Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

221. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security affairs (McGuire) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson¹

Washington, November 16, 1955.

Dear Mr. Robertson: On 29 August 1955 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reexamine the MDA Program and Guidance for Cambodia during FY 1956 and FY 1957, in light of the MDAP Survey Report on Cambodia.²

Subsequent to that date, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs informally requested the Department of Defense to consider, along with the MAAG-Cambodia Survey Report, the views reiterated by the U.S. Ambassador, Cambodia, in his cable No. 400 dated 26 September 1955 to the Secretary of State.³

Attached for your information are the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject, which are concurred in by the Department of Defense.

In view of the DOD position, I strongly recommend that every effort be made by the Department of State to have the present French training mission withdrawn at an early date, in order that the U.S. may assume sole control over all the training of the Cambodian Armed Forces. In the meantime, the Department of Defense will commence development of plans for the augmentation of MAAG-Cambodia with necessary training personnel which can be put into effect as soon as the Department of State determines that it is politically feasible for the U.S. to assume sole control over all the training of the Cambodian Armed Forces.

Sincerely yours,

E. Perkins McGuire

[Enclosure]

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)⁴

Washington, October 19, 1955.

SUBJECT

• MDAP Survey Report on Cambodia

1. This memorandum is in response to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 29 August 1955, subject as above, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to reexamine MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1956 and FY 1957, in light of the subject report.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporated the Cambodian force levels in recommended MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1956 and FY 1957 on the basis of decision by your office as to those force levels and on the basis of related actions establishing a U.S. military assistance advisory group and providing MDA for Cambodia without the prerequisite of ultimate withdrawal of the French training mission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had previously recommended the phased withdrawal of the French mission and U.S. assumption of control over all training.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the MDAP Survey Report properly assesses the potential Cambodian capabilities in relation to their military force requirements. The forces recommended in the report could be properly developed with full U.S. control of training. However, the French have retained control of training, making it clear that there is no present intention of withdrawing. Further, the French mission has been ineffective and consequently the training of Cambodian forces has been unsatisfactory. Unless remedial actions are taken and proper training is given at all echelons, it is doubtful that the Cambodian armed forces could accomplish their internal security mission. These forces when properly trained could make a contribution to the collective free world defense of Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the U.S. should continue to press for phased withdrawal and ultimate elimination of the French military mission, with the U.S. assuming sole control over all training of Cambodian armed forces.

4. With the reservations stated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the organization and the 30,170 level of forces shown for 1955-56 in Annex “C” of the MDAP Survey Report are appropriate for the Cambodian armed forces. It is noted, however, that the American Ambassador to Cambodia has “negotiated a force basis agreement” with the Cambodian Ministry of National Defense, in which agreement was made for planning purposes to a force level of 31,000. The discrepancy is relatively minor and the United States seems virtually obligated to honor the commitment made by the Ambassador. Accordingly, with the basic reservations previously expressed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff interpose no major objection to the 31,000 force level.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also considered the 26 September message (Phnom Penh 400) from the American Ambassador, Cambodia, to the Secretary of State, in which the Ambassador indicates that the Cambodian Government will not be satisfied with the agreed 31,000 regular force level. He requested authority to furnish pay and allowance support for 7,000 suppletifs (non-regulars) for the next calendar year, decreasing such support as the suppletifs are assimilated into the regular forces. The Ambassador noted that the implications involved in the support of suppletif s are primarily political in nature in that a withdrawal of support might result in these individuals becoming bandits or recruits for Viet Minh guerrilla bands. This problem therefore appears to be one of provision of economic relief for political purposes rather than increasing the military potential of Cambodia. Since Military Assistance and Direct Force Support funds should not be diverted for economic relief, these funds should not be used to support Cambodian suppletifs. Under existing circumstances, it is illogical from a military point of view to agree to support expansion of Cambodian armed forces above the 31,000 level or the 1955–56 organization proposed in the Survey Report.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. No further revision of FY 1956 and FY 1957 Programming Guidance, except as indicated in paragraph 4 above, be made until the effectiveness of U.S. aid has been demonstrated and satisfactory provision has been made regarding the phased withdrawal of the French mission and U.S. assumption of control over all training.

b. MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1956 and FY 1957 be revised in accordance with the views stated herein.

c. The U.S. continue to press for phased withdrawal and ultimate elimination of the French military mission, with the U.S. assuming sole control over all training of Cambodian armed forces.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford⁵
Chairman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP11–1655. Top Secret.
2. A copy of the U.S. MAAG Cambodia Survey Report, July 20, is in Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 60 B 1025, 334 MAAG Cambodia. The conclusions and recommendations may be summarized as follows: The political situation in Cambodia was relatively stable and a flexible and mobile armed force was required for Cambodia’s defense and internal security. The command structure, organization and training of FARK was poor, but the individual Cambodian soldier was an asset, “alert, tough and courageous.” The report noted that the U.S.-recommended force level for FARK of 31,000 was not immediately possible, but suggested a series of reductions over the next 5 years to reach that level. The report recommended that FARK be organized on a regimental level (each regiment 2,100 men), that there be 4 regional commands, and that training and support functions be improved. In order to achieve these goals, the report recommended an increase in the size of the MAAG Mission in Cambodia.
3. Supra.
4. Top Secret.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.