Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

291. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, May 3, 1955—6 p.m.

619. Reference Department Circular telegrams 559² and 560;³ Legtel 605.⁴ Following is requested country study representing agreed views of Legation, … USARMA and USOM. Principal auxiliary references, to be read in conjunction this study, are: Legtel 572,⁵ reassessment as of late April of situation in Laos and US policy in regard thereto; Tousfo 173, summary report of US states police survey mission, and report itself pouched FOA/W April 21;⁶ Legtels 567⁷ and 601,⁸ preliminary negotiations on military budget, force levels and organization of Lao Army. Discussion follows on basis numbered general outline at end of Department circular telegram 559:

I. Potential for liberation of Laos is already highly advanced and dangerous; this should be underlying premise throughout discussion. While doubtful enemy will for time being undertake military action on scale to prompt Manila Pact reprisals, its position is such that its forces could if desired infiltrate from North Vietnam, Sam Neua and/or Phong Saly interest of Laos, initiating guerrilla warfare and/or extensive covert political activity in virtually any area according its estimate of tactical possibilities of situation. Communist Pathet Laos (PL) have strong bases Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces whence they unlikely be dislodged in foreseeable future; large Communist military units are positioned just over Viet Minh (VM) and Red Chinese borders, which borders also provide privileged sanctuary, and ability build up with VM equipment and training, to PL; throughout rest of Laos, Communist cells, in unestimated number and extent, lie ready for action when called upon, and small groups of stay-behind VM remain spotted through country to encourage cells and support action if and when called for. Laos moreover is country where Communist able enter government legally through elections. Upcoming elections late summer or fall would provide setting for such propaganda or strong arm activities as Communists may deem suitable; present indication is PL will present full slate candidates throughout country. Stage is thus set for Communist action along classic lines and we must be prepared for propaganda subversion and/or terrorism in mixture to be determined by enemy high command. As Legation has often pointed out, wishful hopes for elimination of Communist threat through peaceful negotiation and efforts of ICC are dangerously naive.

II. Except for US-sponsored paramilitary training program for 200 Lao police and gendarmérie in Thailand, which expected be under way within one week, Royal Government has to date depended only on conventional military and police actions to combat subversion. This owed in some part to administrative confusion resulting from quite recent graduation to full independence, and in some part to generally lackadaisical Lao outlook; for most part however it appears due to fact Lao Government has been mesmerized by hopes pinned on negotiations with PL (premise: PL are not really Communists but only wayward brothers who will return patriotically to fold once reasonable give-and-take presented). Thus no special counter-measures have been developed, nor indeed any concerted plans for confronting Red threat in coming national elections. In a word, question of subversion has not been faced up to.

(a) Til quite recently Lao police have been more aware of subversion menace than other branches government, though incapable of controlling with present limited strength and organization. But with progressive manifestation of impotence of ICC and PL intransigeance (latter culminating in break-off April negotiations after only two days) government in general now appears more and more aware of Red threat and attitude is stiffening. If line is to be held however, government must undertake considerably more concerted and effective steps than manifested to date, including formation unified national front against guerrilla resistance existing in these provinces.

(b) JCS paper already assigned Lao forces task of maintaining internal security (rather than halting outside aggression). Lao Chief of Staff recently recognized this as limit of capabilities, and similar limitation on part of gendarmérie was recognized in survey report summarized Tousfo 173.

1. Preliminary police survey referenced above, which based on thorough study Lao police and gendarmeérie and which Leg. and USOM consider sound, concludes these services today are not capable of discharging responsibilities public safety or successfully combatting concerted effort Communist infiltration or subversion. Survey concludes however, that it possible strengthen services to point where they can discharge responsibilities by: (A) Immediately combining police and gendarmérie into one service under single ministry (police now under Interior; gendarmérie under Defense) and increasing combined strength over 2 years from 1,000 to 4,000; (B) training personnel in civil police duties and paramilitary techniques; (C) providing for maximum mobility and extensive radio communications net works; (D) providing necessary arms; ammo, laboratory equipment, housing. Survey team convinced effective police service most immediate: Related to goal of increased internal security and that police program envisaged would provide a type of security force which would be provided by army, though anticipating closer working relationship between two. Lao Government has already in principle taken decision to merge police and gendarmérie, and broad outlines of survey will soon be communicated to government.

2. Though police/gendarmérie have primary responsibility for detection, detention and prosecution of individuals and small groups, army holds line in 2 penetrated provinces and must be available as striking force in support of police elsewhere when problem reaches sufficient proportions. If for example substantial infiltration results in guerrilla outbreak, action passes to army. Army must also show flag throughout countryside; even when no infiltration evident, army should in our opinion be present in greater numbers than gendarmérie to give population sense of security. At present we consider army capable discharge latter responsibilities but not doing so adequately, concentrating for most part rather on 2 penetrated provinces and in more populous or controversial areas. Direct US support of and organization of Lao Armed Forces is in principle designed to strengthen army capabilities to combat and control internal problem.

