281. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Secto 44. During stopover in Vientiane I had separate conversations with Crown Prince, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister. Each was deeply concerned with exposed position in which Laos finds itself, with internal danger created by entrenched position of Pathet Lao in northern provinces, and with possibility of large-scale Chinese or Viet invasion in case government takes vigorous action to restore its authority in those provinces.
I made it my principal object to quiet these fears by explaining full nature of protection offered by Manila Pact. I emphasized application of Pact to security of Laos, achievements of Bangkok conference, very substantial forces of Pact powers, particularly US, available in Far East for use against external aggression, awareness of Chinese Communists and Viets of existence of these forces, and hence unlikelihood they will resort to open armed aggression which would lead to their own destruction. I expressed view therefore that Lao Government, in determining what action is required to deal with internal danger, need not be deterred by fear of large-scale external attack. Infiltration, of course could not be prevented and with that Lao Government, which aid we are already supplying, would have to cope.
As to internal danger, I said that means of meeting it are solely for Lao Government to decide, I pointed out, however, US is assuming great responsibilities in behalf of distant nations, such as Laos, in belief that they, like we, are prepared resolutely to defend their independence and liberty. It had been my experience with Communists that they use negotiations as cloak for strengthening their military and political position and that action against them should be not only resolute but prompt.
It is my impression that these explanations and reassurances were effective in stiffening Lao leaders. Crown Prince in particular declared categorically that, in view of my reaffirmation of Manila Pact and US support, he would now feel free promptly to take the necessary measures to deal with the internal danger and to re-establish the Royal authority in the two provinces. If the present government should not be willing to take these measures, another government would be formed. Crown Prince showed complete awareness of [Page 620] Communist character of Pathet Lao, thorough skepticism of will and ability of ICC to preserve territorial integrity of Laos, and full confidence in capacity of Royal Army to subdue any and all Communist forces now on Laos soil. Defense Minister reiterated equally strongly position taken by Prince.
Prime Minister, while representing himself as devoted adherent of US policy and repeating his intention to break off negotiations with Pathets if they are not successful by March 15, was vague as to action to be taken after that date. He indicated he might merely continue by other means his efforts to induce Pathet leaders and rank and file to defect. In our view, while it is obviously desirable to preserve present broadly based government if possible, there is likelihood that, if Prime Minister does not adopt more vigorous line within next few weeks, government will be reshuffled accordingly.
Memoranda of my conversations in Vientiane being carried Washington.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/2–2855. Top Secret. Repeated to Vientiane, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh. Dulles also sent a general report on Indochina to Eisenhower in which he specifically mentioned his discussions with Lao leaders and the Pathet Lao situation. See Dulte 18, vol. I, p. 96.↩
- See Documents 277–280.↩