Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 3, 1957—8 a.m.

2357. Following received from Ambassador Hildreth in Lahore repeated for your information.

From Ambassador.

General Cawthorn Australian HICOM has just given me copy memo he left with President Mirza and the Prime Minister separately to which he set forth strong Australian position against any effort GOP to try to remove SEATO meeting reservations about the pact being only against Communist aggression.²

Made clear Australia felt any such attempt by GOP would fail and, because it would leak, would boomerang and suggest ending of GOP and SEATO.

Neutralism Australia felt no objection to frank exposition in secret session but felt problem should be approached “through efforts to influence opinion in favor of collective security and not by public criticism of neutralist governments”.

Cawthorn also gave me copy his cable to Casey reporting his conference with President and Prime Minister in which he stated President’s personal opinion that raising of issues at limiting language in SEATO pact and neutralism quite unnecessary in view of American declaration of November 29.³

Prime Minister after some cynical remarks querying value of SEATO to Pakistan, dictated long letter to Baig Foreign Secretary using same argument that Cawthorn submitted to Prime Minister against raising the issues objected to at SEATO meeting. Prime Minister, who not knowing what President had told Cawthorn, said that in event of Indian attack, Pakistan had ample guarantees of assistance from US Government and Baghdad Pact powers through UN provisions provided country concerned fulfilled obligation which no one could guarantee in advance. Prime Minister added any attempt to secure further guarantee through SEATO obviously not worth while.

Cawthorn in cable to Casey said he advised me of above. I will send by Truman or Jack Bell full text summarized above.⁴ I will pursue same line with Prime Minister and President, as Cawthorn, but avoid any indication of collaboration. In view of strong position by President and Prime Minister will not rush them because I believe GOP policy now settled.⁵

Hildreth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/3–357. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok.
2. In a note of February 27, the Australian Embassy informed the Department that the Pakistan Foreign Office had told Cawthorn that the Pakistan Delegation at Canberra would initiate a discussion of what Pakistan termed India’s “aggressive neutralism” and would also attempt to have withdrawn the U.S. and Australian limiting reservations to the operation of Article IV, paragraph 1, of the SEACDT. The Embassy stated also that the Australian Government would advise the Government of Pakistan not to raise these matters at Canberra. (Ibid., 790.5/2–2757)
3. Apparent reference to the Department’s press release of October 29, 1956, in which the United States reiterated its support for the Baghdad Pact and concluded: “A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.” For text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 10, 1956, p. 918.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. In telegram 228 from Lahore, March 5, marked “From Ambassador,” Hildreth stated that he had seen both President Mirza and Prime Minister Suhrawady the previous evening. “Both emphatic in casual references that idea amending SEATO pact by withdrawing Communist restriction was stupid. President said sometimes Prime Minister went off halfcocked. Prime Minister said soon as he learned about plan he killed it. Cawthorn who present at dinner laughed when I reported to him and said he sure Prime Minister started whole idea and backed down when he found his bluff called.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/3–557)