Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

189. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)¹

Washington, February 15, 1955.

Dear Bob: Since our talk yesterday² regarding the problem of training in Cambodia, I have given considerable thought to finding a formula to resolve the issue with the French. I am sure that no French Government will accede to exclusive U.S. control and operation of the training of Cambodian forces. To press our current proposals will undoubtedly provoke a sharp and vigorous counteraction from the French. This will only have the effect of straining U.S.-French relations in general, putting the Cambodians in a difficult position, and delaying indefinitely the reorganization and modernization of Cambodian armed forces. This latter objective is essential to the security of the area, as we indicated yesterday.

I wish that we could proceed with our proposals, for they seem sensible and workable from our viewpoint. However, the French Ambassador has told me on instructions that his government is deeply disturbed and opposes turning over the training in Cambodia to us.³ His government wishes to discuss this problem with me at the Bangkok Conference.

So, after a good deal of thought on the matter I think we have to evolve a formula that I can negotiate at Bangkok with the French, if you concur. This formula must satisfy our requirement for the controlling voice in the entire utilization of U.S. funds and equipment in Cambodia. This means, as I see it, that our resources will be used according to our doctrine and procedures. If we have satisfactory assurances to that effect and the means to safeguard and observe the utilization of U.S. resources, then it is not indispensable, though it would be desirable, to participate in the day-to-day conduct of the training operation. Since U.S. resources will be the mainstay of the Cambodian army, our control over their use will provide us with the deciding voice on the development of Cambodian forces, subject only to the assent of the King of Cambodia as commander-in-chief.

Under these circumstances, I suggest for your consideration the following possible formula:

1. By agreement with the Cambodian Government, the Chief of U.S. MAAG in Cambodia would be designated by the United States as the military adviser to the King of Cambodia who is Commander in Chief of the Cambodian armed forces. The Chief of U.S. MAAG would advise the King, and through him the Chief of the French training mission, on:

a. the doctrine and procedures for the utilization of U.S. funds and equipment by Cambodian armed forces;

b. the force goals, costs, structure, and military mission of Cambodian forces for which U.S. funds and equipment are to be provided.

2. It should be understood by the French and Cambodian Governments that the Chief, U.S. MAAG will have the sole responsibility and final authority, subject to the U.S. Ambassador, for providing such advice.

3. The French training mission under a French general officer would remain in Cambodia to conduct the day-to-day training operation of Cambodian units and personnel according to the advice and doctrines provided the King by the U.S. MAAG Chief and accepted by the King for the training of Cambodian forces. The U.S. MAAG would have authority to observe the day-to-day training operations and to make recommendations and suggestions to the French training mission and to the King.

4. The U.S. MAAG would maintain exclusive control over U.S. funds and equipment. If U.S. recommendations and suggestions as to doctrine and procedure for the development of Cambodian armed forces were not followed, the Chief of U.S. MAAG could ultimately recommend to the U.S. Ambassador and U.S. Government the withdrawal of U.S. equipment and funds for training Cambodian armed forces.

This is just the bare outline of a formula. If it is workable in principle, you may want to refine it. I think we may be able to persuade the Cambodians and the French to accept it. Accordingly, I would appreciate your views on this if possible before I leave Friday⁴ for Bangkok.

Sincerely,

FOSTER

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5/2–1555. Secret. Drafted by Young.
2. No record of this meeting has been found.
3. See Document 186.
4. February 18.