Office of the Historian

282. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, March 4, 1955—8 p.m.

390. Manila for Yost.2 Joint Legation–OARMA message. Department pass FOA. Re Deptel 304, February 25.3

1.
Memo of JCS and covering letter of OSD not yet received. Following data are in reply solely to reference telegram. Minister Yost is in Manila but he requested Legation staff reply soonest and not await his return due urgency setting up proper control over Lao forces.
2.
Legation believes following aspects US military aid, as outlined in reference telegram, will be acceptable to Lao Government and to French training mission: Force level of 23,650, initial cost of $40 million, and reexamination of $2,000 per year per man.
3.
OARMA has telegraphed regarding divisional reorganization (sent MC–13–55 to G–2 Department Army4) and is sending one on gendarmérie training.
4.
Copy of reference telegram being sent Embassy Bangkok and Embassy may wish to comment on sentence “JCS iterates view Indochina as important part Southeast Asia merits limited US support, but support to Laos should not be at expense other potentially more productive programs”. This phrasing is of course correct but perhaps it pertinent for Legation to point out it considers military value of Laos does not lie principally in relation to Indochina… The strategic value of Laos is connected with the defense of Thailand. The mountain boundary of Laos is a defensible line but it is doubtful that, if Laos is absorbed by the Communists, the Mekong will be effective barrier against infiltration.
5.
Future telegrams on Laos armed forces probably should be repeated to Bangkok, especially as military and police training of Laotians in Thailand is live subject now.
6.
JCS states US support of Lao armed forces would be contingent on:
a.
Laotian effectiveness in absorbing US support (Legation comment: Their ability to utilize US support depends primarily on calibre of French training mission).
b.
Effectiveness French training mission (discussed below).
c.
Political military developments Vietnam (Legation comment: This is long-range contingency and not directly applicable to decisions that must be made now on Laos; we are already in third month of piecemeal budget support without it as yet any definite program.)
7.
Legation concurs in JCS and OSD analysis requiring, by implication, three distinct elements in staffing requirements:
a.
Personnel required for verification proper end-use of US military equipment.
b.
Budget group to make cost study for establishing precise annual budget limitations.
c.
Comptroller personnel for control and audit of military budget support. Certain positions may follow each other sequentially, so same person might fill two or more positions.
8.
Following is recommended as minimum table of organization for combined group:
a.
One chief of group; one executive officer; one administrations officer; one general services officer; one clerk typist.
b.
End-use personnel. One supply expert; one ordnance expert; one signal expert; one engineer.
c.
Budget and control personnel; one civilian counterpart for each of G–1, 2, 3, 4 of Laotian Army, three clerk typists.
9.
French language imperative for all personnel except typists.
10.
Group must be organized as properly rounded unit, not sent here as may happen become available. Assignments should not wait for verification that housing is available (see below) or for extended orientation; men must come at once. Control group as a whole must be in operation at early date, certainly by May 1. Urgency of problem of Lao armed forces should preclude any consideration of a later date.
11.
Complete separation of group from OARMA is recommended. Otherwise the touchy French will assume US military attempting to dictate to them, with resultant further French mission personnel. …5
12.
Housing and administration support, such as vehicles, for this group must be handled on special crash basis with wide authority delegated locally. Given freedom of action in field and adequate funds it believed this addition of approximately 16 American personnel can be met. For administrative background suggest confer with Capella (FE), Herter (GC/FOA), Cogell (Defense) and members Secretary’s party including MacArthur, Robertson, Young, as these personally familiar with administrative aspects of problem. For housing recommend Defense fly necessary number of units (either Quon-sets or prefabs, and including one as chancellery wing for office space) together with erection crews. Otherwise authorize Legation engage engineering firm in Bangkok to procure units from nearest point in Far East and fly them here by chartered plane.
13.
In addition to major problems of getting control group personnel here by May 1 and having housing and office space ready there remains vital problem of spirit and effectiveness of French training mission. Except insofar as some Laotians may be sent to Thailand, American objectives in Laos are largely dependent on success of French mission in its job. They are now a dispirited and listless group, due primarily to:
a.
General lassitude of defeat of French throughout Indochina.
b.
Feeling that Laotians do not appreciate or want them.
c.
Assumption that Americans will take first opportunity to ease them out.
d.
Masochistic satisfaction that if Communists take over Laos Americans will get the blame.
e.
Failure to see any future in Laos either for themselves or France.
14.
Washington agencies as well as Embassy Paris should consider now means available to US for building up prestige and effectiveness of French training mission.
Paddock
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/3–455. Top Secret. Also sent to Paris and Bangkok and repeated to Manila, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.↩
  2. Yost was at the Far East Chiefs of Mission in Conference in Baguio, Philippines, March 2–5. A report by Bell of the proceedings of the conference is ibid., S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, Far East.↩
  3. See footnote 4, Document 275.↩
  4. In this message, March 2, the U.S. Army Attaché in Vientiane argued that divisional organization was not necessary for the Lao National Army because the mission, terrain, and road and communications network required a small, self-sufficient army made up of mobile units at the battalion level. (Department of State, FE/SEA Files: Lot 58 D 266, Army Navy Messages, January–June 1955)↩
  5. In joint State–Defense–FOA telegram 355 to Vientiane, March 18, the Legation was informed that it had been determined “as a matter of national policy” that a normal MAAG should not be established in Laos. Defense would furnish civilian personnel with military backgrounds to supervise military aid to Laos, to evaluate the effectiveness and development of the Lao forces, to advise the country team on Laos force levels, to assist in screening Lao military expenditures, and to advise on military matters. (Ibid., Central Files, 7951J.5–MSP/3–455)↩