[Attachment]
PROGRESS REPORT TO THE SEATO
COUNCIL FROM THE MILITARY ADVISERS, CANBERRA, MARCH, 1957
Introduction
1. This report contains a summary of the work accomplished by the
Military Advisers since the Council last met at Karachi in March,
1956. At that meeting the Council was advised of the programme of
future work that had been drawn up. In the main all programmed work
has been accomplished.
2. Since March, 1956, we have had further meetings at Baguio in
September, 1956, and at Canberra in March, 1957. In addition our
staffs have met on a number of occasions as follows:—
- (a)
- Ad Hoc Threat Evaluation Sub-committee—Pearl
Harbour—March, 1956.
- (b)
- Third Military Staff Planners Conference—Singapore—June,
1956.
- (c)
- Ad Hoc Military Finance Committee—Bangkok—October,
1956.
- (d)
- Ad Hoc Intelligence Sub-committee—Singapore—December,
1956.
- (e)
- Ad Hoc Communications Sub-committee—Pearl Harbour—January,
1957.
3. These meetings have made significant contributions to progress in
the SEATO military field, and
their recommendations form the basis both of the recommendations we
wish to make to the Council at their present meeting and of the work
we plan to proceed with in the coming year.
Summary of Work Since March, 1956
Permanent Planning Office
4. One of the most significant actions by the Military Advisers has
been the establishment of the SEATO Permanent Planning Office which opened at Bangkok
on 1st March, 1957. This organisation provides the best means of
ensuring continuity in SEATO
military planning. It will also co-ordinate and expedite the
detailed planning which must follow from the broad strategic
concepts already developed and forms a sound nucleus for any
expansion in an emergency. Additionally its establishment will
reduce the need for ad hoc meetings.
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Location of Future Meetings of
Military Advisers
5. The Military Advisers have concluded that it would be desirable
and more economical for all future meetings of the Military Advisers
to be held at Bangkok, with the possible exception of those meetings
immediately preceding Council meetings. We have directed the Chief,
SEATO Military Planning
Office, to submit at our next meeting a proposed financial procedure
whereby “out-of-pocket” expenses incurred by Thailand in staging
Military Advisers’ meetings at Bangkok would be charged against the
SEATO military budget.
The Strategic Concepts for the
Defence of South East Asia
6. In line with the approved decision of the Second Military
Advisers’ Conference,4 strategic concepts have been developed for the
defence of South East Asia, including East Pakistan in the event of
aggression by:—
- (a)
- Viet Minh
forces.
- (b)
- Chinese Communist and Viet Minh forces; or by the Chinese Communists
alone.
7. In general these concepts require that:—
- (a)
- All possible steps should be taken to ensure that the
protocol states do not fall to the Communists by subversion
or war by proxy.
- (b)
- In the event of it being decided that an act of overt
aggression has been committed by Viet Minh and/or Chinese
Communist forces, and that SEATO military counter-action should be taken,
this should be:—
- (i)
- To initiate immediately air attacks, including the
use of nuclear weapons against selected targets of
military importance in the territory of the
aggressor states;
- (ii)
- To provide air interdiction of the enemy’s
advance;
- (iii)
- To provide naval and air support to SEATO or indigenous
forces;
- (iv)
- To deploy well-supported ground forces to secure
the key areas;
- (v)
- To maintain sea and air communications and deny
them to the enemy;
- (vi)
- As early as possible to go over to the offensive
exploiting SEATO’s
amphibious and airborne capabilities to clear the
enemy from the occupied areas;
- (vii)
- To be prepared to conduct expanded military
operations to complete the destruction of the
enemy.
8. These strategic concepts are considered to be a major advance over
the defence concepts previously studied.
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Strategic Concept for the Defence
of West Pakistan in Global War
9. A strategic concept for the defence of West Pakistan in a global
war, using nuclear weapons, if required, was approved. The
development of the strategy was limited because of its global
implications. It was agreed that Pakistan should produce a further
position paper on the defence of West Pakistan in global war in
relationship to enemy strategy in the Middle East area.
Overall Threat Evaluation to the
Treaty Area
10. As a basis for the preparation of the strategic concepts
discussed above, detailed studies were made of the net Chinese
Communist and Viet Minh
threat to various parts of the Treaty Area after SEATO air attacks. These studies have
been consolidated into an overall estimate of the Communist threat
to the Treaty Area taking into account the threat of aggression by
overt military and/or subversive means.
11. The evaluation of the overt threat took into account the effect
of initial attacks of SEATO air,
both conventional and nuclear upon selected military targets. The
importance of this study cannot be over emphasized since SEATO strategy in the event of overt
aggression is predominantly based on the effective use of SEATO nuclear air power. This concept
agrees with the decision noted by the Council at their meeting in
March, 1956, as the most effective one to adopt in the event of
overt aggression to the Treaty Area.
