280. Memorandum of a Conversation, Vientiane, February 27, 19551
FOLLOWING PERSONS PRESENT
- Secretary Dulles
- Defense Minister Souvanna Phouma
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Bowie
- [Mr. Yost]
After the usual amenities, the Secretary said that the Bangkok meeting had been a very good one with important organizational decisions being taken which would enable the Treaty to be implemented. He mentioned the reaffirmation in the Bangkok communiqué of the determination of the members to defend Laos, Cambodia, and Free Vietnam. While it was unfortunate that Laos could not become a member of the Treaty because of the Geneva Accords, Laos was fully protected by it against external attack. The Secretary said that the Laotians could be confident of this and he went on to mention the strong forces which the United States maintains in the Western Pacific area. He explained why it was unwise to dissipate these forces in piecemeal commitments and how by keeping them concentrated Laos could be aided in the event of aggression. He believed that because the Communists know of the great strength of our forces Laos would not be attacked.
The Defense Minister said he believed the Manila Pact provided adequate external protection. What worried him was the internal situation which was serious. The International Control Commission could not be relied upon to apply the Geneva Accords. He went on to say that it was most important from the military viewpoint that the Laotian Government make certain dispositions of its forces within the next month to deal with the Pathet-Lao movement in view of the coming rainy season. He then said that unfortunately the Laotian military means were limited. The Secretary replied that the means of his enemies in Laos were also limited and that all the United States and the other Manila Powers could do was to give Laos solid assurances against external attack. Internal matters must be dealt with by the Laotians and without firm will American assistance would be meaningless. The Defense Minister said that the Laotian forces were in the neighborhood of about 30,000 and that this seemed the maximum level that could be maintained. He mentioned that the mission of these forces was primarily a delaying mission and that if there were external aggression aid must come in ten days time since this was the limit of Laotian holding capacity. The Secretary explained that with aviation, assistance could come very quickly and said that we had had the means to come to the aid of Dien Bien Phu but the French had not wished this.
The Defense Minister then asked whether the Secretary believed that a Chinese attack against Indochina was more probable because of the Formosa tension. The Secretary replied that he did not think so. He explained that tension in Formosa should tend to reduce the chances of an attack against Laos since the Chinese Communists like to fight on only one front at a time. He said that the Chinese Communists only gave massive aid to Indochina after the Korean war had been liquidated and that they only stepped up their activity against [Page 618] Formosa after the Indochinese war had been liquidated. As long as the Chinese were concentrating on Formosa there was less danger to the Associated States.
The Defense Minister said that the Laotians feared an external attack by the Communists. The Secretary replied that if the Communists resorted to open aggression, general war would result and massive destruction would be visited upon Red China. The Chinese Communists know this and he did not, therefore, think they would resort to open aggression.
The Minister discussed briefly the status of the Laotian Army and stated that he hoped in several months it would be considerably stronger and more effective. The Laotian Army had been formed in haste to fight in the Indochina war. It needed to be completely overhauled and revitalized. Older members of the armed forces should be released to reserve status and younger men should be brought in. Effective training of officers was necessary.
Mr. Yost inquired whether, if there were no external attack, Laos could liquidate the Pathet-Lao problem. The Minister replied in the affirmative. He said that he had the military forces to do so but the International Control Commission would intervene to prevent Laos from doing so. It was impossible to get approval of the Commission to any effective steps because of its composition. The Minister referred specifically to the Laotian post,2 which they had held before the Geneva Armistice, seized about six weeks ago by the Pathet-Lao movement. The ICC was still debating a resolution of condemnation but was deadlocked because of the position taken by the Indian Chairman who wished every problem to be settled on the basis of agreement between the two parties rather than implementing the terms of the Geneva Accords. The Minister said that he had positive information that there were Vietminh agents operating and directing the Pathet-Lao movement and units in Laos. However, whenever the ICC went to investigate, advance warning was given and the Vietminh went into hiding. He concluded by saying that while the situation is difficult, he believed that the two provinces could be recovered and favored prompt action to this end. The Secretary said that time was important as the danger increased as the situation dragged along. The Minister said he fully agreed.