(c) Population for most part appears not so much worked up re Communism itself as it is generally insecure. Attitude seems part apathy part apprehension. In some parts of country, not only areas formerly occupied by VM, areas adjacent 2 provinces in which PL predominant, or south central areas near VM borders, there have been instances villagers refusing government offers of aid because apprehensive other side may come back. If felt government had situation in hand would probably for most part support it; if army (provided it behaved well) came to these areas in force and effective gendarmérie operating, confidence in government would probably return. In other areas than those mentioned, population believed relatively indifferent excepting where Chief of Province exceptionally diligent and effective.

III. Aside from direct support to Lao forces and proposed strengthening of police/gendarmérie, both of which commented on in passing above, US programs are directed principally at (a) economic aid and (b) propaganda. To date most of effort these lines has perforce been devoted to groundwork and first beginnings.

(a) Immediate need in economic aid is for relief (food and supplies) and credits for reconstruction: Also, price reduction of essential goods through import program. Element in future USOM programs will be to bring US aid to village levels through broad based village program. Improvement transport and communications, which long been focus USOM programs being stepped up FY 1956, has also direct bearing on internal security. Extensive agricultural development now being studied. Indirectly, almost all USOM programs appear have impact over period to mean will to resist of local populations, and this factor will be touchstone in evaluating future USOM activities.

(b) Under technical direction USIS extensive information project has just been launched by USOM to counteract Communist propaganda and subversion. Several principal anti-Communist movies now finished, 2 more are almost ready and others are in preparation or planned. Distribution is through both US and Lao Army and civilian mobile teams; hope eventually reach all provinces. USOM providing Laos with equipment, USIS training crews. Army units especially active, often make political speeches on own and pick up and refute PL propaganda.

Recommendations:

That the OCB:

1. Support the police survey report with view to implementing it soonest possible;

2. Re Legation telegrams 567 and 572, support Legation position that Lao force levels may have to be maintained over longer term and at considerably higher point than expected; support urgent development and organization of Lao army through … civilian Mission outlined Legation telegram 598, to enable Tito [sic] discharge responsibilities outlined in foregoing discussion.

3. Support and encourage prompt implementation economic and propaganda programs outlined part III. Re economic: Strongly believe order of priorities is: (A) relief to needy areas, which primary and urgent, i.e. supplies (food and immediate necessities), credits to rebuild devastated areas, price reduction of essential goods; (B) village programs; (C) transportation and communications; (D) agricultural aid. For all these, but particularly for relief, completion of USOM staffing pattern is essential and urgent. Re propaganda it is hoped program in full swing in several months; recommend every facility be afforded to permit this goal be reached, with subsequent expansion to extent possible.

4. Reference Legation telegram 572, recognizing that recovery of 2 penetrated provinces through military action is unlikely in foreseeable future, support efforts to: (A) exert increased moral and political pressure on Communists through ICC, Indian Government, Geneva signatories and, ultimately, United Nations; (B) support continued discreet re-enforcement of Royal Forces in 2 provinces … with view to holding government-occupied areas and possibly extending these.

5. Above, recognizing emphasis at least for present is on holding line in 10 remaining provinces, support steps outlined numbered paragraph 4 Legation telegram 572, notably to encourage development of unified anti-Communist national front…

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/5–355. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.
2. In circular telegram 559, March 23, the Department instructed recipient Chiefs of Mission “to have the country team, including representatives from FOA, MAAG (or service attachés), … prepare a report on the possibilities and requirements for U.S. assistance in increasing the effectiveness of police-type forces to deal with Communist subversion and, in those countries where Communist subversion has reached the stage of actual or potential large-scale insurrection, increasing the effectiveness of the regular armed forces to deal with Communist subversion and insurrection.” (Ibid., 700.5/3–2355) Such information was to enable the OCB to formulate a concept for U.S. assistance in the development of forces adequate to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion. Eventually this information was for the use of the NSC. (NSC Action No. 1290–d; see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844, footnote 10.)
3. In circular telegram 560, March 23, the Department further explained that this attempt to combat Communist subversion grew out of Eisenhower’s personal interest and that country team assessments would weigh heavily in NSC deliberations. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/3–2355)
4. Dated April 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/4–2955)
5. Supra.
6. Neither printed. Tousfo 173, April 22, is in Washington National Records Center, FOA Message Files: FRC 56 A 632, Box 102, Vientiane.
7. See footnote 2, supra.
8. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.5–MSP/4–2855)