284. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State1
420. Reference Legtel 411, repeated Saigon 445, Paris 73, Bangkok 148, Phnom Penh Unnumbered;2 Legtel 414, repeated Saigon 446, Bangkok 151, Paris 74, London 5, Phnom Penh Unnumbered;3 Legtel 415, repeated Saigon 447, Paris 75, London 6, Bangkok 153, Phnom Penh Unnumbered.4
Following serious immediate obstacles to achievement US objectives in Laos have recently arisen:
- (1)
- Though Prime Minister’s March 15 deadline for winding up negotiations with Pathets has arrived, negotiations seem about to be given new lease on life by agreement to continue them in Vientiane on more formal basis. (Agreement described Legtel 411 not yet approved by Katay but will be submitted to him and to Cabinet when he returns to Vientiane tomorrow.) While Prime Minister’s absence has prevented our obtaining clarification his intentions, projected continuation negotiations both prolongs risk Katay will make dangerous concessions to Pathets and delays resort to other means, pacific or forceful, for re-establishment Royal authority in two northern provinces.
- (2)
- British and French have been very actively discouraging Lao Government from any use of force in northern provinces and, in case of former at least, have in effect subjected any proposed Lao action there to ICC veto. This advice of course strengthens Katay and weakens Crown Prince and Souvanna Phouma.
Fortunately there appears to be agreement among British, French and ourselves that negotiations with Pathets should be terminated at earliest possible moment. I would expect that upon Katay’s return three of us would separately make strong representations to him to this effect. I will urge, as I have for past months, that at next meeting negotiators government submit reasonable package settlement, based on Geneva Accords and including immediate restoration Royal administration in two provinces, that Pathets be given few days to [Page 626] consider this proposal, and that if they reject it negotiations be broken off.
Katay will probably agree and then attempt to squirm out of his commitment. Foreign Minister tells me that, in those circumstances, he would resign from government, which would presumably bring about its fall. Crown Prince and Souvanna would almost certainly favor such step. Whether French and British would is still doubtful. Government should not be ousted however unless it is clear effective successor can be rapidly formed.
If and when negotiations with Pathets are broken off, by this or another government, next step would certainly be, and to this British and French heartily agree, appeal by Lao Government to ICC to support immediate re-establishment Royal administration in two provinces. This appeal should be accompanied by intensive world-wide publicity.
However sharp divergence arises as to proper course to follow when almost inevitable deadlock in ICC develops. British favor appeal to Geneva signatories and no further action pending their reexamination Geneva decisions. We favor military action in two provinces before commencement rainy season, if no other solution has then been found. French are of two minds but leaning toward caution. No Lao Government is likely to take military, or indeed any vigorous, action unless at least French and ourselves, and probably British as well, are backing them firmly. Moreover, wholehearted cooperation French military mission is essential to successful conduct of any military operations.
We, therefore, urge that these matters be discussed with French and British at high level during next two weeks. Forthcoming Washington meeting may provide occasion, though on British side Eden himself has already taken fixed position.
To sum up, matters on which agreement should be sought are:
(1) That tripartite pressure be exerted on Lao Government to bring about termination Pathet negotiations and submission appeal to ICC in nearest future, (2) that if this pressure ineffective on Katay, we should encourage Crown Prince and others to bring about change in government, provided effective successor feasible, (3) that thereafter tripartite pressure be exerted on ICC, particularly Indians, to bring about early decision favorable to Lao Government, (4) that appeal to ICC and any action ICC may take be widely publicized, and (5), most important, it be determined whether others will support, or at least, in case of British, refrain from opposing, Lao military action in two provinces in case pacific means of re-establishing Royal authority have not produced results by end of April (termination [Page 627] Bandung conference5) and in case adequate diplomatic and propaganda ground work has been laid. If British and French will not agree to (5), alternatives should be explored, though we are frankly unable to see any alternative which will not very probably result in loss at least of two provinces.
Meanwhile Franco-Lao military are drawing up plan for clearing out two provinces. We shall encourage them to perfect this plan, without however taking any position on its eventual use until Department has consulted French and British and has further instructed us.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1555. Top Secret. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Saigon, Bangkok, Paris, and London.↩
- In telegram 411, March 12, the Legation reported that the Lao Government and Pathet Lao negotiators had agreed on the text of a “cease-fire declaration”, yet there had been no decisions or discussions at the negotiations of such issues as the reestablishment of Royal authority in the two northern provinces or the fate of Pathet Lao military forces. (Ibid., 751G.00/3–1255)↩
- In telegram 414, March 14, the Legation reported that British and French representatives in Vientiane had been engaged in countering the effect of the Secretary’s reassurance to Lao officials that, in view Manila Pact and U.S. forces in the Far East, “they might proceed against insurrectionists in northern provinces without serious risk of overt external attack.” (Ibid., 751J.00/3–1455)↩
- Supra.↩
- The Conference of Afro-Asian nations, April 18–24, 1955.↩