283. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State1
415. Reference: Deptel 329, repeated information Saigon 3947, Phnom Penh 431, Paris 3183.2 (Suggest Department repeat this telegram to Bangkok and London.)
USARMA Vientiane continues to believe Lao National Army capable of reoccupying two northern provinces against current Pathet Forces. (See MC 17–55 USARMA Laos to DA3) Pathets have 8 battalions Sam Neua, only 1 of which is considered fully organized, armed and trained, total strength Sam Neua approximately 1,900; in Phong Saly 2 battalions, 1 only considered combat effective, total province strength 950. ARMA assumes, however, French military advisers would plan, prepare and direct campaign. He strongly doubts capacity of Lao military to do so unaided.
Whether Lao Army could reoccupy provinces against Pathets reinforced by Viets depends on size and character of Viet reinforcements. Infiltration of individuals or small units would probably not be sufficient to alter outcome. On other hand, entry at critical juncture of even three or four organized Viet battalions would throw Laotians off balance and continued entry units this size would probably [Page 624] hamstring operation. Entry into Laos of bulk of Viet Forces (see MC 18–55 USARMA Laos to DA4) now stationed along Lao border would wholly frustrate reoccupation two provinces, and probably quickly result in occupation whole country.
Our estimate is that it is not present intention of Viets and Chinese Communists to resume hostilities in case of continued stalemate. They are steadily consolidating their hold on two northern provinces. We doubt they have lost hope of strengthening their position in rest of Laos through current negotiations. Even if these are broken off, situation in remainder of country is still sufficiently soft to justify confidence they can steadily improve their position by infiltration and subversion. Unless this situation changes to their disadvantage, it seems unlikely they would take unnecessary risk of resuming hostilities. To extent we can strengthen Laos against subversion, however, danger of larger scale, more overt Communist intervention will increase.
In case Royal Army attack against Pathets, we presume ChiCom-Viet reaction would be governed by their estimate overall situation. Viets are building up their forces along Lao frontier. Propaganda preparation for counter-action is obviously being made. Communists are probably aware divergent advice being given Lao Government by British, French and ourselves. Their natural inclination would be not to take lying down loss of Pathet pawn and installation “American imperialists” on Chinese frontier at Phong Saly. On other hand, if they believe their intervention would provoke swift and certain retaliation and if they feel world opinion hostile to them on this issue, we doubt they would consider game worth the candle. However, to instill such belief, more explicit warning by Western powers and intensified propaganda groundwork on this issue would probably be necessary.
We consider ChiCom–Viets have been and will continue to strengthen Pathets by additional imports equipment and cadres, though tempo this reinforcement will presumably be affected by their estimate Lao Government and our intentions. Propaganda objective mentioned by Department is, of course, also in their minds.
USARMA has learned from French that about 3,000 Chinese irregulars, associated with Franco-Lao forces until Geneva ceasefire, have since that time been operating in Burma–Laos border region. …
Subsequent telegrams will set forth our recommendations on these matters.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/3–1455. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Saigon, Paris, London, and Bangkok.↩
- In telegram 329, March 11, the Department informed the Legation of concern over “reports indicating greatly increased Chinese Communist and Viet Minh interest in Laos while at same time military estimates reveal doubt Royal Lao Army capable undertaking successful action against Pathets.” The Department requested the Legation’s assessment of the Lao National Army’s capabilities and of Chinese and Viet Minh intentions in the case of either a continued stalemate or a Royal Army attack on the two northern provinces. (Ibid., 751J.5/3–1155)↩
- Not found.↩
- Not found.↩
- See telegram 420, infra.↩