao

24. Since the Geneva Conference, Lao government relations with the Pathet Lao have been tense, and on several occasions actual fighting has occurred. Following repeated efforts by the ICC, a ceasefire was finally concluded between the two sides on 9 March 1955. However, sporadic small-scale fighting has continued around Royal Laotian Army posts in Sam Neua and Phong Saly, and political negotiations which began in January between the government and the Pathet Lao are at a stalemate.

25. Faced with its own military inadequacies³ and with the threat of DRV reinforcement of the Pathet position if the Royal Lao Army attempts to assert its control over the two provinces, the Katay government has sought by negotiation to reach some compromise settlement. Although Premier Katay has probably become increasingly ware of the Communist motivation and allegiance of the Pathet Lao, he apparently is still willing to continue negotiations in the hope that if DRV control of the Pathet Lao can be eliminated these “wayward brothers” can be brought back into the fold. Moreover, he probably hopes that by demonstrating the intransigence of the present Pathet Lao position, the ICC will be influenced to support the Royal Lao government. The Pathet Lao’s ultimate objective is the formation of a coalition government throughout Laos. In the most recent renewal of intermittent political talks between the government and the Pathet Lao, the government has finally acceded to Pathet Lao demands to discuss election procedures prior to settlement of the problem of restoring Royal administration in the two provinces.

The Lao government has considered other methods of regaining control of the two provinces. Plans for covert stimulation of popular uprisings in the Pathet Lao area have been made, but numerous Lao leaders, including Prime Minister Katay, fear that success might induce the DRV to intervene, or that failure might force the Lao government to commit its regular forces to defend the loyal partisans. Meanwhile, the government has appointed two high-ranking military officers as governors of the two provinces. These officers, accompanied by lower-level officials, have now installed themselves in the small areas of Sam Neua and Phong Saly still occupied by the Lao government.

27. We believe that the Lao government will continue to seek a resolution of the Pathet Lao problem by negotiation, perhaps accompanied by the covert activation and support of anti-Pathet Lao guerrillas in Sam Neua and Phong Saly. It is unlikely that the Lao government will attempt to seize Sam Neua and Phong Saly by force, particularly so long as such a move is deterred by the presence of the ICC, is actively discouraged by France and the UK, and lacks the full support of the US.

28. In the absence of direct military action by the Lao government, the Pathet Lao will probably tighten its control over Sam Neua and Phong Saly. The capability of Pathet Lao security forces will probably be improved, primarily as a result of DRV material and advisory assistance. Moreover, sizeable DRV military units readily available to support the Pathet Lao will continue to be stationed on the Laos–Tonkin border. Elements of these units might be infiltrated to support the Pathet Lao if the Communists consider that their control of the provinces is threatened.

29. The Pathet Lao will probably continue to seek to develop popular support and guerrilla bases throughout Laos, and to weaken and discredit the Lao government and its leaders. Although it will probably have some success in these efforts, the Pathet Lao almost certainly will not develop sufficient popular appeal or military strength during the period of this estimate to gain control of Laos.

30. Pathet Lao in its negotiations with the Lao government, will continue to seek participation, in some manner, in a coalition government for all of Laos. It will probably also continue its propaganda to have its area and candidates included in the national elections scheduled for December 1955. The Pathet Lao will not be willing to accept any proposal which weakens its control of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Unless directed to do so for reasons of Bloc strategy, the Pathet Lao is unlikely to launch attacks southward from its present areas or to initiate general guerrilla warfare throughout Laos during the period of this estimate. However, the Pathet Lao, possibly reinforced by infiltrated DRV regulars, will probably continue its military efforts to force the small isolated Royal Lao Army garrisons to withdraw from Sam Neua and Phong Saly.

31. The Lao government almost certainly will not be able to solve the Pathet Lao problem by force during the period of this estimate. In the unlikely event that the Lao government should attempt to regain control of the two northern provinces by force, the DRV would probably covertly provide military units sufficient to prevent the destruction of the Pathet Lao. Although the Lao government may be able by covert means to develop an anti-Communist resistance effort in Pathet Lao territory, such resistance will probably not weaken Pathet Lao forces significantly or threaten Communist control of the northern provinces.

32. In the longer run, if the Pathet Lao is not suppressed by force, the best that the Lao government can hope to accomplish is to increase its military and police effectiveness and popular support sufficiently to prevent the spread of Pathet Lao influence. The long-range prospects for achieving this limited objective appear slightly better than even if Laos receives timely economic, technical, and military assistance. However, the chances would be greatly reduced if South Vietnam fell under DRV control.

[Here follow sections IV, “Civil and Security Functions,” V, “Economic Conditions,” and VI, “Foreign Relations.”]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates were high-level interdepartmental reports appraising foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the CIA, approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the members of the NSC. The Department of State provided many of the political and some economic sections of NIEs.

   According to a note on the cover sheet of this NIE, the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: CIA, and intelligence organizations of Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the IAC concurred with this estimate on July 26 with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

2. This estimate supersedes portions of NIE 63–17–54 on Laos. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NIE 63–7–54, November 23, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, p. 2286.]
3. See paragraphs 32–37. [Footnote in the source text.]