Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

292. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Embassy in France¹

Vientiane, May 6, 1955—4 p.m.

137. Paris Tosec for Young. Following developments have occurred during past two weeks affecting analysis and recommendations submitted Legtel 572 repeated Paris 119:²

I. Crown Prince and Defense Minister are urging government to encourage and support popular revolt against Pathets in two northern provinces. Both have insisted Royal army will take no action unless attacked, and that assistance to population would be entirely covert and limited to small amounts money and arms and perhaps small number of soldiers, native to provinces, in civilian clothes. (Reference Legtel 635 repeated Paris 134.³) It is still uncertain (a) whether government will endorse operation, (b) whether it might not occur even without government endorsement, (c) whether it would have any chance of success, and (d) whether Royal forces in two provinces could avoid involvement.

Despite these uncertainties I do not believe we should discourage project. As previously reported, we are not sanguine poorly armed and organized irregulars could drive Pathets out of province, unless latter are far weaker than we believe them to be. Even small-scale popular revolt however would be extremely embarrassing to Pathets, both militarily and politically, and would substantially reinforce government’s demand for restoration Royal administration. Moreover such revolt, if Royal forces held aloof, would be unlikely afford excuse Pathet intervention. On other hand, if great powers veto this operation, as they have vetoed attack on Pathets by Royal forces, they would risk provoking more extreme action, i.e., either unauthorized attack by Royal forces for which military leaders are clamoring or, in mood of despair, deal with Communitst involving far-reaching concessions. Laotions are apt to move rapidly from mood of exaltation to mood of apathy, and if we should deny them all liberty of action in two provinces we could hardly expect them to manifest in remainder of country energy required to win elections and check Communist subversion.

II. Formal negotiations with Pathets remain suspended but Katay has been authorized to negotiate informally and briefly with Phoumi. Terms he is authorized to present will certainly be unsatisfactory to Pathets and rupture may occur shortly. However Phoumi will certainly do his best to string out affair and Katay may prove amenable. As long as two provinces remain in Pathet hands, temptation to make deal with Communists will persist.

III. ICC has not yet even begun to consider restoration of Royal authority in two provinces and latest indications are that if and when it does, Indian chairman will evade any clear-cut decision. (Legtel 636 repeated Paris 135.⁴) Government intends to publish at once its long memorandum to ICC.

IV. Katay and Phoui have agreed to merge their two parties, at least for duration of electoral campaign. This alliance constitutes most essential element of national front and, it it sticks, greatly improves changes of substantial nationalist victory in elections. (Legtel 622⁵ and 632,⁶ repeated Paris 131 and 133).

V. Conclusion: On the whole we consider these developments encouraging. Lao Government, including Katay, is beginning to follow more realistic and energetic line we have long been urging. Alliance between Katay and Phoui, endorsed by Crown Prince and General Phao, promises truce in internal political strife. Only states of two northern provinces and behavior of ICC remain as unsatisfactory as ever.

VI. Reference specific points listed Deptel 467⁷ repeated Paris 3919, we have only following comments: Point 2. Performance of French training mission is slightly better but there is still considerable room for improvement. Point 3. We doubt Katay can be accused of “increased” neutralism. On contrary his attitude toward both Pathets and Viets has hardened in recent weeks and Phoui was somewhat shocked at violence with which he lit into Pham Van Dong at Bandung. On other hand, as mentioned above, as long as Pathets hold two provinces Katay will be tempted to buy them off.

We would suggest that in discussions with British and French primary emphasis be placed on persuading Indian and Canadian Governments that ICC must deal promptly and effectively with problem of two provinces. We simply cannot expect Lao Governments to take loss of these provinces lying down and, if international machinery proves inadequate for their recovery, government will ultimately choose one of only available alternatives, i.e. resort to force in some form or deal with Communist involving at best neutralism and at worst loss of Laos. For reasons mentioned above, we suggest no more extensive discussion of resort to force at this time.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–655. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State (which is the source text), Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh. Dulles and Young were in Paris for talks with the British and French and for the scheduled North Atlantic Council meetings, May 9–11.
2. Document 290.
3. Dated May 5, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–555)
4. Dated May 5, not printed. (Ibid., 751 G.00/5–555)
5. Reference should be telegram 628 from Vientiane, May 3, repeated to Paris as 131, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–355)
6. Dated May 5, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–555)
7. Reference is to specific topics for position papers on Laos in connection with anticipated side talks on Laos with the British and French at the upcoming North Atlantic Council meetings in Paris. Point 2 was “military assistance program”; and point 3, “political situation.” These briefing papers, May 3 and 4, are in Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Bilateral and Trilateral Talks–Paris. Telegram 467 is not printed.