Overt Communist Threat to the
Philippines
12. A study of the overt Communist threat to the Philippines was
approved for use as a basis for future planning studies.
Overt Communist Threat to East
Pakistan
13. A study was made of the overt Communist threat to East Pakistan.
This, too, will be used as a basis for future planning studies.
Defence of West Pakistan Against
Afghanistan
14. We have considered a study on the defence of West Pakistan in
view of the Communist-inspired threat posed by Afghanistan. In view
of the possibility of this threat from Afghanistan being subject to
change as a result of outside assistance we have decided to keep
this subject under review.
Concept for the Defence of the
Treaty Area in Conditions of Global War
15. We have considered the question of developing a concept for the
defence of the Treaty Area in conditions of global war. It was
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considered it can be
assumed that the residual threat to the mainland of South East Asia
in such conditions would be no greater, and may be less, than that
in limited war. It appears we can reasonably proceed on the
assumption that our military studies for limited war in South East
Asia will be adaptable for global war conditions.
16. We have previously agreed that SEATO military planning for the defence of West
Pakistan in global war must be co-ordinated with the overall
planning for the defence of the Middle East area.
17. The Pakistan Military Adviser does not agree with the view
expressed in paragraph 15 above and considers that a concept for the
defence of the Treaty Area in global war should be developed if the
necessary political clearance can be obtained.
Military Measures Required to
Counter the Threat to the Security of the Treaty Area Through
Quasi-Overt Military Action.
18. Quasi-overt military action is defined as follows:—
Armed action, under conditions which do not permit it to be
identified as overt aggression, by organized bands or groups
responsive in varying degrees to foreign control or direction.
19. We have approved an initial study of this problem from the
military point of view which has been forwarded to the Council
Representatives. The following conclusions were reached in this
study:—
- (a)
- Quasi-overt military action can be successfully contained
or defeated in a nation capable of maintaining internal
order. The immediate solution to the threat is the
development, by each of the countries of the Treaty Area of
the capability to maintain internal order.
- (b)
- The following counter measures against quasi-overt
military action are a responsibility of the Government of
the countries concerned:—
- (i)
- Intelligence operations;
- (ii)
- Unconventional warfare;
- (iii)
- Conventional military operations.
- (c)
- The following military measures which SEATO may take under present
conditions:—
- (i)
- Continuing existing measures to strengthen the
indigenous forces of those countries most directly
threatened by quasi-overt military action;
and
- (ii)
- Providing special aid in support of (b) (i), (ii)
and (iii); are limited to assisting and supporting
the counter-measures undertaken by individual member
nations of the Treaty Area.
- (d)
- The assistance and support given by SEATO cannot exceed that
which the South East Asian countries are willing and able to
accept.
- (e)
- There is a need for co-ordinating civil and military
measures with a view to taking effective counter-action
against quasi-overt military action.
20. We recommend to the Council that they convene at an early date a
meeting of civil and military representatives to study the problem
of quasi-overt aggression and to make recommendations to the Council
for effective counter-action.
SEATO Exercises
21. We have approved a schedule of SEATO exercises for the year 1956–57 and the following
exercises have been conducted:—
- (a)
- Exercise “Albatross”—an elementary maritime exercise
sponsored by Australia—October, 1956.
- (b)
- Exercise “Ridhee”—a combined air/ground operations centre
staff exercise sponsored by Thailand—January, 1957.
22. Exercise “Teamwork”, a bilateral amphibious exercise, was
conducted jointly by the United States and Thailand in October,
1956.
23. Further SEATO exercises
projected for the current year include—
- (a)
- Exercise “Astra”—a maritime exercise sponsored by the
United Kingdom—April, 1957.
- (b)
- A small force naval gunfire support exercise sponsored
jointly by the United States and the Philippines—April,
1957.
- (c)
- A small force close air support exercise sponsored jointly
by Thailand and the United States—May, 1957.
In addition certain bilateral and multilateral exercises may be
conducted.
24. We have agreed to principles and to a procedure for the staging
of SEATO exercises and recommend
that the Council take note of the principles and the use of this
procedure, a copy of which is attached.5
SEATO Atomic Warfare Orientation Course
25. A course, conducted by the U.S. Military Adviser, was held at
Pearl Harbour in February, 1957. The course was designed “to provide
to SEATO planning officers a
general background knowledge of atomic weapons, their uses and
effects, in order to broaden the capabilities of SEATO planners and to facilitate the
atomic phases of SEATO planning
studies”. The course proved most valuable and provided
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much useful material on
which realistic training programmes may be based.
Communications
26. The conduct of SEATO military
exercises and the establishment of the Military Planning Office in
Bangkok have brought to light a number of communications problems.
