266. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State 1

288. Reference Deptel 208, repeated Saigon 2986, Paris 2975, London 3710, Phnom Penh 293.2 Military situation in north is quiet for moment. Nong Khang remains in Pathet hands. Defense Minister informs us he has been inconspicuously reinforcing accessible government posts in two provinces, in addition to moving additional troops up to Samneua border. In present atmosphere, further incidents could break out at any time.

As previously reported, intercepted messages indicated Viet-Pathets intend drive all government forces out of two provinces. On other hand, action of Polish delegate ICC in voting for restoration status quo ante last incident suggests attack may have been premature. Government forces prepared to resist any further Pathet aggression but have no intention take initiative themselves at this time. Unless pathets precipitate matters, therefore, considerable hostilities seem unlikely in immediate future. This estimate however may not hold good for long.

Opinions vary considerably between French and Laos as to whether government forces could recapture provinces easily if given free hand. French doubtful whereas Laotians are confident. Our present estimate, which we are checking as carefully as possible, is that existing government forces under French direction could retake provinces if Viets did not further reinforce Pathets, but that is at present a large if. (Re financial aspects see Legtel 277,3 French are planning no new financial assistance as far as we know.)

Meantime Communists control entire area two provinces except for scattered government post which are surrounded and largely isolated. Lao Government, even if it displayed considerably more vigor and realism than it does, could not overcome this situation without risk producing widespread hostilities. As pointed out numerous previous telegrams, we therefore recommend concerted high-level international diplomatic action in effort maneuver Viets out through these means. Action through ICC should be tried, and we shall press it [Page 591] again with Khosla upon his return from Delhi, but in view its record little reliance should be placed upon this means.

I have therefore urged (Legtel 2484) that Bangkok conference concern itself with this matter. Action by conference might well be preceded by high-level US–UK–French–Thai consideration of problem either in Washington and/or Bangkok just before opening of conference. Whether or not conference acts in this sense, Secretary’s projected visit to Vientiane would provide opportunity for further high-level consideration on the spot and, if conference has acted, for emphasis and commencement execution its decisions.

Having in mind desirability moving Lao Government somewhat further in direction of realism and pushing ICC forward as far as possible, this seems to be timetable best adapted to meeting problem. Should Pathet–Viets take further military action in north before Bangkok, more rapid consultation and action would of course be necessary.

Yost
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/1–2655. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, and Phnom Penh.
  2. Document 263.
  3. In telegram 277, January 22, the Legation reported that it had received an estimate from the Lao Foreign Minister of the equivalent of $3.78 million for expenditures for the National Army for February. The Legation assumed that given the special circumstances in the north the request was reasonable. The Legation suggested informing the Lao Government that the United States would support expenditures in February. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/1–2655)
  4. Document 261.