278. Memorandum of a Conversation, Vientiane, February 27, 19551
FOLLOWING PERSONS PRESENT
- Secretary Dulles
- Foreign Minister Phoui Sananikone
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Bowie
- Foreign Minister’s Secretary
The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that he would not have wished to come to the Bangkok Conference without paying [Page 613] a brief visit to Vientiane. Although his stay here was very short, it would enable him to report on the situation with more authority. This was very important because the United States regarded its treaty engagement under the Manila Pact which covers Laos as a serious engagement. The Secretary went on to say that the United States has strong military forces in the Western Pacific area which have great power. The potential enemies of Laos are fully aware of the strength of United States military power, and therefore, Laos should not fear overt military aggression directed against it. This leaves for Laos the internal problem which is its primary responsibility. The Laotian Government should be confident that in dealing with its internal problem and in taking the necessary decisions it will not have to fear external attack. This is important in terms of dealing with certain insurrectionary movements in Laos.
The Foreign Minister replied that Laos counted on United States economic and military assistance. Laos has a long frontier with China and, while the police cannot prevent infiltration, protection against external aggression is important. Because of Laos’ exposed position it needs more aid than do the other Associated States.
The Secretary said that the Bangkok Conference had reaffirmed the determination of the member States to assist Laos in maintaining its freedom and independence. He then read to the Minister the pertinent paragraph of the Bangkok communiqué.2 He briefly outlined the results of the Bangkok Conference in creating a permanent organization with secretariat and the establishment of these ad hoc groups of experts which would confer regarding military, counter-subversion, and economic cooperation. The military group will meet at Manila, the economic group probably at Karachi, and the place for the counter-subversion group has not as yet been fixed. Much of the counter-subversive work would be done bi-laterally because of the necessary secrecy which must be observed in these matters.
The Secretary then said he understood that Laos was going to send Army officers to Thailand for training. The Foreign Minister said he would prefer to have American officers come to Laos to train Laotian forces but understood the Armistice prevented the stationing in Laos of United States military instructors. The Foreign Minister said he had read in the newspaper that we had a training mission in Vietnam and wondered how that situation differed from the case of Laos. The Secretary explained to him that we had a military advisory group in Vietnam of 350 at the time when the Geneva Accord were signed and that we could keep our military mission at that level for training and other purposes but could not increase that ceiling. The Foreign Minister said it was better to send the Laotian officers to [Page 614] Thailand since relations with Thailand were good. In this connection, he mentioned the importance of the Thai-Laotian frontier, explaining that there were substantial numbers of Vietnamese in Thailand just across the border and that most of these elements were pro-Viet-minh. The Laos Government wished close cooperation with the Thai police to control the frontier and prevent infiltration, and were in touch with the Thais on this matter. He felt the best solution would be that these people be sent back to Vietnam.
The meeting concluded with the Foreign Minister expressing again his appreciation for the Secretary visiting Laos.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BA/2–2755. Secret. Drafted by MacArthur.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 276.↩