Progress has been made towards the solution of these problems, but,
while a need exists for a general crypto system, none is yet
available.
Military Assistant to Civilian
Public Relations Officer
27. We have accepted the invitation of the Council to appoint a
military assistant to the Civilian Public Relations Officer and the
offer by the United States to fill this post. A United States
officer has since taken up this appointment.
SEATO Military Expenditure I1128. The past
procedures for the administration of SEATO joint military finance have proved cumbersome
and inadequate, particularly in view of the expansion of the
Military Secretariat and the establishment of the SEATO Military Planning Office.
In examining the problem, whenever possible and appropriate,
proposals have been made to take full advantage of existing
civil SEATO facilities on a
cost-sharing basis.
29. We have agreed to:—
- (a)
- Endorse the principle that the financial requirements of
the SEATO Military
Planning Office should be budgeted and controlled in
accordance with SEATO
civil procedure, suitably amended.
- (b)
- Approve the military budgets—
| (i) 1st January, 1957–31st March, 1957 |
$3,575 |
| (ii) 1st April, 1957–30th June, 1958 |
$88,320 |
- (c)
- Approve the appointment of an Accountant and Budget
Officer, whose salary would be shared equally by the Civil
and Military sides.
Future Work
30. An initial programme of work for the Permanent Military Planning
Office has been drawn up and is attached.6
31. We have decided that future meetings will be held as follows:—
- (a)
- Seventh Military Advisers’ Conference, Bangkok, September,
1957.
- (b)
- Ad Hoc Intelligence Sub-committee meeting in Bangkok,
November, 1957.
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A meeting of appropriate civil and military representatives is
required to study the problem of quasi-overt aggression as
recommended in paragraph 20 above.
Recommendations
32. The Military Advisers recommend that the Council:—
- (a)
- Note this progress report;
- (b)
- Take note that the SEATO
Military Advisers have approved strategic concepts and
intelligence studies on which detailed planning and
preparations will be based. (Details of these approvals are
contained in the Report of the Third Military Advisers
Meeting at Baguio—MA 3rd M);
- (c)
- Take note of the principles and the procedure for the
staging of SEATO military
exercises which have been approved by the Military Advisers
(paragraph 24);
- (d)
- Endorse the following specific recommendations of the
Military Advisers—
- (i)
- The convening at an early date of a meeting of
civil and military representatives to study the
problem of quasi-overt aggression and to make
recommendations to the Council for effective
counter-action (paragraph 19);
- (ii)
- The principle that the financial requirements of
the SEATO Military
Planning Office should be budgeted and controlled in
accordance with SEATO civil procedure, suitably amended
(paragraph 29);
- (iii)
- The military budgets—
| (i) 1st January, 1957–31st March, 1957 |
$3,575 |
| (ii) 1st April, 1957–30th June, 1958 |
$88,320 (paragraph 29) |
- (iv)
- The appointment of an Accountant and Budget Officer, whose
salary would be shared equally by the Civil and Military
sides (paragraph 29).
Annex B
SEATO MILITARY PLANNING STAFF
Initial Programme of Work
Item A
To draw up detailed plans, including logistics and facilities, from
the strategic concept agreed by the Third Staff Planners Meeting for
the defence of South East Asia including East Pakistan against an
attack by Communist Chinese and Viet Minh forces.
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Item B
To draw up detailed plans, including logistics and facilities, from
the strategic concept agreed by the Third Staff Planners Meeting for
the defence of South East Asia against an attack by Viet Minh forces. In this connection,
the military feasibility of holding Vientiane should be
examined.
Item C
To develop further plans for the defence of West Pakistan after the
strategic concept formulated by the Third Staff Planners Meeting
has, by agreement of the Military Advisers, been related to the
appropriate plans for the Middle East Area.
Item D
To examine the military measures required to counter the threat to
the security of the Treaty Area through quasi-overt military action
and the steps which should be taken for their implementation.
Item E
To develop a strategic concept for the defence of South East Asia
against overt Communist aggression on the Philippines.
Item F
To examine and develop further studies in the field of non-material
standardization, specially with regard to staff procedures and
techniques; operations and training; and logistics.
Item G
The study of the defence of West Pakistan in relationship to the
Middle East strategy. (Pakistan will prepare a position paper on
this item.)
Item H
Naval study of the SEATO area
including the control and protection of merchant shipping.
Item I
To study whether a requirement exists for the establishment of a
SEATO Defence College and to
estimate the initial and annual recurring cost of such a college,
for submission to the Seventh Military Advisers’ Conference.
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Item J
To determine terms of reference for the Military Assistant to SEATO P.R.O., including a definition
of his duties and relationships with the Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office and
the SEATO P.R.O.
Item K
To examine the availability of existing maps of the SEATO area and to determine the
suitability of those maps and scales for common reference for
planning and intelligence studies.
