279. Memorandum of a Conversation, Vientiane, February 27, 19551
FOLLOWING PERSONS PRESENT
- Secretary Dulles
- Prime Minister Katay D. Sasorith
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Bowie
- [Mr. Yost]
The Prime Minister opened the conversation by expressing appreciation for the Secretary’s visit and the hope that he was not too tired. The Secretary replied that the Bangkok Conference had been a very busy and tiring one but that lots of good work had been done. The Conference had reaffirmed the determination of the members to aid Laos in maintaining its freedom and independence. Furthermore the United States had powerful forces deployed in this general area to counter aggression. Although Laos was not a member of the Manila Pact, in view of the Geneva Agreement, it and the other two Associated States were fully protected against external aggression by the Manila Pact. If there is overt military aggression against Laos, such an aggressor would be our common enemy. The Secretary said that the Prime Minister could be sure that under these circumstances and since the Communists know the extent of our strength in the area which could be used against them, there would not be overt military aggression against Laos.
The Prime Minister replied that the Laotians feared an attack because of the long and exposed frontier. The Secretary reiterated [Page 615] that we have powerful forces in the area and that if Laos were attacked from without, we would react. The Prime Minister said that Laos was very happy to be covered by the Manila Pact but that it really counted on only the United States.
The Secretary then said had been important to create a situation by which Laos could regulate its internal difficulties without fear of external aggression. This had been one of the principal objectives of the Manila Treaty. The Secretary said he knew that the Laotians were sincerely disturbed by the Pathet-Lao and that it was important for them to settle the Pathet-Lao problem since with the passage of time the Pathet-Lao forces would simply become stronger and stronger. He went on to explain that he had had many conferences with the Communists in the past ten years, mentioning San Francisco, the various meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Berlin and Geneva Conferences. He said that the Communists in conferences held out the hope of an early settlement only in order for them to stall and use the time gained to build up their strength. The Secretary said to the United States and the other Manila Pact countries could protect Laos against external attacks but only the Laotians themselves could settle their internal affairs. It was important that they deal with the Pathet-Lao movement before it was to late.
The Prime Minister said that the Laotian Government was determined to settle the Pathet-Lao question by March 15. He said it was necessary for the Laotian people to be convinced of the government’s good faith and feel that it had exhausted every possibility for a reasonable settlement. He hoped that the patience the Laotian Government had shown would not be considered as weakness. The Secretary replied that Laos was very far from Washington, the United States wished to help but their help would only be effective if the Laotians had the strength and will to help themselves. He mentioned the overwhelming majority in the Senate for the Manila Treaty despite the fact that the treaty had been negotiated by the Republican Administration and the Senate was organized and controlled by the Democrats. This had shown the unity of purpose of the American Congress and people. It was important that Laos show a similar unity in surmounting its political difficulties.
The Prime Minister said that it was necessary to strengthen the Laotian forces and they were counting on United States aid. The Secretary replied that the United States wished to help them in this matter. While the Geneva Accords prevented our sending a military training mission to Laos, the Laotians could send their people abroad for training, for example to Thailand. The Prime Minister agreed and said that in his recent visit to Bangkok it had been agreed to send contingents of 200 Laotians every two months for training. He said [Page 616] he understood the need for having United States training doctrines adopted since in the event of hostilities the United States would have to come to the aid of Laos.
The Secretary then said he understood that the French military personnel in Laos was being reduced. The Prime Minister said that as soon as the Laotian forces were strong enough the French should leave. In the eyes of the Laotian people the French presence was not helpful and incidents of a minor character occurred which gave the impression that Laotian sovereignty had not been restored. He reiterated the importance of Laos assuming responsibilities for its own affairs and reiterated the hope that the situation would be such that the French would be able to leave in the relatively near future.
Mr. Yost then asked the Prime Minister whether he was optimistic that if the Pathet-Lao problem was not settled by March 15, the Laotian Government would be able to deal successfully with it. The Prime Minister replied that this was a delicate matter and that the Laotians hoped to disintegrate the Pathet-Lao movement and cause defections. He said that many of the Pathet-Lao were not sympathetic to Communism and expressed optimism that it could be dealt with. He mentioned documents which had been received from Hanoi which established conclusively the fact that the leader of the Pathet-Lao was receiving his orders and instructions from the Vietminh. Mr. Yost expressed some skepticism that the Pathet-Lao movement could be dealt with simply by trying to induce defections since too many of the Pathet-Lao were committed to the Communists. The Prime Minister agreed that the Vietminh could intimidate many of them but still seemed to believe that the situation could be dealt with although he did not indicate how he intended to do so.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BA/2–2755. Secret. Drafted by MacArthur.↩