Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

261. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, January 11, 1955—7 p.m.

248. Katay and Phoui both informed me negotiations with Pathet Lao have made no progress and have not as yet touched on matter of substance. Optimistic statement made to press yesterday by Oun Hueun, one of leading Lao Government delegates, reflects hopes rather than facts. Argument continues over site of future meetings, Pathets still urging Khang Khai and Lao Government suggesting various alternatives.² Pathets have proposed formal procedures customary at post full-dress conferences in press releases after each meeting, while government has replied these formalities unnecessary.

Both my informants recognize these moves are designed to enhance Pathet status and serve their propaganda objectives. Both moreover noted subservience Pathet negotiators to absent Viets. Katay, however, said in private conversation with government representatives, Pathets had indicated desire for wholehearted reintegration into national community, and he therefore retains hopefulness that they can be separated from Viets and reasonable settlement reached. Phoui, on other hand, expects Pathets to stall as long as possible and is doubtful of any settlement.

I asked both what government would do if no agreement could be reached. Phoui said that general staff is making plans and armed forces are being collected south of two provinces. Katay made no mention of military moves but said failure to reach agreement would demonstrate continued intervention of Viets and problem would be tossed back to ICC. I argued that it is already clear Pathets are instruments of Viets, that they are stalling in order consolidate their position in two provinces, and that government ought promptly to present its own proposals for reasonable settlement in order to force Pathets’ hand. Katay indicated he should do so if necessary but still minimizes difficulties.

Meanwhile Breal³ informs me …, existence extensive Viet cadres with Pathets and contains warnings to cadre to avoid identification by ICC. French reluctant reveal this information to ICC lest source dry up. Also Pathet forces tending to increase, presumably from North Vietnam, though some defections are taking place. Clashes with government forces are frequent and latter have impression they are being encircled and isolated.

Comment: It seems evident Communist strategy is to drag out negotiations, first by procedural wrangles and presumably later by presenting impossible demands. Meanwhile, they will consolidate grip on two provinces and improve training and equipment their forces. Their first objective is probably to obtain participation Lao Government and incorporation their forces in Royal Army. Failing this, Pathets may well withdraw their qualified recognition of Royal Government, denounce it as puppet of Western imperialists, and set themselves up as legitimate government of Lao Peoples Democracy. This would follow pattern successfully established in China and Vietnam.

It seems essential to interrupt this process before it has been carried to point of no return. It probably could be interrupted by prompt Lao military action but this is last resort which should be avoided if possible. I believe there is at least hope that, if major non-Communist powers state unequivocally in impressive forum that they consider this de facto partition of Laos to be gross violation Geneva Accords which they regard with utmost seriousness, Viets and their masters, having in mind overall strategy, may at least temporarily withdraw. While it is unlikely ICC will take firm position on this question, deference to India requires ICC machinery be at least invoked.

We therefore suggest following sequence of steps:

(1) Lao Government press negotiations themselves presenting proposal for reasonable settlement, (2) if no progress made within two or three weeks, Lao government publicly appeal to ICC to mediate and in meantime to restore Royal Government’s authority within two provinces, (3) if no settlement is in sight by that time, Manila Pact powers at Bangkok⁴ adopt and issue declaration stating that they find territorial integrity of Laos, recognized by all pact members and all Geneva signatories, is being infringed by de facto partition of country, that they are consulting in regard thereto under Article IV paragraph 2 of pact, and that in meantime they call upon Viets to cease interference in Lao internal affairs and permit immediate restoration royal authority throughout whole of Laos. Lao Government might simultaneously appeal to Nehru to seek from Ho Chi Minh loyal compliance with their joint declaration of October 28 (Legtel 681⁵).

I fear that unless some effective action is taken existing situation will over period of months crystallize, Laos will have two governments instead of one and task of holding remainder of country be rendered far more difficult. On other hand, Communists are not yet deeply committed and there seems at least fair prospect that energetic action on our side might eliminate Pathets as serious threat and halt at outset chain reaction which could otherwise run quickly across Laos and into neighboring states. All our other plans for assisting this country to maintain its independence are likely to prove useless unless this first crucial campaign can be won.

Yost

“Lao Government Bulletin features declaration reportedly made by Ho Chi-minh during Nehru visit to effect ‘Viet Minh Government subscribes fully to five principles elaborated by the Prime Ministers of China, India and desires to apply them in its relation with Laos and Cambodia.’ Principles include ‘mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of other party’ and ‘non-interference in internal affairs of other party.’” (Department of State, Central Files, 033.9151G/10–2054)

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/1–1155. Secret. Repeated to Saigon, Paris, and Phnom Penh.
2. According to telegrams 219 and 221 from Vientiane, January 2 and 4, the Pathet Lao insisted that preliminary negotiations for a political settlement described in telegram 248 take place at Khong Khai in Xieng Khouang province (bordering Sam Neua) rather than at Vientiane as the Royal Government proposed. The Royal Government agreed to meet at Khong Khai and sent its delegation there on January 3. (Ibid., 751G.00/1–255 and 751G.00/1–455, respectively)
3. Michel G.E. Brèal, French High Commissioner in Laos.
4. Reference is to the Council meetings organized under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, which was later termed the SEATO Council. The meetings opened on February 23 and concluded on February 25. See Documents 18 ff.
5. This telegram, October 30, 1954, reads as follows: