Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

135. Background Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of Vietnam Affairs (Corcoran)¹

SAM B–6/53

Washington, March 1, 1957.

VIETNAMESE DESIRE FOR MILITARY OBSERVER STATUS

The Vietnamese Government is eager to have Vietnamese officers participate in SEATO military planning or at least sit in meetings as observers.

We hope that the Vietnamese Government will make its own military planning consistent with SEATO planning and we should like to see Viet-Nam participate as much as possible in military planning for the defense of the SEATO Treaty area.

However, admission of Vietnamese officers to SEATO council meetings could not be decided on unilaterally by the United States but would have to be agreed to by the other SEATO members. The present attitudes of certain of these members make it clear that they would not agree to the admission of Vietnamese observers. Some of these members would regard admission of Vietnamese participants or observers at this time as inconsistent with the Vietnamese Government’s declaration of April 6, 1956. The International Commission for Control and Supervision of the Armistice in Viet-Nam would very likely regard such participation as violating Article 19 of the Geneva Agreement and as casting doubt on the sincerity of our denials of the existence of any Vietnamese-American military alliance. In its April 6, 1956 declaration² the Government of Viet-Nam said it did not see the necessity of joining any military alliance and that it would continue to extend effective cooperation to the International Commission.

President Diem recently told Admiral Stump he was anxious to have Vietnamese officers participate in SEATO military planning or at least sit in meetings as observers. From the military viewpoint Admiral Stump strongly favors bringing Viet-Nam into SEATO as much as is politically possible. While we favor the maximum possible Vietnamese participation in SEATO as soon as possible the advantages resulting from such participation at the present time would be far outweighed by the disadvantages resulting from the clearly predictable unfavorable reaction by friendly member nations of the Geneva Conference and of the International Commission.

Meanwhile we do see the possibility of early extension to Viet-Nam of any non-military aspects of SEATO that may be developed.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 837. Secret. Prepared for the use of the U.S. Delegation at the Canberra SEATO Council Meeting; attached to a covering note by Burns.
2. See vol. I, p. 668.