260. Telegram From the Legation in Laos to the Department of State1
247. 12 January 8 p.m. I invited Private [Prime] Minister to dinner alone last night in order reach closer understanding re our common objectives.
Having in mind our estimate that Katay is interested primarily in his own personal fortunes, that he will probably work energetically on our side if he believes it to his personal advantage, that he has backing majority of Lao assembly and strong Thai support but that his attitude toward Lao Royal Family and some of his own Ministerial colleagues is cloudy, I made point of emphasizing that it is our desire to support (1) present regime in Laos including Royal Family, (2) present government of national union representing all important non-Communist elements in country, and (3) Katay himself as leader best capable of maintaining Lao independence. I pointed out only US objective in Laos is to aid Lao Government and people to resist external and internal Communist aggression and to improve their welfare.
Prime Minister responded by referring his anti-Communist booklet published during Bangkok exile (reference Legation’s biographic report OM on Katay, December 3112) and asserting it had long been his conviction that Communism is principal threat to Lao independence and that Laos must rely primarily on US for its security. He insisted Lao people wholly unreceptive to Communism and will resist if given adequate means and adequate understanding of threat. [Page 579] He expressed serious concern at effect on Laos and Cambodia of loss of South Vietnam which he considered probable. He expressed anxiety over Cambodian weakness, ambiguous Burmese attitude, and unreliability of French. He therefore concluded Laos could rely only on US and Thailand to maintain its independence.
We discussed closer relations Laos with Thailand and Cambodia, particularly former, exchange of Royal visits, possible visit General Phao to Laos, early negotiation broad commercial agreement with Thailand. Prime Minister expressed himself in favor all these steps especially enthusiastic re latter. He did not expect bilateral agreement with France to be an obstacle and anticipated its conclusion shortly. He said French Government is taking wholly correct attitude re Lao independence but some of local French still behaving objectionably.
We also discussed importance mobile teams, including Ministers and Assembly members, canvassing country thoroughly between now and elections in combined information and economic aid mission. I offered cooperation USOM and USIS (which are working out specific projects for discussion with Lao Government this week). Katay most enthusiastic on this point and promised would endeavor organize several teams at once.3
Separate following telegrams report our discussions Pathet Lao negotiations4 and Petsarath question,5 as well as Legation estimate of situation.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/–1355. Secret. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- The Department approved this offer of cooperation in telegram 196 to Vientiane, January 14, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–1355)↩
- See telegram 248, infra.↩
- Presumably telegram 250 from Vientiane, January 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–1355) Prince Petsarath was senior member of the vice-regal branch of the Royal House of Luang Prabang and elder brother to Prince Souvanna Phouma and half-brother to Prince Souvanouvong. In 1945, after the end of Japanese occupation, he declared an independent Laos, but was forced into exile in Thailand when France reestablished control over the country. Petsarath in 1955 was negotiating his return to Laos and insisting upon restoration of his title as Viceroy.↩
- Presumably telegram 251 from Vientiane, Joint Weeka 54, January 14, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00(W/1–1455)↩