136. Editorial Note
In a memorandum to Sebald, March 2, Abbott stated that he and several other Departmental officers had met (apparently on more than one occasion) with A.J. de la Mare and J.R.A. Bottomley, respectively Counselor and First Secretary of the British Embassy, to discuss an undated paper entitled “Defense of Southeast Asia Against the Communist Threat,” which the Embassy had furnished to the Department sometime in February.
In their paper the British stated their belief that the United States and the United Kingdom were in agreement on three points: 1) Southeast Asia was an important area whose loss to the Communist bloc could lead to a shift in the world balance of power; 2) while the Communist military threat in the area was not pressing, it was necessary to counter Communist attempts to extend influence in Southeast Asia by nonmilitary means; and 3) present British policies in Malaya and Singapore were the correct ones under the circumstances.
In the paper the British also stated certain other conclusions, noting that with regard to them some differences were to be expected between the two countries. SEATO was an important deterrent, but its composition was anomalous in that only one mainland Southeast Asian nation was a member. Therefore SEATO could not be the exclusive instrument of policy in the area. In addition, SEATO had incurred certain enmities, and attempts to publicize the organization unduly might prove counterproductive. Neutralism would have to be lived with for some time, and in an intelligent form was not inimical to United States or British interests. Small countries in the area would inevitably look for leadership to large powers. The only [Page 293] choices in Southeast Asia would be India and China. Indian influence would grow and the Western powers would not be able to check it even if they wanted to. When it was necessary for the Western powers to counter specific Indian moves in, say, Laos and Cambodia, the implication should be avoided that they wished as a matter of principle to curb the growth of Indian authority and prestige.
In his memorandum, Abbott reported that, regarding neutralism, Department officers had pointed out that the United States did not agree with the contention in the British paper that a position of neutrality and acceptance of aid from both East and West was the optimum to be expected from uncommitted Asian countries. The British representatives were also informed that the United States did not accept the idea that smaller Southeast Asian nations would look to bigger and more powerful countries for leadership. “The implied British viewpoint that Indian influence should be encouraged was questioned in view of recent Indian activities in Laos and other places.”
Both the British paper and Abbott’s memorandum are attachments to circular instruction CA–8673 to Bangkok, Djakarta, Karachi, Manila, New Delhi, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, Saigon, Taipei, Tokyo, and Vientiane, April 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/4–1957)