Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

220. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, September 26, 1955—9 p.m.

400. Department pass DOD and CINCPAC. As indicated Embassy telegram 388,² we were misinformed by Prime Minister as to imminence of discussion by party caucus of question of US military aid to Cambodia. In consequence, US reply to letter of Defense Minister Sirik Matak which was summarized in Embassy telegram 377³ is now not so urgent as it had seemed. However, since Prince Sihanouk has indicated question will be ventilated in party congress within next month, US would be well-advised, in my judgment, to make compromise on FARK force basis which will forestall possibility that … Monseigneur might reject US military aid on ground that it is insufficient to assist Cambodia in attaining a safe posture of national defense.

Problem, in essence, is political one. Cambodian Government is faced with dilemma, as indicated in Embassy despatch 70,⁴ of having men under arms who, if promptly demobilized to meet JCS force basis figure, might either become bandits roving on population or recruits for Viet Minh guerilla bands. Likewise, there is the usual Oriental “face” and reluctance to accept a reduction in National Army which is principal ornament of Royal House and Royal Government. Furthermore, Cambodian authorities are sincerely convinced that with extensive frontiers adjoining Laos and Vietnam, they require large land force to guard against eventual Viet Minh penetration.

It follows from this premise that we cannot be too arbitrary or too insistent upon immutability of JCS figure, irrespective of otherwise valid military considerations which contribute to establishment of the figure. We should accordingly like leeway in order negotiate a force basis somewhere between 30,000 figure established by JCS and 45,000 desired by FARK. A compromise can, in my opinion, be worked out. I would take one figure which is common to both FARK and MAAG estimates except in its framework of time. Sirik Matak, in his letter of September 15, cited TO and E of 41,000 men. MAAG, in its proposal for a five-year development of FARK likewise comes out at 41,000, but in 1960 and not in 1955. Main problem is how to reconcile these figures in a time sequence, and so far as political situation is concerned, to find a solution for 7,000 suppletif troops who otherwise might go over the hill or defect to Viet Minh if they are immediately demobilized.

My recommendation is that we be authorized by JCS to negotiate agreement with FARK which would provide for MAAG logistical support of force basis of 31,000 effectives, but with an agreement to consent to higher troop basis to include 7,000 suppletif troops for next calendar year. This would imply readiness on our part to pay these suppletifs at present rate which is $1 million a year, above current outlay for regular troop pay and rations. In return for this concession, I would expect Cambodians to agree to limit recruitment for regular FARK troop basis of 31,000 to suppletif forces. MAAG estimates that annual attrition rate is in neighborhood of 1,000. Thus, in theory, if each year suppletif forces would contribute this amount to regular army establishment we could in seven years eliminate suppletifs entirely and not increase total of FARK of 31,000. This arithmetic, however, ignores political factors and we should be satisfied, I think, if we could reach basis of 35,000 men as of January 1, 1958.

In consequence, it is requested that JCS authorize Embassy and MAAG to negotiate along these terms. Thus, US would indicate its readiness to support logistically a troop basis of 31,000 effectives, but in terms of troop pay and allowances a force reaching 35,000 men by January 1, 1958, it being understood that during this transitional period we would continue to support in reduced pay and rations 7,000 suppletifs who would be in process of gradual absorption into FARK or demobilization of the less fit. MAAG would in return require acceptance by FARK of its five-year plan with clear understanding that cost of any force above 35,000 maximum would have to be defrayed by Cambodian budget. Ultimately, if MAAG five-year plan is adopted, FARK would number 41,000 men in 1960.

MAAG concurs and requests this message be submitted to JCS for approval.⁵

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/9–2655. Secret.
2. Dated September 23, not printed. (ibid., 751H.00/9–2355)
3. According to telegram 377, September 15, the Cambodian Defense Minister submitted in a letter of the same date a force level proposal of 38,000 and a table of organization of 41,277 in response to the Embassy and MAAG recommendation that the Cambodian army be reduced to 31,000. (ibid., 751H.5–MSP/9–255) Discussion on the recommended level of 31,000 and how it could be reached is in telegram PC 67–55 from the U.S. Army Attaché to the Department of the Army, August 15 and telegram 251 from Phnom Penh, August 25, neither printed. (ibid., FE–SEA Files: Lot 58 D 266, Army–Navy Messages, 1955, and Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/8–2555, respectively)
4. Dated September 19, not printed. (ibid., 751H.5–MSP/9–1955)
5. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, also concurred. (Telegram 356, 010019Z to Chief of Naval Operations, October 1; JCS Records, CCS/092 Asia (6–25–48) (2))