Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

265. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, January 21, 1955—7 p.m.

274. Katay and Phoui inform me that, agreement having at last been reached on site in Plaine des Jarres, negotiations with Pathet Lao were resumed yesterday.

Somewhat shaken by recent events in Samneua,² Katay now admits Pathets have been dragging out talks while consolidating their grip on northern provinces. He still contends, however, it is not “proved” they intend drive out all government forces. To my urging that, in order prevent further feet dragging, government itself submit reasonable proposal, Katay replied government would insist its authority in two provinces be promptly restored and, if Pathets refused, negotiations would be broken off. In same breath, while admitting (for the first time) that Prince Souphannouvong is “probably” Viet dominated, Katay insisted that when this becomes clear “his lieutenants” would desert him. I expressed thorough skepticism.

Prime Minister said he had just received report from Lao Legation Washington that Department concerned regarding views on Pathet negotiations he had expressed at recent press conference; he asked I reassure Department that he will make no dangerous concessions. I pointed out that Department rightly concerned lest, while Communists use negotiations as tactical screen, two provinces be in fact lost to Laos.

As previously reported, Katay and his intimates in Cabinet have held in exaggerated form view shared by many Laotians and ICC members that majority Pathets not really Communists and would flock back into fold when freed of Viet control (reference Department telegram 2001³). Boreal, Talbot and I have for months been endeavoring cure this delusion but in many cases only effective medicine will be sad experience. Phoui never shared this delusion, Souvanna is coming around as result recent developments, but Katay and his friends are still in early stages psychologically upsetting process of disillusionment. It is probable few more weeks exposure to Communist tactics will complete process of enlightenment but danger is that provinces may by that time be hopelessly lost.

I intend this weekend urge Crown Prince exert his influence more positively on this problem.⁴ Basic difficulty, however, is that, with Pathets now firmly entrenched in two provinces, they can be ousted only by military force or, possibly, by international pressure.

Governor of SamNeua, who called on me yesterday, urges former, claiming population of province largely anti-Pathet and, if supplied with arms, would arise in support of incoming government troops. On other hand, French military question capacity government forces to drive out Pathets even at present strength. This estimate may be based somewhat on French pique at their summary exclusion from command positions, and in two provinces even from advisory positions, in Lao armed forces.

Regarding second alternative, ICC has by unanimous vote recommended both parties “withdraw to former positions”, in other words that Pathets permit reestablishment government post at Nongkhang. It is interesting Poles went along with this resolution, which might suggest Pathets had been a little premature in launching attacks. Breal, in company De Beaufort and Cerles (Saigon’s 2831 to Department⁵) had urged ICC to condemn, or at least take note of, Pathet disregard commissions earlier injunction to remain two kilometers distant from Nongkhang post. If ICC had so acted, Breal expected Poles to protest Pathet attacks to Geneva signatories.

While this or similar gambit might be useful, it seems to us too narrow. We should prefer to see international attention centered not on passing incidents but on basic violation of Geneva final declaration, which is creeping de facto partition of Laos. It is this aspect of question on which we hope Bangkok conference, if it deals with this matter, will concentrate.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2155. Secret. Repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Paris.
2. According to telegram 263 from Vientiane, January 19, the Royal Government’s post and airstrip at Nong Khang were lost, but the post at Houeithao was holding out. Government losses were believed to be light and the fighting had ceased. (Ibid., 751G.00/1–1755)
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. In light of press reports from Vientiane that Katay had declared himself willing to accept Pathet Lao participation in his government, the Department instructed Yost in telegram 211 to Vientiane, January 20, as follows: “Therefore if you deem it advisable suggest you approach Savang saying we are disturbed at discrepancy between Katay’s lip-service to anti-Communist, anti-Pathet Lao, pro-Western attitude and his continued vacillation and yielding in face Pathet Lao demands.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/1–1855)

   For a report on Yost’s discussions with Savang at Luang Prabang, January 22–23, see Document 267.

5. Dated January 18, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/1–1855) Pierre Cerles was Diplomatic Counselor to the French Commissioner General in Saigon and French General Debeaufort was with the ICC Liaison Mission in Saigon.