Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

290. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, April 23, 1955—6 p.m.

572. We consider this appropriate moment for reassessment situation in Laos and US policy in regard thereto, because:

a. Decision not to employ military force in two northern provinces at this time, to which both US and Lao Governments have now subscribed, practically rules out use of force on substantial scale, unless initiated by other side, before October;

b. Long-delayed negotiations on Lao annual military budget and on force levels and organizations of Lao army have just commenced,² and simultaneously US police survey mission has submitted its reports;³

c. Negotiations with Pathets have reached impasse which will probably force early government decision whether to fish or cut bait;⁴

d. Following return Prime Minister from Bandung and anticipated arrival Crown Prince in Vientiane, serious negotiations will begin for formation national front and settlement other pre-electoral measures. These negotiations may lead to change in government.

1. From first of these premises we conclude that it doubtful Royal government will recover control of two provinces in foreseeable future, except as result of radical and improbably change in either its or Communists’ basic policy. While we consider recovery under other conditions unlikely, we do not wholly rule it out. We therefore favor attempts to exert increased moral and political pressure on Communists through ICC, Indian Government, Geneva signatories, and, ultimately, UN. Secondly, we favor continued discreet reenforcement of Royal forces in two provinces and covert arming loyal civilians, with view to holding government-occupied areas and conceivably to extending these areas. Thirdly, we favor efforts to organize forthcoming national elections in such way as to permit free vote in two provinces. We should not however, be sanguine as to effectiveness of any or all these measures in achieving our objective.

2. Further conclusion we draw from first and second premises above is that Lao force levels and military and police expenditures may have to be maintained over long term, at considerably higher point than we had previously expected. Had Pathet forces been eliminated or reduced to small guerilla bands, we believe it would have been possible, considering primary mission of Royal army to be maintenance internal order and recommendation combined police-gendarmérie of 4,000 perform part of this task, to cut back Lao force levels over period of two years to approximately 15,000, with substantial financial savings to US. (This assumes Manila Pact military planners did not assign larger role to Royal forces.) However, if Pathets are free to remain in privileged sanctuary and to build up forces indefinitely with Vietnamese equipment and training, they will constitute permanent military hazard within de jure frontiers of Laos which, since attacks from them may not automatically bring Manila Pact into play, would require maintenance in being of substantial Royal army in addition to recommended police forces. Under these circumstances, we doubt we could recommend cutting Lao force levels below 24,000 and might even be impressed by Lao arguments that reduction even to that level would be dangerous at this time.

3. As to third premise, we must of course continue to discourage concessions to Pathets which would provide them with substantial foothold in Royal government and Royal forces. We might even as last resort, if dangerous concessions seem to be imminent, have again to threaten to withhold aid. However, there is point beyond which we cannot push Lao nationalist sensibilities without risk bringing on dangerous access neutralism and jeopardizing our whole program here. Fortunately it appears likely that extreme demands of Pathets are about to bring present negotiations to a close. However, they may well be renewed later under aegis of ICC.

4. Our conclusion from all our premises is that, while during last six months our primary emphasis has been on recovery of SamNeua and Phongsaly (because we wanted to remove cancer before it became malignant) our emphasis during remainder this year at least should be on holding other ten provinces. We think this can be done but it will require considerably more concerted and effective effort by Royal government than has been manifested so far.

First essential step is formation national front with single national ticket for presentation in elections. Second is prompt creation effective police–gendarmeérie force. Third is much more active propaganda campaign. Fourth is prompt distribution necessary relief supplies and credits (for which completion USOM staffing pattern is essential). We prepared to offer substantial assistance in all these endeavors.… We must leave decisions to Laotians just when election might best be held, Crown Prince favoring August and most of politicos November or December.

As suggested above, carrying out these measures may require change in government. … Katay has been gradually losing support in Assembly and probably throughout country. On other hand, impossible as he often seems, we should be prepared to continue to put up with him even as Prime Minister, if he would get behind national front. Reasons are, first, that he still has considerable following, second, that Thais are behind him (Bangkok’s 2573 to Department⁵) and third, that even if he were kicked out, he might either tie up with Pathets or form neutralist party which would split nationalist vote. Best solution would be reshuffle present Cabinet with new Prime Minister, and Katay staying on as Deputy Prime Minister, but is doubtful his vanity would stand it. What change, if any, is most sound and feasible will probably emerge during next three of four weeks.

Department’s comments on this general analysis would be appreciated.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2335. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.
2. A more detailed report is in telegram 567 from Vientiane, April 23, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.5–MSP/4–2355)
3. Text of the report, April 18, is ibid., Vientiane Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 47, 350 Lao Police, 1955.
4. A more detailed report is in telegram 568 from Vientiane, April 22, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/4–2255)
5. Dated April 14, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–1455)