Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

200. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 3, 1955.

SUBJECT

• MAAG Training Formula, Cambodia

Despite the President’s approval of the compromise training formula, the Department of Defense continues to urge that MAAG have full authority for all training and advisory functions and that we obtain written commitments from Cambodia to this effect and to the phase-out of the French Military Mission.

France has raised objections to the compromise formula and has attempted to obtain U.S. adherence in writing to a set of “Principles” which would require MAAG recommendations be worked out in agreement with the French while the French would retain responsibility for direct instruction of the Cambodian Army. Such principles would in effect make a U.S. MAAG impotent.

The Cambodians continue to be vague as to their desires. They speak of “American equipment, American instruction; for French equipment, French instruction.” During your discussions of the formula with the Prime Minister, he said it might facilitate solution of the problem caused by the French who desired to retain a military mission, which Cambodia found acceptable, if acceptable to U.S. Further reaction from Cambodia has not been forthcoming and it appears Cambodia will accept any solution which is satisfactory to the U.S. and France and does not impinge on her own sovereignty.

Recommendations:

In view of Cambodia’s noncommittal attitude, French objections to any U.S. training, and the Defense Department’s uncompromising attitude, it is recommended that we defer further discussion of the training formula and MAAG’s ultimate functions until after the MDA Agreement is signed² and the Chief MAAG has had a chance to make on-the-spot surveys and recommendations.

Officers in Defense, however, will not concur in this position and insist that we use this opportunity to obtain French concurrence to the following:

1. Adoption of U.S. organizations and training concepts is necessary to make most efficient use of U.S. material and equipment;

2. U.S. training mission is necessary to insure adequate implementation of U.S. organizational and training concepts;

3. French assistance is desirable in the initial stages of a U.S. training program;

4. The U.S. does not desire to act through a third country in implementing its aid program for Cambodia.

It will therefore be necessary to seek Defense concurrence at a high level or override Defense objections.

I suggest that you or the Under Secretary discuss this matter with Secretary Wilson before you depart for Paris.

Discussion:

The French gave Embassy Paris an informal memorandum dated March 24, 1954, outlining French thinking on the training problem:

[Here follows text of the French memorandum as transmitted in Document 197.]

The U.S. has not officially commented on these “Principles”. When Mr. Young was in Paris on March 23, he did informally object to several aspects of this memorandum and proposed some changes which the French rejected.

Embassy Phnom Penh and PSA believe that the U.S. should not attempt to enter into a written agreement with France on this subject as it could only limit our field of action. An attempt, however, was made to clear a message which would have informed the French of our broad thinking on the relative functions of MAAG and the French Military Mission. Defense would not clear this message because it envisaged the possibility of the French continuing current training and service functions and anticipated the possibility of U.S. unit training. Defense argues that unless MAAG can have control of all training schools it does not desire unit training.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/5–355. Secret. Drafted by Purnell and cleared by Young. A note on the source text indicates that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum.
2. See Document 202.
3. Attached but not printed is a position paper for side talks with the French at the NATO Conference entitled, “MAAG Training Formula”. Bilateral and trilateral side talks with the French and British at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris, May 9–11, were limited to Vietnam and in particular the Diem government and the sect crisis in Saigon. For documentation on the discussions, see vol. I, pp. 372 ff.