Office of the Historian

146. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State1

Canberra, March 13, 1957—10 p.m.

Secto 14. Fifth session opened with discussion French resolution on education introduced at end of fourth session (Secto 102). After discussion Council adopted resolution as amended by omitting portion of last sentence following words framework SEATO.3

Council adopted decisions and resolutions on military advisers report4 (agenda item 6) which:

(a)
Noted the progress report;
(b)
Noted that military advisers now approved certain strategic concepts and intelligence studies;
(c)
Noted principles and procedures for staging SEATO military exercises as approved by military advisers;
(d)
Endorsed the recommendations of military advisers that:

1.
Civil and military representatives convene at early date to study quasi-overt aggression and make recommendations to Council for effective counter-action;
2.
Financial requirements for SEATO military planning office be budgeted and controlled with SEATO civil procedures;
3.
Military budgets be set at $3,575 for period January 1 to March 31, 1957, and $88,320 for period April 1, 1957 to June 30, 1958;
4.
Accountant and budget officer be appointed salary to be shared equally by civil and military sides.

The Secretary’s remarks included warnings against tendency of free nations to feel that military danger ends with cessation hostilities. Since we are dealing with an enemy not bound by moral or legal restraints, attack could be sudden because enemy does not need consult Parliament for public opinion. In considering the military potential and political ambition of the enemy, we have no reason to feel complacent. ChiComs show evidences of increase in military preparations despite its heavy burden on the economy. On matter of ambition there is every evidence of desire of Chinese Communists to dominate the entire area.

Our Geneva conversations with ChiComs primarily designed to obtain release United States citizens and achieve renunciation of [Page 327] force Taiwan area. Response has been that Chinese Communists would prefer take over Taiwan by peaceful means but that they reserve right to take by forceful means.

Secretary hoped relative calm which has prevailed in treaty area for last two years, thanks largely to SEATO, will not lead us to neglect military planning and potential. Those are heart of organization and cannot be neglected or be consigned secondary place.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–CA/3–1357. Secret; Priority. Pouched to Wellington, Manila, Saigon, Karachi, Bangkok, London, Paris, and Singapore at Canberra’s request.↩
  2. Document 144.↩
  3. Summarized in Document 144.↩
  4. MA 6th M (Report of the Sixth Meeting of the SEATO Military Advisers), March 10, not found in Department of State files. See Document 138.↩