Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Legation in Laos¹

Washington, March 17, 1955—8:35 p.m.

351. Vientiane 414 repeated Phnom Penh unnumbered Saigon 446 Bangkok 151 Paris 74 London 5.² Vientiane 420 repeated Phnom Penh unnumbered Saigon 452 Bangkok 154 Paris 76 London 7; Vientiane 415 repeated Paris 75 London 6 Bangkok 153 Saigon 447 Phnom Penh unnumbered.³ Department seriously disturbed revelation French and British attitudes Lao northern provinces. Their desire avoid resumption hostilities and consequent urging strict adherence Geneva Accords well known and understandable. Nevertheless, Yost’s arguments reference telegram pointing up risks of allowing provinces go to Communists by default show need prompt resolute action. Department will discuss question during bilateral or trilateral talks next month but believes approach through diplomatic channels should be begun immediately.

Although Army G–2 has recently believed that barring Viet Minh intervention Lao Army could wrest two provinces from Pathet control, latest indications increased strength effectiveness Pathets and strained relations French-Lao military have changed estimate. According G–2 estimate March 17,⁴ Pathet military now believed total at least 5,000 regular troops organized 9 infantry and one heavy weapons battalions. Effectiveness apparently increased as result recent intensive training indoctrination; discipline training equipment reported markedly improved. Reports indicate growing antipathy and noncooperative spirit between Lao Army and French Military Mission; morale French officers poor. G–2 estimate of March 17 (believed valid despite Vientiane 415 repeated Phnom Penh unnumbered Saigon 447 Paris 75 London 6 Bangkok 153 and USARMA Lao MC 17–55⁵) states if French-Lao cooperation restored more effective level and adequate airlift established, even against Pathet opposition only Lao capability reoccupy two northern provinces would be marginal at best. Might be able occupy major population communications centers but would probably not be able completely eliminate Pathet military forces from provinces, especially if guerrilla operations undertaken (Viet Minh territory would furnish Pathets unassailable base).

Seems clear this juncture means other than military must be found restore provinces to Royal control.

To this end Aldrich and Yost instructed inform British our disturbance at continuation situation permitting consolidation Communist control two provinces and urge British exert influence on Indians Canadians to invigorate ICC.⁶ First objective would be strong stand on right of Royal Government restore authority two disputed provinces. Prompt investigations Pathet Violations should also be made and measures taken supervise Pathet borders, particularly Sam Neua-North Viet-Nam, in accordance Article 27–c Geneva,⁷ in order prevent Communist introduction equipment and personnel.

FYI: Secretary during Ottawa visit may suggest more positive action by Canadians ICC, pointing out paragraph 177 of ICC First Interim Report⁸ voiced concern Commission that if political settlement delayed situation might deteriorate and clashes become more serious. Secretary may wish point out U.S. believes only alternative to energetic ICC efforts seems to be resumption hostilities which all wish avoid. Canadian ideas on ways ICC and U.S. might help may be requested. End FYI.

French seem lethargic in executing responsibilities Laos. Geneva prohibition against introduction foreign military personnel other than French eliminates any possibility U.S. training and advisory functions. Yet in country where French responsibility clear they have nevertheless withdrawn many advisers from Lao Army. Also seem willing see loss provinces through inaction rather than risk possible resumption hostilities. Achilles and Yost instructed make strong démarches to French to effect we disturbed see lack French guidance Lao Army when faced Communist threat.⁹ We believe French should offer restore officers and noncoms in training and advisory posts Lao Army Command and step up training program.

Regarding Lao Government Department agrees Yost’s analysis 420¹⁰ that cease-fire declaration and constitution mixed political committee Vientiane will restore Katay’s faith in negotiations with Pathets. Department concurs suggestion French British U.S. urge Lao Government propose reasonable settlement and terminate talks after appropriate period. Department not certain what would constitute such reasonable settlement but might conceivably include Pathet representation in Royal administration two provinces but not in central government, re-affirmation amnesty and full participation free general elections, and possibly integration personnel two Pathet battalions National Army not as units. (View imminent reduction Lao Army from 31,000 to 24,000, Pathet representation two battalions seems reasonable if not generous offer.) Any event continued Government vacillation must be avoided. Department unable give opinion possible Katay ousting until proposed substitute known.

If negotiations broken off next step would logically be appeal ICC with full publicity. British views reported Vientiane 414 indicate they might be willing attempt influence Indians and Canadians to favorable vote. Since however unanimity would be required this substantive issue, it highly unlikely ICC will be able settle problem. Nevertheless measure must be tried view Lao Army present lack capability overwhelm Pathets.

FYI only: Department believes any political settlement acceptable Lao Government and U.S. would be rejected by Pathets. It possible international opinion necessarily including Nehru to be effective, could be mobilized to urge Pathets Viet Minh moderate position to preserve international Communist prestige. However this concerted effort not likely be quickly undertaken and in any event might be unavailing. Therefore appears only means by which Laos will regain Phong Saly and Sam Neua is use force. In view G–2 estimate Army apparently not now capable accomplishing this mission, Department consequently feels French must be galvanized into increasing capability Lao forces for possible future military action.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1555. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne; cleared by Hoey, Sebald (in draft), Merchant, Murphy; and approved by Robertson. Also sent priority to Paris and London and repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, Ottawa priority for MacArthur, and Bangkok. MacArthur was accompanying Dulles on a trip to Ottawa, March 17–18, for discussions with Canadian officials. (Dulles’ Appointment Book; Princeton University, Dulles Papers)
2. See footnote 3, supra.
3. Document 283.
4. Attached to a memorandum from Fried of DRF to Armstrong, March 17, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/3–1755)
5. See footnote 3, Document 283.
6. Done according to telegram 4076 from London, March 18, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1855)
7. Article 27, paragraph c, of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos, July 20, 1954, gave the ICC responsibility for supervision, at ports and airfields and along borders, of implementation of the provisions of the agreement regulating the introduction into Laos of military personnel and war materials.
8. For the complete text, see Cmd. 9445, Laos No. 1 (1955), First Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, August 11–December 31, 1954 (London, HMSO, May 1955).
9. Done according to telegram 3996 from Paris, March 19, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1955)
10. Supra.